


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CSIS REPORT

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CONFERENCE REPORT
ON
THE FUTURE OF MARITIME STRATEGY
(April 1, 1980)
AND
GEOPOLITICS AND MARITIME POWER
(September 17, 18, 1980)

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THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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I. INTRODUCTION

This report contains the findings from two conferences held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one on April 1, 1980 on "The Future of Maritime Power," and the other on September 17, 1980 on "Geopolitics and Maritime Power." There is some inevitable overlap between the findings of the two conferences, but the proceedings of each have been reported on separately..

II. THE FUTURE OF MARITIME STRATEGY

On April 1, 1980 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) held a conference on "The Future of Maritime Power." Bradford Dismukes of the Center for Naval Analysis began the conference with a paper on the "Expected Demand for the U.S. Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy." Dismukes' essay was offered as a common departing point for discussion about the role of U.S. naval power and its costs and risks in foreign policy formulation. His central concern was the Afro-Asian Third World instead of the NATO central front, and the observations in the paper were based on the assumption that the United States would seek to maintain at least strategic parity with the Soviet Union.

Dismukes analyzed the reasons he thought the Navy would continue to serve as a prime instrument of American foreign policy. He pointed out first that the Navy's role would depend on two factors:

- the degree to which the United States wants to influence, change, or stabilize the status quo, and
- the degree to which the Navy is perceived as being an appropriate and effective foreign policy lever for these purposes.

There are many areas in which the United States will want to influence change and maintain stability. In areas of vital interest to the United States, including Western Europe, Japan, and the Western Hemisphere, military might will be maintained to deter war with the Soviet Union and the effectiveness of U.S. ground forces in Eurasia is largely dependent upon the strength of the alliance's naval power. A strong Navy helps dissuade fear among our NATO allies.

In the rest of the world, the United States will continue its efforts to shape political outcomes, depending upon:

- the degree of order or disorder in the international system. According to Dismukes, the level of disorder is almost certain to increase in the foreseeable future. The non-aligned countries involved in the North-South conflict are apt to view the United States in an increasingly unfriendly light. This deteriorating political situation makes it probable that military force will continue to be regarded as an important policy instrument by U.S. leaders.
- the calculation of threats to U.S. interests. The Persian Gulf, specifically, is likely to continue to be regarded as crucial to U.S. interests. Additionally, sub-saharan Africa, with its vast mineral reserves, is important economically to the United States, though this area is unlikely to be considered as "crucial". Finally, America will continue to consider the Caribbean a vital area of interest.
- The degree of Soviet activism. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union will continue to use military-political pressure to pursue the goals of its foreign policy. The Persian Gulf is likely to become the first area outside of Europe that both the United States and the USSR will see as vital, especially if the Soviet Union becomes a net oil importer in the near future. Regardless of the degree of Soviet interest in Gulf oil, however, the level of Soviet activism in the Third World is not likely to suddenly decrease. Therefore, the United States will have a continued interest in affecting Soviet cost/benefit analyses for further activism in this area.
- U.S. perceptions of threats to the use of seabeds and the safe passage of ships on the open seas. Freedom of the seas cannot be taken for granted. There is a definite threat of terrorist attacks on maritime commodities, ports, and petroleum loading terminals. Protecting the seabeds will be increasingly important as the demand for raw materials rises, and technology enhances the exploitation of these resources.

Given these considerations, the Navy will continue to play an important role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in light of its ability to contribute to coercive diplomacy. In general, coercive diplomacy is a foreign policy option that wins time to consider and implement other foreign policy choices;

it also produces direct results. The projection of military force into a turbulent region signals to the appropriate parties U.S. interest in local political issues. The threat implied by a military presence has an important impact on decisionmaking by foreign leaders.

The Navy is particularly useful for coercive diplomacy because naval power can be projected on a global basis. It can be quickly redirected to keep pace with rapidly evolving events. And naval power, specifically Marine ground forces, have been invaluable in capturing strategically crucial objectives in times of threat or intervention abroad. These considerations will likely enhance the role of the Navy in the Persian Gulf region.

Finally, the Navy will prove vitally important to the United States to counter the thrusts of Soviet coercive diplomacy. In such an event, it will be desirable for the United States to mount a counterdeployment to set the bounds of Soviet actions and affect perceptions in the world community as to who the dominant arbiters in the situation are.

Given the background of continued Third World instability and Soviet activism, demands on the Navy as a foreign policy lever should remain strong. However, there is an important caveat: naval diplomacy should not be required to perform tasks for which it is ill-suited. For example, the Navy is not designed to counter terrorism. Also, many nations are not particularly susceptible to coercion. Furthermore, the Navy should not be used as a substitute for other long range

policy options and it cannot be used to salvage for more than a short period of time the shortcomings of other policy instruments.

But these provisos do not mean that the Navy's role will decrease. On the contrary, it will remain an essential requirement for an effective U.S. foreign policy and naval forces deserve augmentation in the future.

Professor Michael MccGwire of Brookings Institution followed Bradford Dismukes' paper with an examination of "The Soviet Demand for Naval Force as an instrument of Foreign policy." The purpose of MccGwire's paper was to consider the future role of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of Soviet overseas policy in peacetime. It started with a summary review of the Soviet Union's wartime requirements and the type of navy this will produce in the next 10 - 15 years. It then considered the role of military force in Soviet overseas policy and the part which the navy can play.

Wartime Naval Requirements

The Soviet SSBN force has three overlapping roles:

- Intercontinental strike against targets in North America.
- Continental strike against targets on the Eurasian land mass.
- Preservation as a national strategic reserve.

The major wartime requirement for each of these roles is that the SSBN force be kept secure from attack until it is needed to fire its weapons. Formerly, ship design focused on the capability to weather a preemptive attack just long enough to discharge their primary mission. This assumed a brutal

but short war. But later it was assumed that the war might be long and the requirement became to secure the safety of the SSBN force for its entire duration. Thus, ships programmed for delivery in 1980 were scaled-up one type-size.

Also, in the late sixties it became apparent that the traditional Soviet ASW system could not be successful against the Polaris. This, in conjunction with the policy of defended bastions, brought about a shift from ASW capabilities in potential missile-launch areas (eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea) to strengthen the ASW defenses of the northern and Pacific fleet areas. This shift occurred shortly after the doctrinal acknowledgement that a world war could be protracted and combined with it to change the criteria for surface ship design.

In 1971/1972 Admiral Gorshkov went public with the navy's case that it still had insufficient forces to prevail against the United States and would need capabilities comparable with the U.S. Navy, including an effective sea based airforce. This brought about the construction of a second large destroyer class with the authority to design a large air-superiority carrier. These forces are intended to provide the navy with the capability to gain and maintain command of the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and the Sea of Okhotsk and its approaches. The new surface ship programs represent an increase in both the number of ocean-going warships delivered each year and in the size of the various ship types. Every three years the Soviet navy will acquire a powerful new battle group comprised

of a heavily armed battle cruiser (over 20,000 tons), three cruisers (12,000 tons), and about ten large destroyers (8,000 tons). The number of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines should stabilize at about 100 by the end of 1992; the diesel force at about 75 in the mid-nineties (although the Soviets could easily boost production).

The possibility of war with the West and the concept of SSBN bastions tend to concentrate Soviet naval forces in the northern and Pacific fleet areas. However, the possibility of war with China draws the navy in a more outwardly direction because we assume that in case of war the Far Eastern front would be supplied by sea.

The significance of these developments is that for the first time the Soviet Union's wartime requirements for naval forces will generate a surface fleet with the genuine capability for world-wide peacetime employment. Over the next 15-20 years, we will see a fundamental change in the shape and structure of the Soviet navy as it moves from being a task-specific force to one with a general-purpose capability. As this occurs, the Soviets will progressively develop the capability to secure the use of the seas for their own purposes rather than simply being able to prevent its use by others. Significantly, the navy's political clout within the Soviet military establishment has clearly increased since 1974 as the concept of seapower has for the first time been accepted within the mainstream of Soviet analytic discourse.

Soviet Overseas Interests in the Third World

The vast resources of the Soviet Union make it mainly self-sufficient, except for grain and fish products and some scattered raw materials (tin, fluorspar, bauxite, alumina, tungsten, barite, and natural rubber). The problem is not with the level of reserves, but with their exploitation (particularly evident in the case of oil). Thus, Soviet difficulties derive from the fact that it is unable to earn enough hard currency to pay for important imports (oil, grain, key equipment, and technology). Furthermore, some important imports depend on Western goodwill.

Strategic, Wartime. - Of foremost interest in wartime is the requirement to be favorably placed in the event of war with China or with the West. For the Chinese contingency the Soviet Union needs facilities that will enable it to secure sea lines of communication between western Russia and the Far Eastern front to launch diversionary attacks on China. For world war with the West, the most immediate need stems from the nature of nuclear missile war, which requires the discharge of a range of tasks in distant sea areas at the very onset of war. In addition, the Soviet definition of world war as a fight to the finish means that combat endurance will depend on prepositioned stockpiles and the availability of support facilities throughout the globe. Thus, establishing a strategic infrastructure (physical, political, and operational) including the existence of the physical facilities is required to gain access to distant areas and sustain wartime operations there (control is not essential).

Peacetime. - Peacetime interests require rapid access to distant parts of the world in order to bring support to a client state or faction, exploit an unforeseen opportunity, or to reassert control. Wartime and peacetime requirements are mutually supportive. Although the level of commitment involved in providing the war-related strategic infrastructure is relatively high, the Soviet Union appears to be prepared to accept significant political and economic costs to establish it.

Political. - Soviet political interests stem from traditional national aspirations, systemic competition with the West, and competition with China for leadership of the world Communist movement. The methods of Soviet influence building include: (1) economic support (trade, aid, and investment), (2) political and military support (from diplomacy to direct military involvement), (3) ideological "guidance" (mass propaganda or education programs for elites), and (4) propaganda (about the high Soviet standard of living, Soviet military power and advanced technology, or the ability of the Soviet Union to shape events).

The targets of such instruments divide into three main groups: (1) Communist governments in power, (2) opposition groups and "liberation" movements, and (3) China and the West.

The Balance of Interests. - Inevitably, several of the Soviet Union's individual interests come into conflict, raising questions of which take priority. One conflict is between support of national liberation movements, East/West detente, competition

with China, and the concern for the domestic Soviet economy. Individual policies will most likely be dictated by the particular circumstances of each case, including the extent of Soviet involvement. Another area of conflict exists between the more assertive aspects of influence building such as the support of client states and the concern about avoiding major war, while maintaining the posture to fight and win one if necessary.

Military Intervention Overseas

First, we should note that there are a wide range of other instruments available to the Soviet Union, including diplomatic, political, economic, cultural, subversive, and proxy military involvement.

Soviet policy concerning the role of military intervention is still evolving and has been shaped by their view of the international system -- a view which differs significantly from that of the West. The Soviet belief in a dynamic process of change towards a predetermined end leads to a policy of opportunistic exploitation while relying on the inevitability of their eventual triumph. The West's notions of normalcy (stability, disrupted by undesirable revolutionary forces) prompts us to take a series of rearguard actions, resulting in a generally more active overseas policy. There is also a contrast in U.S. and Soviet views on the relationship between military power and the use of force. The Soviets, traditionally in the inferior position, find it hard to imagine having too much military power. In addition, since 1945, the Soviets

have used military force relatively infrequently and then mainly in their immediate national security zone. For the United States military power more closely equated with the ability to project usable force overseas. As a corollary, the Soviet Union attaches relatively high value to Third World opinion, whereas the West focuses more on tangible factors (access to raw materials and key strategic areas).

Since 1961 several trends have combined to favor a more active overseas policy for the Soviet Union: (1) new U.S. emphasis on supportive intervention, as in Vietnam, (2) growing Sino-Soviet competition, (3) the end of the colonial era, (4) the maturation of Soviet policy toward the Third World, (5) the emergence of Soviet capability to project force overseas, and (6) a renewed emphasis within the Soviet military on contingency planning for a world war. With these factors as background, Soviet ideas about a more assertive use of force were shaped by several key developments between 1967 and 1972, including: the achievement of strategic parity, increased Soviet self-confidence, and a series of events which led them to downgrade the danger that confrontation with the West would escalate to nuclear war (the Czech crisis in 1968, the 1967 Arab/Israeli war, the Jordanian crisis in 1970, and the SALT negotiation process).

These changes in conditions have fostered a steady increase in the Soviet capability to deliver prompt military support over large distances. As their capabilities have grown, the Soviets have shown themselves to be politically

adept in the way they use the supply of arms to "capture" a Third World state in time of need, and their military intervention overseas has always been supportive, in direct contrast to Soviet policy within their immediate national security zone. But, it is still too early to assess the long term political utility of the Soviet Union's military interventions overseas.

The Navy as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy

There are four objectives for which the Soviet navy is employed in peacetime, each involving a different level of risk and a different degree of political commitment. They are: (1) protecting Soviet lives and property, (2) increasing Soviet prestige and influence, (3) countering imperialist aggression (although there is no evidence of Soviet readiness to actually engage the West's naval forces in order to prevent intervention against a Soviet client state), and (4) establishing the strategic infrastructure to support war-related missions.

The Soviet Union's use of its naval instrument evolved incrementally as a by-product of their navy's shift to forward deployment patterns to counter the threat from the West's strategic delivery systems. But now the Soviet navy is becoming more involved in providing logistic support both before and during third party conflicts. The Soviets appear to be following a policy of incrementalism, taking advantage of opportunities as they occur, probing Western responses, and establishing precedents for the future. But important distinctions still remain between the employment of Soviet

warships to ensure the safe arrival of logistic support and their employment to prevent Western intervention against a client state. And although the Soviets have shown a willingness to risk hostilities with a third-party state, they continue to be reluctant to engage U.S. naval forces.

Future Requirements for Soviet Use of the Seas

Securing Use for the Transport of Goods and People - For securing the seas for maritime trade and the movement of military cargoes in merchant ships, the threat from China is primarily submarine; from third party states, missile patrol craft; and from the United States it is most likely to take the form of a blockade by surface ships and mines.

Securing Use of the Projection of Force Ashore - This category includes both the display of latent force and the actual application of force ashore. The capability to display latent force is a by-product of other naval requirements and it is unlikely that the Soviets see a requirement for the projection of coercive force ashore.

Preventing Use for the Conveyance of Goods and People - The two superpowers have treated the supply of client states as sanctuary, with the exception of the Cuban blockade and the mining of Hanoi. It is likely that the Soviet Union will continue to respect this convention.

Preventing Use for the Projection of Force - There is no indication of actual Soviet willingness to engage U.S. forces in the event that these were used against one of their clients. With the development of more powerful general purpose forces

in the future, this becomes possible, but again, policy and requirements will develop incrementally.

Geoffrey Kemp of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy discussed both papers and sketched what he thought the environmental and geopolitical trends of the future would be, contending that such trends are likely to influence U.S. and Soviet naval requirements.

He argued that the Soviet Union has some inherent advantages because of its vast natural resources and land area. Their problem is access to the sea. Economic trends, i.e., fish shortage, and the possibility of limited oil resources in the foreseeable future, will increase the pressure on the Soviets to push toward the sea.

Joint U.S. - Soviet concerns were then discussed. Kemp mentioned that the buildup of local maritime forces may one day signal the power of former clients to inflict injury upon the superpowers. He also listed the common U.S.- Soviet interest in creating certain pollution free zones, military free zones, and economically safe zones. Despite these common interests, however, he felt the strong likelihood of increased military conflict remains.

Kemp stressed the fact that land access is critical to the balance of maritime power; that sea control really begins on land. Britain's control of the sealanes in the 19th century was dependent of its control of the infrastructure on shore. Gorshkov refers to this in his writings. Thus, Kemp felt, future U.S. and Soviet naval requirements will be

influenced by the changing situation on land. Afghanistan is important to the naval balance because the Soviet presence there allows Russian air power to reach the northwestern quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Any future changes of this sort would drastically tilt the strategic balance in this area of the world. The bottom line is that changes in the balance of power on land will be the key to understanding the requirements of maritime power in the years ahead. A discussion on these and other points followed.

Discussion of the Rapid Deployment Force

The second half of the "Future of Maritime Power" conference opened with a discussion of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) concept. Professor Francis West of the Naval War College presented a paper on "Limited U.S.-Soviet Conflict and the Rapid Deployment Force." He looked at the strategy, force structure, and the actual combat capabilities of the RDF to determine if it was "a paper tiger or a flesh and blood animal."

In discussing strategy, West compared President Carter's defense policy to the past security measures and concerns of the defense community. Carter had reversed decades of American policy that dictated placement of conventional forces to meet global contingencies and replaced it with an increased concern for forces on NATO's central front, over admonitions from the defense sector. Then, in response to worldwide Soviet military moves, Carter had redesigned existing military units, added \$2.5 billion for civilian MPS and \$6.6 billion for a CX aircraft, and dubbed the changes the Rapid Deployment Force.

West stated that the Carter administration implicitly judged our forces capable of meeting the "one and a half war" requirement (a full-scale U.S.-Soviet war along the central front as well as a smaller war somewhere else). West felt skeptical about our abilities in regard to the "half war". For one thing, American military muscle had declined relative to increased Soviet military outlays over the past decade. In addition, based on Carter defense estimates, the RDF would be essentially the same fighting force in 1985 that it is today.

Professor West then analyzed four conceptual foundations of Carter's version of the RDF. First, the RDF is designed to serve as a peacetime deterrent to potential enemies, also reassuring our Persian Gulf allies. Unfortunately, our allies in the Gulf region do not desire such a presence.

Second, the RDF should deter Soviet action in times of heightened tension, by virtue of its enhanced mobility capabilities.

Third, if the Soviets do not turn back, the RDF should serve as a trigger for military escalation. Professor West pointed out that leaving the door open to escalation is not the same thing as inviting escalation.

Finally, if none of these risks forces Soviet retreat, the RDF must have the capacity to be an effective and unsuccessful fighting force.

In West's view, these strategic principles fall short, given Carter administration planning, of the desired goal of

arresting Soviet advances. West identifies several problems, among them: the remoteness of the United States as opposed to Soviet proximity to the Gulf; an over-emphasis on air-lifted military personnel and armament; the need to re-in-vigorate U.S. naval power if the RDF is to be effective; and the lack of emphasis on our leverage points against the Soviets.

The three issues that West feels should be discussed in conjunction with the actual employment of the RDF are:

(1) how to keep a conflict limited; (2) how to utilize U.S. strategic advantages against the Soviets, and (3) how to conclude a military confrontation. The conclusion he reaches is that the United States must redefine its global military priorities, shore up its weaknesses and identify the Achilles heels of the Soviets.

As for force structure, West argues that a major problem of Carter's RDF is that it is designed more to meet the type of problems encountered in the 1958 Lebanon operation, without being adequately able to confront the challenge of the 1980s. Without sizeable injections of military programming and a reinvigorated defense budget, West feels the ill-ridden RDF can hardly survive.

Professor West then examined five guidelines he felt should guide the development of a redesigned RDF. First, the Soviets will attempt to cut off airlanding facilities for the employment of the RDF. Second, "...carrier aircraft will provide the main surveillance/intelligence/EW/reconnaissance

as well as interdiction/close airsupport for the RDF." Third, the Navy could strengthen its strategic superiority to counter-balance Soviet landing capabilities. Fourth, the RDF must be prepared to face combat in Southwest Asia by using increased land power. Finally, the strongest deterrent to Soviet misdeeds rests in a determination to seriously increase our military outlays and to reject weak-kneed foreign policy options.

West then asked: How do we rank the RDF among our military priorities? He suggested we not consider it the centerpiece of our military expenditures. Cold budget choices must be weighed. We must balance the Central Front investments against the following items:

- the reduction of our growing ICBM vulnerability and the enhancement of a secure U.S. strategic counterforce capability
- a secure theater nuclear counterforce capability
- an antisatellite program
- a response to the Soviet chemical program
- a second-hand fleet, with cruise missiles, for the Indian Ocean
- an anti-armor system for the RDF, and
- forward bases for the RDF.

In conclusion, West said, future foreign policy considerations should begin by recognizing the problems of past experience. Future options must be carefully considered, for there is nothing to be gained by hasty and improper expenditures.

Dr. Jeffrey Record, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, then presented a paper entitled "Some Thoughts on the Rapid Deployment Force."

Record said he had no doubts that the United States needs a rapidly deployable military force. However, he felt the final form of the RDF deserved careful scrutiny. Its development must be weighed in light of Soviet advances in the Middle East and Horn of Africa, and Soviet military buildups.

The central strategic problem for the United States in the Persian Gulf is the vast expanse between our economic interests and our military capabilities. Historically, Record suggests, such a disparity invites Soviet adventurism. To meet this problem, Record suggests that the RDF should be developed within the following framework: "(1) an expansion of the size of the U.S. surface navy; (2) alterations in its traditional deployment patterns; (3) the establishment of a new base structure in the region capable of sustaining prolonged intervention; (4) a sizeable increase in strategic airlift and sealift capabilities; and (5) the creation of a new command organization capable of identifying and orchestrating the inevitably disparate components of any major intervention force."

Although the Carter administration sought to include each of these elements in the fiscal 1981 defense budget, there are important considerations that need to be addressed before the RDF takes on its final form.

First, the injection of military power into the Middle East will fail in the absence of supportive and militarily capable allies in the region. According to Record, our "friends" in the region could hardly be referred to as politically trustworthy or militarily competent.

Additionally, Record suggests that the primary source of unrest in the region is not external aggression, but internal turmoil. And, the presence of American military fixtures in any Middle Eastern country could well lead to a degeneration of that country's stability. This instability could ultimately prevent the United States from attaining permanent bases.

Furthermore, the Carter RDF may not be optimally designed. The desire to speed heavy forces into the area, or even lightly armed advance Marine forces could do more harm than good. Speed is not the answer. The solution rests in combining "...the strategic mobility of light infantry and the tactical agility and firepower of heavy ground forces."

Finally, what to do about the NATO allies and Japan? It is highly unlikely that they will, or are capable of lending more than token forces to an enhanced Western presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. However, we should demand that NATO and Japan share a greater burden of the expenses necessary for their own defenses.

A wide ranging discussion on the Rapid Deployment Force idea of the Carter administration followed. Generally, the discussion was quite pessimistic about the RDF's potential effectiveness as a solution to the Middle East crisis and about its ability to counter the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. Criticism ranged from the concept itself, i.e., what was its precise purpose, to such matters as the size, logistics, and command structure. One of the participants, Paul Nitze, referred to the concept as the administration's version of the "Free

Lunch". He said that we need not only an RDF, we also need to rebuild our strategic nuclear forces, our naval forces, and our logistics capabilities and we are a long way from achieving these goals.

A discussion of command structure followed and it was pointed out there was a tendency each time a crisis surfaced to create a new command. This happened when the Soviet brigade was discovered in Cuba and this was now our immediate approach to the Persian Gulf crisis. Many thought that the Carter approach to the RDF was too cosmetic to be perceived as serious by our friends, allies, and the Soviets and their clients. Former National Security Advisor to the President, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, pointed out that even if the RDF concept at present was a hollow shell, as many at the meeting believed, at least it was a step in the right direction. One other point emphasized by Scowcroft was that some participants had been too critical of the NATO priority. Scowcroft argued that while it is possible, as the Carter administration did, to pour money into NATO and say you are achieving much for defense without really getting down to the real problems of force projection, the NATO investment is still defensible.

There was much acceptance of Admiral Hayward's idea that a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would be global, meaning that we must think about the conjunction of a NATO and Middle East war. It was quite reasonable to assume that if the Soviets take action on one front they would try to apply maximum pressure on another.

Robert MacFarlane, of the Senate Armed Services Committee, intervened to say that we should not simply react to the Soviets at the place they challenge us, but rather pressure them at points where they are weakest. General Scowcroft added that in this regard the NATO enhancement may be beneficial. Just as we cannot assume the Soviets will take action in NATO without considering action in another area, it is quite obvious that action of ours in the Middle East area will lead the Soviets to maximize our problems elsewhere. Thus, we cannot say that the emphasis on NATO funding is all lost.

In the past we always maintained stocks of military equipment that could be drawn on in crises. Prepositioned stocks from Europe were used in 1967, much to the chagrin of our allies. Stocks from Europe were also used in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli war. Larger stocks permit greater flexibility. Thus, there was no question that they should be increased.

A discussion of our overall strategy followed. Beginning in 1960 we had a two-and-a-half war strategy, meaning that the United States would have the ability to hold in both NATO and the Far East and still contend with a lesser problem, like the Dominican Republic crisis. This was not really a strategy, but rather a force-sizing yardstick. Later, we moved from the two-and-a-half war strategy to the "swing strategy," largely because of the changed relations between Moscow and Communist China. The swing strategy envisaged holding the NATO area and still being able to deal with one other contingency, for example, a Middle East war or a North Korean attack against South Korea.

This was a one-and-a-half war strategy and it then became the basis for force sizing. If the contingencies exceeded our capabilities, we would then resort to our fundamental strategy based on strategic superiority, i.e., we would escalate to a level of conflict where we could clearly dominate. That brings us to the present crisis in the Middle East. We are no longer superior at the nuclear level and this causes fundamental strategic problems.

Robert MacFarlane raised the question of whether the purpose of the RDF was to fight the Soviets north of the Gulf, or to defuse local conflicts in the Arabian Peninsula so that they would not expand and provide the pretext for Soviet adventurism. Most thought the RDF could credibly handle the latter contingency, but not the former. It was clear, however, that the purpose of the RDF should not be defined too precisely or its credibility and deterrent effect would not be damaged.

There was considerable discussion of the role the European allies might play in offsetting some U.S. military inadequacies in the Gulf. There was some uncertainty about just what role our European allies could actually play. While it was clear that the allies, especially the French, could add to the total number of ships in the area, it was not clear how much more credibility this would give to our presence since U.S. forces represent the most credible military presence. There was talk, however, of having Japan free U.S. resources by convincing them to spend more on defense. Geoffrey Kemp said that he favored help from Europe, if only for political purposes, but he was

very wary about applying this concept to Japan because of the effect this could have on our policy in the Far East where the memory of Japanese aggression in the past represents a major problem for the nations of that area. The Undersecretary of the Navy, Robert Murray, felt that any hope that our allies would pull their full weight was unrealistic. He thought that the RDF was a step in the right direction for meeting some types of contingencies, but not for the purpose of dealing with the Soviet military threat directly.

Professor McC GWIRE discussed the type of threat he felt was not likely in the Persian Gulf. He did not feel it was credible to suggest that we would escalate to a level where we could dominate if the challenge overwhelmed our conventional forces. He thought the most important and realistic goal was to deter political fragmentation, i.e., prevent the deterioration of political stability in the fragile Gulf regimes. He felt the most probable threat was that a local political conflict would evolve into a situation where the Soviets might support one of the antagonists. The RDF could be a useful force if it prevented Soviet exploitation of such conflicts. This type of Soviet threat, he believed was far more likely than a direct attack launched from their borders. He felt the Soviets might be able to engage in indirect political adventurism in the Persian Gulf over the next few years, but they were not likely to become involved in a direct military thrust.

Professor Scott Thompson of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy pointed out that we are forced to rely on allies who

have forces in the region, particularly the French, because we cannot completely redress the situation by ourselves. He cited a study done in conjunction with Admiral Worth Bagley and Dr. Albert Wohlstetter in which they had concluded that if we were required to deter a Soviet attack on the Persian Gulf oil fields, a force of four carriers would be required and that would be prohibitively costly. We have only two carriers there at present.

Mr. Bill Lind said that he felt too often we thought unfavorable events were due to Soviet machinations when actually more often than not they were due to local causes. He did not believe the Soviets had any Schlieffen Plan for the Middle East and felt we attributed too much clarity to their policies in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East where they may be no more clear about the situation than we are. He felt the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was more likely related to Soviet goals in Afghanistan and not to their overall goals for the Persian Gulf region, although the latter was widely assumed to be the case. In Lind's opinion the Soviets had made a bad choice in Afghanistan because now they were faced with humiliation if a client regime on their own border was replaced by a hostile regime. He felt Soviet problems in Afghanistan may deter them from taking actions anywhere else in the region.

In summary, Jeffrey Record felt the RDF must meet three needs: first, rapid strategic response with, secondly, tactically mobile forces that can, third, fight maneuver warfare. Today we only have forces that can get there but cannot win or forces

that cannot get there and win. He felt the rapid deployment force should be configured as a marine force and pointed out that we already have a force that can move by sea -- it is called the Marine Corps. He thought that the present emphasis on air-lift was greatly exaggerated. The Army could also be made to move by sea, but then we would have two Marine Corps. Record felt the Army's problems spring from institutional illness. Its doctrine is a translation of the French manuals of 1940. Its tactics are pre-1916, and the Army is still preparing to fight a war of the past with firepower conquering and infantry occupying. In addition, he felt the officer corps is another part of the problem, because it does not see itself as a war-fighting organization, but rather as a management one.

The current RDF is more a cosmetic organization for demonstration purposes than a war-fighting one. The kind of force described by Dr. Record can be very useful if we keep in mind Prof. West's warnings about dealing with the Soviets along their own geographic perimeter. The RDF must be described in broader terms, not merely as a ground force because we are at a disadvantage in ground warfare. We must think of the RDF in terms of seapower and maritime superiority. We will be more credible and effective if our policy is not just power projection, but also command of the sea. We must make it clear to everyone that if there is a naval war we will win it. This is a far more useful RDF concept for dealing with the Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX 1

CONFERENCE
on
THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES

April 1, 1980

A G E N D A

9:30 - 9:35 - Welcoming Remarks, David M. Abshire, Chairman, CSIS
9:35 - Dr. Cottrell Opens Conference
9:35 - 12:30 - FIRST PANEL SESSION

Chairman: Dr. Ray Cline

*U.S. AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF NAVAL REQUIREMENTS
AS INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY*

Mr. Bradford Dismukes:

*Expected Demand for the U.S. Navy as an Instrument
of Foreign Policy*

Prof. Michael McCwire:

*The Soviet Demand for Naval Forces as an
Instrument of Foreign Policy*

Prof. Geoffrey Kemp:

Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Naval Perceptions

Discussants:

Mr. Richard Burt, Prof. W. Kaufmann, The Hon. Paul Nitze, Dr. Dimitri Simes

Discussion

12:30 - 2:00 - LUNCH

2:00 - 4:30 - SECOND PANEL SESSION

Chairman: Dr. Alvin Cottrell

*U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROJECTION OF FORCE IN THIRD WORLD REGIONS*

Dr. Jeffrey Record:

Some Thoughts on the Rapid Deployment Force

Prof. Francis West:

*"Limited" U.S.-Soviet Conflict and the Rapid
Deployment Force*

Discussants:

Mr. Bill Lind, Mr. John Grace, Mr. Bud McFarlane,
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Mr. John O'Shaughnessy

Discussion

4:30 - ADJOURNMENT - HOSPITALITY



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CONFERENCE on

THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES

April 1, 1980

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Bud McFARLANE	- Senate Armed Services Committee
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APPENDIX 2

EXPECTED DEMAND FOR THE U.S. NAVY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

By

BRADFORD DISMUKES

PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE
ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL
AND MARINE FORCES

APRIL 1, 1980

27 MARCH 1980

EXPECTED DEMAND FOR THE U.S. NAVY TO SERVE
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Bradford Dismukes*

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

Prepared for a Conference on the
Future Role of Naval and Marine Forces:
Political and Environmental Factors Affecting
the Future Projection of Force,
sponsored by the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
1 April 1980

*The views expressed herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Center
for Naval Analyses, the Department of the Navy,
or any other department or agency of the U.S.
Government.

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INTRODUCTION

It is probably fair to say that there is wide agreement that since World War II the U.S. Navy has made valuable contributions to the nation's foreign policy in peacetime. Most analysts agree that in principle the power to threaten violence or act violently from the sea retains utility today. But one finds considerable disagreement about the range of practical contingencies in which U.S. seapower can be usefully employed at acceptable cost and risk. To help provide a common departure point for the conference, this paper will provide: (1) a brief review of a few necessary terms of reference; (2) a discussion of the specifics of how requirements to use the navy in support of policy are likely to arise; (3) an assessment of the factors affecting the navy's utility in a political role, particularly as compared to the other instruments available; and finally (4) a brief summary look into the future.

Terms of Reference

These remarks are meant to apply to the roles of naval general-purpose forces in peacetime over the coming decade. Expected conditions in the international system make it analytically reasonable to define the

term "peacetime" quite broadly. It is meant to encompass all situations short of major war with the USSR. Operations in "peacetime" can range from routine forward deployments, to crisis augmentations of forces, to actions against a nation other than the USSR, and can even include a local conventional exchange between U.S. and Soviet forces in connection with a Third World crisis. In this last respect the category mirrors the definition in Soviet doctrine of a "local war," which, since the mid to late sixties, has allowed for the participation of the superpowers and is fought for limited goals specifically with conventional means.

The main focus of attention will be on the navy's sea control functions, although related questions of the projection of power ashore necessarily will arise.¹ Primary emphasis will be given to the Afro-Asian Third World, away from the epicenter of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. In these peripheral areas the superpowers have found opportunities for maneuver and gain through the employment of military forces

¹Such issues are the major topic of another session of the conference.

because conditions are more fluid than those found in Europe. Moreover, with the exception of the flow of oil from the Middle East, the interests the superpowers have thus far seen at stake, though important, have not been vital. Finally, it will be assumed that the U.S. will maintain strategic forces adequate for at least "equivalence" with the USSR. Such forces are an essential precondition to the effective use of the navy or the other military services in the support of foreign policy.¹

SERVING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Demand for the navy to serve as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy will vary with

- o the extent to which the U.S. actively seeks to influence change, especially in the Third World; and
- o the perception of U.S. authorities of the utility of the navy for this task.

¹Needless to say, if U.S. strategic forces are inadequate by this standard today or become so in the future, the most vigorous steps to acquire needed strategic capabilities would be required. At the same time, the immense destructive power of strategic weapons makes them difficult to employ effectively for political purposes in connection with any but core values.

Analysis has provided a reasonable understanding of the determinants of these factors. Let us examine first, potential U.S. requirements to seek to influence change, then the relevance of naval power to such purposes, and finally the resulting implications for future demand on the navy to provide politico-military services.

The Requirement to Influence Change

Because enduring geopolitical realities require, the U.S. is highly likely to continue to define as vital its interests in the security and independence of Western Europe, Japan, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus the U.S. will remain extremely sensitive to change in those areas and will procure and deploy military forces designed to insure that such changes are not inimical to our interests. The primary objective of these forces is the deterrence of major war with the USSR, for which purpose they will prepare for and demonstrate in peacetime the relevant warfighting capabilities. We should only note here that the ultimate military, and thus political, viability of U.S. forces on the ground in Eurasia is dependent on the perceived effectiveness of the alliance's naval forces. A second major objective of

these forces is to reassure the members of the alliance which, at its core, depends on maritime power for its coherence.

The degree to which the U.S. will seek to influence events in the remainder of the world will vary with: (1) the level of order that generally obtains in the international system; (2) our perception of the magnitude of and threats to our interests in specific regions; (3) the specific level and effects of Soviet activism; and (4) trends in the importance of and threats to the free use of the seas and seabed.

An Orderly or an Anarchic World?

However turbulent the decades since the Second World War, the international system nonetheless has functioned; it has been orderly or at least predictable. Today, however, many signs suggest that disorder, if not the collapse of the working rules of the world economy and security system, may be at hand. The root causes of the trend toward disorder lie in "the intersection of the old East-West conflict with the

new North-South conflict."¹ This global tension is deepened by the cumulative effects of population growth, social instability, and unresolved disputes over national autonomy and national unity.

North-South confrontation is profound; it involves much more than the disruption of important commodity markets; and it almost certainly will endure at least until existing or perhaps as yet unforeseen institutions deal more successfully with the distribution of the world product. The "non-aligned" movement's anti-Western tendencies are likely to focus on the United States, and it is at least an open question whether the next generation of Third World leaders will be as conservative as the current one. There are good reasons to expect that they will become more antagonistic to the North, especially to the U.S., and that the solidarity of the Third World on North-South issues may increase.

In sum, considerable evidence suggests that turbulence in commodity markets and the U.S.-Iranian cri-

¹These words by Guy Pauker are from his "Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s" (RAND, R-20003-AF, November 1977), perhaps the most cogent of recent statements of these problems.

sis of 1979-80 are harbingers of things to come. Even given the skillful implementation by the U.S. of wise political and economic policies, the international economic and security systems are likely to become more disorderly in the coming decade. This condition necessarily makes military power more important among the instruments available to decision-makers.

Regional Assessment of U.S. Interests

Regardless of how U.S. policy ultimately strikes a balance between relatively narrow national interests and larger interests of global order, the U.S. almost certainly will react to disorder in the world in proportion to what it sees at stake in each region.

The Persian Gulf has gained recognition as a vital U.S. economic interest by Presidential fiat. It is likely to continue to hold that position even though additional sources of energy, including petroleum, may well develop before the end of the century. The extent of U.S. interests in the Gulf is magnified by the dependence on that region of our vital allies in Europe and Asia.

A second source of strong "derivative" interests are those arising from our relations with China. The PRC may or may not achieve full superpower status in the next decades, but it will continue to play a crucial role in U.S. relations with the USSR -- as well as with Japan and the emerging ASEAN states. Thus, to the general U.S. interest in the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, we must add some measure of the weight of the interests of China.

The immense mineral wealth of sub-Saharan Africa clearly makes it an important economic stake. However, U.S. economic interests there are unlikely to reach the level of "critical dependence." On the other hand, southern Africa may well experience protracted violence with heavy racial overtones before the end of the century. This, in combination with economic interests, could result in the emergence of a strong U.S. political interest in developments in the region, especially if the process of change is extremely violent and the governments that promise to emerge appear intensely hostile to the U.S.

In the Western Hemisphere, interests are almost certain to remain vital, at least in the Caribbean; however, the emerging powers of South America proper are likely to become more and more capable of securing U.S. interests on the continent against foreseeable external threats. At this time it is difficult to identify specific issues on which the interests of the U.S. and the Latin American states will strongly diverge in the future; however, a prudent planner, mindful of the essentially anti-American positions recently adopted by, say, Mexico or Venezuela, should scarcely rule out that possibility.

In sum, the most likely estimate for U.S. global interests is the continuation of those now seen as vital in the North as well as vital interests, both direct and derivative, in specific regions of the Third World. The dependence of our allies on imported resources will cause other Third World interests to grow in importance, if not become vital. Threats to U.S. interests of local origin will vary; however, the strong consensus among observers in the U.S. and abroad is that domestic and international instability are quite likely to remain endemic to Africa, the northern shore of the Indian Ocean, and the Carib-

bean. Because of pervasive if not growing anti-American sentiments, to a considerable degree this instability is likely to embroil the U.S.

Soviet Activism

Long before the Afghan invasion, there was ample evidence that the actions of the USSR would also impel U.S. decisionmakers to seek to shape events in the Third World. There has been little question that the Soviets have intended an activist policy and have relied heavily on politico-military means. They already possess considerable military wherewithal for the purpose and can draw on more than the twelve years' experience in politico-military operations in non-contiguous areas. Their capabilities to project military power into regions bordering on the USSR are obviously massive; capabilities to operate in more remote areas are quite obviously growing.

Soviet activism will be seen as producing threats to U.S. interests, although in areas which the U.S. credibly defines as vital, any direct Soviet challenge is likely to be tentative -- with one crucial exception: if the USSR and its allies become major oil importers, their stake in the leading exporting

regions like the Persian Gulf will necessarily rise sharply; for the first time the U.S. and USSR may have conflicting interests outside Europe that each deems vital. Even the emergence of a perceived trend in this direction would produce the gravest foreseeable threat to the cohesion and security of the Western alliance and could result in the restructuring of the entire U.S. deployment posture.

Regardless of developments in Soviet energy policy, U.S. decisionmakers are quite likely to perceive a second incentive for U.S. action: the linkage between Soviet behavior in the Third World and relations with the USSR on central issues like strategic arms limitations. The capacity of the U.S. to discipline the Soviet Union on the periphery will be seen as a necessary precondition for detente, for efforts to further stabilize U.S.-Soviet competition over central issues, and as an important determinant of U.S. credibility as a superpower patron, both on the periphery and at the center. Most fundamentally, the U.S. will retain a strong interest in ensuring that current and future leaders of the USSR do not develop an excessive notion of their latitude for ac-

tion in the world under conditions of acceptable risk.

Use of the Sea and Seabed

A final set of interests, producing requirements for the U.S. to seek to manage global change, arises from the growing importance of using the sea and the seabed. Current trends in world merchant shipping suggest a steady increase in total tonnage through 1990, with the Soviet Union and China among the leaders in planned ship acquisitions. Future growth in world trade is obviously dependent on the relatively free movement of this shipping. The unhindered movement of the world tanker fleet is by definition a vital interest of the Western alliance.

Yet, freedom of the seas, however much in the apparent interests of all nations, cannot be lightly assumed. The seaward encroachment of national jurisdictions is already a recognized threat to the world fishing industry and to commercial as well as military navigation and air transit rights. Interruption of maritime transit occurs more frequently than is commonly recognized. Roughly one naval blockade has been mounted somewhere in the world in every year

since 1971.¹ The greatest immediate threat to the maritime movement of commodities comes from "terrorist" attacks especially on ports, petroleum loading terminals, and on ships passing through restricted waters. Less likely, though scarcely to be ruled out in the future, are attacks on ships on the high seas.

The exploitation of the continental shelf and deep seabeds will accelerate with advances in production technology and the rise in world demand for raw materials. Offshore petroleum will be critical to China's development and perhaps to world oil prices. Disputes over the boundaries of economic zones are common. Disagreement over the regime which is to manage deep seabed economic ventures has already provided a telling example of Third World demands for a "new economic order." Today, it is not possible to forecast the degree of violence that will issue from sea and seabed issues, but the classic ingredients for protracted conflict are clearly present.

¹At the same time, blockades have been a favored tool of international organizations when considering the invocation of sanctions against wrongdoers. Almost by necessity forces for such actions must come from navies of the major maritime powers.

A serious breakdown in the international order, should it occur, is almost certainly to involve maritime issues if only because of the physical vulnerability of what is at stake (e.g., merchant shipping, fishing fleets, or ports and offshore economic assets) and the crucial role of international law in their security. At the same time, a general diminution in world order will itself impel the U.S. to speed up exploitation of the seabed in pursuit of national self-sufficiency.

Utility of Naval Forces

U.S. authorities will call on a variety of policy instruments to deal with these changes, among them naval power. Because its use as a coercive tool always involves special elements of cost and risk, decision-makers must be reasonably confident that it can make a net positive contribution in ways other instruments cannot match. Because it shares a number of attributes with ground and land-based air forces, a secondary question is whether there are significant circumstances where naval capabilities are of unique value. To arrive at some informed conjecture about the way U.S. decisionmakers are likely to view the relevance of naval forces over the next decade, let

us take up in sequence the peculiar characteristics of coercive diplomacy, the special nature of its naval variant, and finally the complications introduced into our practice of coercive naval diplomacy by the assignment to the Soviet military, primarily the Soviet Navy, of similar tasks.

Coercive Diplomacy

The nation calls on its military forces to support foreign policy because of their capacity to threaten violence or act violently.¹ These capacities tend to have direct effects on the sovereignty of nations in ways which other policy instruments do not. Moreover, independent of U.S. policies, other states can and do resort to military action. When this nation chooses to respond, it is rarely possible to do so effectively unless the response includes an, often predominant, answer in kind.

In contrast to other forms of diplomacy -- for example, trade policy or development assistance programs

¹This capacity can be used to support allies as well as coerce opponents and for a wide range of combinations of both, all of which are ultimately minatory.

-- the military instrument tends to produce its direct effects more quickly, or, quite commonly, to win time for other policy instruments to take effect. Given U.S. long-term objectives, other instruments of policy in the aggregate are almost certainly more useful than the military, but in some important situations there are no substitutes for it. The decision to use it, however, should be taken with the following caveat in mind: As with all instruments of diplomacy, success is never guaranteed in the exercise of the military instrument, on whatever scale. Prudence commands the careful evaluation of the relevance of coercive diplomacy to the context and the objectives sought, as well as the skillful orchestration of the military-political and other instruments of policy, and, scarcely last, a national consensus that supports its use.

Critical to the determination of the relevance of coercive diplomacy in each situation that may arise in the future is an understanding of the mechanisms through which it appears to have its effects.

The range of ways U.S. military forces can be used varies widely. In some circumstances decisive mili-

military action (for example, disarming an opponent or seizing control of an objective) may be the only option open to the nation. In the future, particularly if the U.S. faces a nuclear-armed, Third World opponent, this mode of action may arise more frequently. To date, however, military power has been commonly employed as a politico-military, rather than a purely military, tool. In these cases its use can be symbolic or direct, or a combination of both.

The principal symbolic uses of military forces involve the periodic injection or the maintenance of their presence in an area of interest -- on a scale sufficient to command serious attention by regional leaders. For example, the forward deployment of the Soviet Navy in the mid- and late-1960s is now seen as an early manifestation of Soviet assertiveness in the Third World, even though the Soviets by that time had been using other instruments of policy there for over a decade. In fact, the persistent presence of the Soviet Navy endowed Soviet interests in the areas of

its deployment with a "legitimacy" that they had earlier lacked.¹

Augmenting deployed forces or increasing their readiness are among the most eloquent forms of symbolic action available to the statesman. Such stimuli have a demonstrated capacity to seize and hold the attention of decisionmakers, to signal to them the intensity of U.S. concern, and to underline the exercise of other forms of national power.

When employed directly, the politico-military instrument also seeks to affect the calculations of statesmen by presenting the credible threat of military action if circumstances require. Where it is feasible and where our interests warrant, massive forces may be marshalled to immobilize the target by threatening irresistible and decisive action. Far more often, however, the goals sought do not warrant such efforts and the scale of the threat presented is deliberately moderated, causing the target to estimate for himself the consequences of failing to take U.S. preferences seriously into account, and to comply.

¹Many would argue that Western governments and media made a major contribution to this "endowment."

Naval Diplomacy

The unique attribute of naval as compared to other forms of military power in the diplomatic context is its capacity to be brought to bear on the vast majority of the world's surface at the unilateral discretion of the United States. Moreover, force composition, size, speed of movement, duration of action, and specific operations can be carefully controlled by national authorities to meet changing political requirements. In addition U.S. Marine ground forces, moving by sea, bring capabilities for seizing objectives which have proved especially valuable in threatened or actual intervention ashore. These unique capabilities account for the relatively frequent employment of U.S. naval power for political purposes over the last 35 years.

Although land-based aviation can have a major combat impact, including on the struggle to use the sea, it is difficult to translate this capability into political effectiveness at least in connection with Third World interests, which may be large, but still not vital. If operated from home territory, land-based aviation invites retaliation, with attendant dangers of escalation. If operated from foreign soil, it is

likely to require supporting air defense forces for airfield protection and perhaps while en route from or to the homeland. Moreover, its operation is, to a considerable degree, at the sufferance of the host government whose domestic and international policies receive tacit endorsement, or to whom security guarantees are inevitably extended on a scale that might not otherwise be the case. In short, the political utility of land-based aviation is limited to specialized circumstances.¹ This accounts for its relatively infrequent use by the U.S. in the past.²

¹These factors are believed to account for the absence of strike aircraft from the contingents of Soviet Naval Aviation that have thus far deployed overseas.

²It has been suggested that land-based air forces have been and remain more effective in producing desired political outcomes than sea-based combat aircraft. (Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 108 and p. 530). However, the evidence on which that judgment was based can lead to other conclusions. Stephen S. Walt in "Causal Inferences and the Use of Force: A Critique of Force Without War", CNA Professional Paper 279, pp. 32-33, argues that "in cases where the different types of forces were used by themselves (thereby controlling for possible perturbing or intervening effects when land-based aircraft and sea-based forces were used together), the rate of success is identical (100 percent), and we have more evidence regarding the effectiveness of naval forces."

At the same time, where changing U.S. interests require, there may be no substitute for committing major U.S. forces on the ground -- Air Force, Army, or/and Marine. It is recognized that such a decision is usually one of long-term strategic proportions -- like those that led to the U.S. military posture in Western Europe, the Western Pacific, and, to a lesser degree, Southeast Asia. The nation appears to be on the brink of such a decision in connection with ancillary vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. There is little doubt that such a strategic realignment would have profound and probably irreversible effects on subsequent U.S. policies. Concern with this possibility has added to the hesitancy in deliberations on its implementation, leading at this time to preliminary decisions to improve the overseas infrastructure and prepositioned equipment for naval and marine forces in the relevant theaters and the capacity to deploy forces rapidly from the United States. These latter clearly enhance the credibility of the U.S. position, increasing the weight with which the U.S. presence is felt.

It can be argued, however, that where interests in a region are deemed vital, something beyond a point

d'appui for forces to be deployed rapidly from the U.S. may well be required. Interests important enough to be fought for on a large scale usually imply explicit or tacit alliances, an underlying view of interests and threats shared with "alliance" partners in the region, and, most probably, the permanent forward commitment of U.S. forces on the ground. The existence of a U.S. "rapid deployment" force undoubtedly will have a deterrent value; however, its speed of movement should not be regarded as a substitute for the skillful preparation of the political prerequisites for its effective use in the forward area, nor for the assessment of which interests are truly vital.

Independent of a major new strategic commitment of U.S. military power, naval forces have a demonstrated capacity to support and invigorate U.S. diplomacy. It is difficult to foresee changes that will make the unique attributes of naval forces less relevant in the future. On the contrary, the political obstacles to global airlift and to the deployment of land-based tactical aviation have clearly increased in the last decade and, in an anarchic world, are likely to continue to do so. This phenomenon, which affects both

the deployment speed and staying power of land-based air forces, strongly suggests that sea-based forces are likely to become increasingly dominant as the most reliable means with which to deliver politico-military services in significant regions of the Third World.

Effects of Soviet Coercive Diplomacy

The posture and attitudes of the Soviet Union will be a major influence on U.S. decisionmakers in determining first the desirability, then the scale of employing the navy in a political role. Analysis has demonstrated that: (1) Soviet policy in the Third World relies heavily on politico-military means, and (2) on issues important enough to draw a U.S. military response, we should expect a Soviet counterdeployment or the augmentation of Soviet forces already on the scene.

When the naval forces of both superpowers are present during an international crisis, the experience of well over a decade has repeatedly shown that the U.S. Navy is not then "neutralized." On the contrary, if credible forces are deployed, the latitude for U.S. action and the effectiveness of the actions we take

hinge on which of the superpowers (or their clients) finds itself on the strategic defensive.¹

If the U.S. (or a U.S. client) is on the defensive, the U.S. will enjoy a considerable advantage with respect to the USSR. Assuming the local factors are favorable (for example, that the U.S. has the necessary capabilities to deal with the situation, that, if a client is involved, his survival after the crisis is a reasonable gamble, etc.), then, under conditions of acceptable risk, the U.S. can employ its forces to restore the status quo. If a U.S. client is severely threatened, the U.S. can at a minimum secure its client's core values (for example, prevent his utter defeat and subjugation). In such cases,

¹These generalizations about the factors affecting the impact of the superpowers on Third World crises are drawn from an empirical examination of roughly 30 cases of Soviet coercive diplomacy, 1967-76 (James M. McConnell, "The 'Rules of the Game': A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy," Soviet Naval Diplomacy, Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell (eds.), New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, Chapter 7.) Note that the question of who started the war is not important. The crucial factor in the superpowers' latitude for action and in the effectiveness of the actions taken is the relationship they (and their clients) hold to the status quo. The latter can involve the security of established governments and the principle of free use of the seas as well as the inviolability of international boundaries.

again assuming the U.S. has credible forces on the scene, threats by the USSR, implied or explicit, lack credibility. (Needless to say, the U.S. did not deploy, perhaps did not possess, credible military capabilities in connection with the Afghanistan case.)

Similarly, when the Soviets are on the strategic defensive or, when they provide politico-military support to one of their clients in a similar situation, corresponding threats by the U.S., should they be made, will also have diminished force. Nonetheless, U.S. forces will still have a vital role to play in such cases. If deployed, they can limit the effects of Soviet actions and seek to insure that their impact is confined to defensive ends. Historically, the failure of the U.S. to counterdeploy adequate forces has encouraged the Soviets to take the initiative and has meant that the threats implied by Soviet actions have, to a considerable extent, become open-ended. Changes in the status quo unfavorable to the interests of the U.S. and its allies have then occurred.

To a significant degree, Soviet respect for status quo has been a function of U.S. willingness to ensure

its enforcement through the deployment of military power to the relevant theaters. Soviet power to act in nations contiguous to its borders is, of course, immense. However, Soviet forces as they are currently structured (airborne/airlift team for rapid intervention; naval forces to counter the U.S. Navy and provide security for sealift and airlift), can only operate in areas beyond those they can reach directly over land at the sufferance of the U.S. U.S. sea control capabilities provide considerable opportunity to constrain Soviet politico-military behavior in most of the Third World. This reality is essentially independent of whether the U.S. in each case chooses to invoke "linkage" with larger U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships. Indeed, the evidence suggests that "linkage" is most effective when the U.S. counterdeploys general-purpose military power and least effective when it does not.

Moreover, even Soviet actions confined to the defense of the status quo have resulted in unfavorable changes -- for example, the Soviets acquired a major position in Ethiopia as a result of their support of the status quo in the Horn of Africa. In that case, because the potential U.S. client, Somalia, was in

violation of the status quo until the war's closing days, it was not possible for the U.S. to prevent Soviet politico-military support for Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the absence of a locally perceived U.S. politico-military response to Soviet actions did result in a revised appreciation within the region (and indeed elsewhere) of Soviet effectiveness and, at best, of U.S. disinterest and passivity.

Thus, although risks are never negligible in Third World crises, Soviet involvement does not produce either intolerable risk or stalemate. On the contrary, assuming local (that is, non-Soviet) factors are favorable, when our interests are threatened or where a U.S. client is in trouble, it will usually be both desirable and feasible to deliver politico-military help. When the Soviets or one of their clients are on the strategic defensive, it will usually be feasible and desirable to mount a U.S. counterdeployment to set limits on their actions, to insure that the Soviet efforts do not go beyond the restoration of the status quo. A second objective in such cases is to reduce the likelihood that the Soviets will gain a favorable position as a result, or if they do, that they will be viewed as the dominant arbiters of

events in the region. In either case, a significant demand for the exercise of U.S. military power will exist. For the reasons discussed above, the navy is very likely to remain the primary agent to meet this demand.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The most likely forecast is that the U.S. will maintain a posture of forward defense in Europe and the Western Pacific and will actively seek to influence developments in key regions of the Third World. U.S. authorities are almost certain to employ politico-military means, along with other forms of national power, especially for the latter purpose. Two particularly influential determinants of the means selected by U.S. decisionmakers will be: (1) the unfolding nature of change in critical regions of the Third World -- it is much more likely to be disorderly and violent than peaceful, and an important portion of that violence will focus on the U.S. and U.S. interests; and (2) the policies followed by the USSR -- Soviet activism will continue and the politico-military instrument will be prominently employed. In coming years, should Soviet energy requirements cause the development of a vital Soviet interest in the

Persian Gulf, the U.S. and its allies could confront the gravest potential long-term threat to their security since the Second World War. If so, a strategic realignment of the military power of the industrial democracies may be called for.

Demand for the use of the navy as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy almost certainly will be strong, and prudent planners have sound reasons to anticipate an increase in demand, with the following important proviso: Decisionmakers should take care not to demand more of naval diplomacy than it should reasonably be expected to deliver. In the aggregate, it is ill-suited for most anti-terrorism tasks. For such purposes specialized capabilities must be carefully developed in each of the services. Further, it must be recognized that some national actors on the international scene today are -- perhaps like pre-World War II Japan -- extremely difficult to coerce. Moreover, even with the most skillful tactical employment of naval diplomacy, it should not be viewed as a substitute for other, slower acting, longer-lived policy instruments. Still less should it be regarded as capable of salvaging, on more than a temporary basis, situations that deteriorate because other instruments

have been ineffectively employed or because such situations simply lie beyond the power of the U.S. to control at political or moral costs its citizens have traditionally been willing to bear. The latter will become especially important if the target of U.S. coercive action possesses nuclear weapons. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that in some cases a narrower definition of U.S. interests may become inescapable.

Assuming national decisionmakers remain mindful of these caveats, they are likely to require a significant U.S. naval presence in vital theaters to enhance the seriousness with which U.S. interests are taken into account and the periodic introduction of naval force into other theaters of interest. They will require, in addition, the augmentation of that presence with needed capabilities to support the interests of the U.S. and its clients and to limit the effects of coercive diplomacy when employed by the Soviet Union. Especially when the Soviets are involved, significant increments of U.S. naval power will be required.

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APPENDIX 3

THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR NAVAL FORCES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

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The Soviet Demand for Naval Forces
as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

The purpose of this paper is to consider the future role of the Soviet navy as an instrument of overseas policy in peacetime. It starts with a summary review of the Soviet Union's wartime requirements and the type of navy this will produce in the next 10-15 years. It then turns to consider the role of military force in Soviet overseas policy and the part which the navy can play.

Wartime Naval Requirements

The Soviet doctrine of deterrence through the possession of a war-fighting (and winning) capability, coupled with their definition of war with the West as a fight to the finish between two social systems, imparts a special importance to the SSBN force, which now has three overlapping roles. It can contribute to:

- o Intercontinental strike against targets in North America
- o Continental strike against targets on the Eurasian land mass
- o The national strategic reserve.

Endless permutations of targetting, deployment and timing in these overlapping roles are possible, but they all raise the requirement that Soviet SSBN be kept secure from attack until they are called on to fire their weapons. This requirement could stretch in time from pre-hostility precautionary deployments, through periods of conventional conflict and

war-fighting with nuclear weapons, to subsequent phases where the continued availability of nuclear weapons could be critical to the outcome of the war.

At the end of the sixties, this requirement led the Soviets to adopt the concept of defended bastions, relatively close to their Northern and Pacific fleet bases, where SSBN could be held secure until required. While the most immediate threat lay in the U.S. SSN, the Soviets had to allow that these submarines would be supported by other naval forces, whose task would be to suppress the bastions' ASW defenses.

The potential of sea-based strategic delivery systems as tactical and strategic reserves, which could determine the final outcome of world war, meant that the same importance had to be given to the task of destroying the enemy's systems, as to protecting one's own. Countering the strike carrier was a manageable problem, but from the outset, the Soviets recognized that the complexity of countering Polaris would require the application of all available resources (including the involvement of other branches of service) and they pursued the three available means of attack, namely exclusion, trailing and area search/surveillance.

In 1962, only exclusion lent itself to some form of initial and interim application, the other two lines of attack having to await the outcome of newly initiated R & D. Between 1962 and 1972, we therefore see the progressive extension of the outer defense zones of the four fleet areas, and it was probably hoped that by 1972/73 it would be possible to start consolidating the ASW capability in these zones, posing a sufficient threat to prompt the withdrawal of U.S. SSBN to safer areas.

However, by the late sixties, it must have been apparent that however innovative their application, traditional ASW systems had little prospects of success against Polaris and that an effective solution would have to wait on the results of research and development still in progress. Taken in conjunction with the new requirement to establish defended SSBN bastions, this prompted a shift away from developing a conventional ASW capability in potential missile-launch areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, to strengthening the ASW defenses of the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. This was shortly after the doctrinal acknowledgement that a world war could be protracted, and combined to engender a change in surface ship design criteria.

Formerly, it was accepted that distant water surface units would be unlikely to survive the initial stages of a war. Since the size of the different types was severely constrained, their design focused on the capability to weather a preemptive attack just long enough to discharge their primary mission, a limited objective which was in tune with the prevailing perception that war with the West would be brutal but short. Now, it was assumed that the war might be long drawn out, and the requirement was to secure the safety of the SSBN force for its whole duration. Surface ships had to be capable of sustained operations and needed long endurance, large magazine loads and an underway replenishment capability. This required a significant increase in the size of individual ships. The 9th Five Year Plan (1971) therefore provided that the follow-on surface classes, programmed to begin delivery in 1980, would be scaled-up

one type-size, with a cruiser-sized class of about 12,000 tons, a destroyer-size of about 8000 tons and an ocean escort or frigate-size of about 4000 tons. In addition, the plan authorized a class of heavily armed nuclear-powered battle cruisers, which would serve as Command ships. A similar scaling-up process was applied to amphibious vessels, reflecting the new requirement for a long-range heavy assault lift, suitable for seizing key islands and/or stretches of the Norwegian coast.

Despite these substantial increases, the navy considered that it would still have insufficient forces to discharge the new mission effectively, and Gorshkov went public with the navy's case in his 1972/73 series of articles. Within the context of this particular mission, the argument would have focused on the specifics of the threat to Soviet SSBN. The direct threat would come from U.S. attack submarines, but the latter's success would depend on Soviet ASW defenses being suppressed by supporting surface forces. The Soviet navy would have to assume that U.S. carrier groups would be deployed in support of U.S. SSN, whereas Soviet shore-based air would cease to be available after the initial exchange. Without the air component, there could be no certainty that the Soviets would be able to prevent the carrier groups from penetrating the outer defense zones. It could be assumed that the U.S. carriers would seek to establish command of the surface and the air, denying their use to Soviet ASW forces, that they would harry the defending SSN, and they might even become directly involved in hunting down Soviet SSBN. If the Soviet navy was to prevail against this kind of force, it would need a comparable capability, including effective sea-based air. I presume

it was the inherent plausibility of this scenario which allowed the navy to win its case, resulting in the addition of a second large destroyer class to the existing program (allowing each to be optimized for a different aspect of maritime warfare), and authority to proceed with design of a large air-superiority carrier.

These forces are intended to provide the navy with the capability to gain and maintain command of the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and the Sea of Okhotsk and its approaches. The new surface ship programs represent both an increase in the number of ocean-going warships delivered each year and the size of the various ship types. When looking to the nineties, it is useful to think in terms of four main sizes of non-air-capable surface ship, with the type designator indicating the general role: a battle cruiser-size of over 20,000 tons; a cruiser-size of about 12,000 tons, a destroyer-size of about 8000 tons; and an ocean-escort or frigate-size of about 4000 tons. I assume that the battle-cruiser and cruiser-sizes will have a general purpose capability and that only one class of each will be built at the same time, whereas there will be at least two classes of destroyer-size ship building, each optimized for different aspects of maritime warfare. The destroyer-sized ships will be able to operate as fleet escorts, whereas the frigate-sized will lack the long range anti-air and -surface systems required for such a role. I am not suggesting that this categorization will apply immediately, but this could be the general fleet structure by 1990, at which date the present inventory of anti-submarine and anti-surface ships will be obsolete or obsolescent, except for the Kara and Kresta II classes, both of which

would be treated as destroyer-sized types.

What sort of numbers are we talking about? Counting only those ships which were built or converted after 1957, but using the former categorization of types (where the cruiser-size is around the 8000 ton mark), at the beginning of 1980 the Soviets had about 27 cruiser-size ships (Kynda, Kresta, Kara), about 60 destroyer-size ships (including Krivak) and about 100 escort-size units. They also had two modified Sverdlov command cruisers and four air capable ships (2 Moskva and 2 Kiev). By 1995, allowing a 25 year life cycle and using the new categorization, we could expect about 15 cruiser-size ships, 65 destroyer-size (including Kara and Kresta II), and 55 frigate-size ships (Krivak and successor). There would also be 5 battlecruiser/command ships and perhaps 7-8 air capable ships, comprising 2 Moskva, 4 Kiev and 1-2 new-type large carriers. To put it another way, every three years the Soviet navy will acquire a powerful new battle group comprising a heavily-armed battle cruiser, 3 cruisers and about 10 large destroyers. The first three or four of these battle groups will rely on a Kiev to provide a modicum of sea-based air support, but thereafter we might expect to see one fully capable air-superiority carrier for every two battle groups.

On the submarine side, U.S. statements indicate that nuclear construction has dropped from ten to seven units a year, and that missile tubes are being removed from Yankees. This suggests that SSBN production is now running at three a year, and in measure as Deltas join the fleet, Yankees are being converted to SSN. This means that seven attack units

will now join the force each year, compared to about four a year during the previous decade. Assuming that the overall production of nuclear hulls remains at seven a year, this will boost the attack submarine force to about 135 nuclear-powered units by the end of 1987, reducing thereafter to stabilize at about 100 units by the end of 1992. The future of the diesel submarine force is much less clear. If current building rates continue, the force could dwindle to about 95 by the end of 1987, stabilizing at about 75 in the mid-nineties. It would, however, be prudent to assume a substantially larger number since the Soviets have the experience of higher force levels, they have spare building capacity and they could easily boost production in the years ahead.

The possibility of war with the West and the concept of SSBN bastions tends to concentrate Soviet naval forces in the inner and outer defense zones of the Northern and Pacific fleet areas. It also generates new requirements to seize key islands and stretches of coastline which delimit these areas, to facilitate gaining and maintaining command of the sea. However, the possibility of war with China draws the navy in a more outwardly direction. In the event of such a war, it has to be assumed that the Trans-Siberian railway would be cut and that the Far Eastern Front would be supplied by sea. Developments during 1969 increased the possibility of such a war and introduced the requirement to protect the shipment of military supplies from the Chinese navy, which includes the third largest submarine force in the world. This threat to shipping reached back to the north-western parts of the Indian Ocean, where it could be posed by Chinese forces using friendly

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bases (eg. Pakistan or, in those days, South Yemen), by U.S. forces, or even by regional navies. The timely arrival of military supplies would be critical to the land battle in the Far East and, if circumstances prevented their shipment via the Red Sea, the Soviets would have to exploit the route used by the Allies in the two world wars, shipping down across Iran and out through the Persian Gulf.

The Soviets have other naval requirements in that area since, in the event of world war, they most probably plan to move south to control the Gulf area, and naval forces will be needed in the seaward approaches to fend off assaults by U.S. strike carriers and amphibious groups. But the heightened threat of war with China increased the strategic significance of the Arabian Sea, more than compensating for the shift in emphasis away from developing the means to counter Polaris in the area. The ground forces were now involved and the Soviet military investment in Somalia took off after Marshall Grechko's visit in February 1972, indicating that the provision of naval support facilities in the area was no longer a narrowly naval concern, but a matter of national defense requirements.

Within the context of this paper, the significance of these developments in the nature of the Soviet Union's wartime requirements for naval forces, is that for the first time, these requirements will generate a surface fleet with a genuine capability for world-wide employment in peacetime. Over the next 15-20 years we will see a fundamental change in the shape and structure of the Soviet navy as they move from task-specific forces to those with a general-purpose capability, and they will progressively develop the capability to secure the use of the sea for their own

purposes rather than preventing its use by others. There are two other developments of comparable significance. First, the navy's political clout within the Soviet military establishment has clearly increased since 1974 and was still in the ascendency in 1979. Second, in the wake of Gorshkov's book, the concept of seapower has for the first time been accepted within the mainstream of Soviet analytic discourse. Up to now, Soviet theorists have had an ideological aversion to the concept, which they equated with Mahan, capitalism and colonialism. Just as Keynes' "General Theory" legitimized the idea of deficit financing and induced a shift in national economic policies, so may this "scientific formulation" of seapower engender a shift in Soviet perceptions of the navy's role in war and peace.

Soviet Overseas Interests in the Third World

These can usefully be discussed under the headings of economic, strategic and political.

Economic. The Soviet Union has a bias towards autarky and is fortunate in being well endowed with raw materials, although a large proportion of key resources lie in inaccessible and hard-to-exploit parts of the country. Key imports from overseas involved food and a small number of raw materials. The food is of two kinds: grain and fish products. Until recently, it seemed likely that substantial imports of grain would become a regular feature of the Soviet domestic economy, but these would come mainly from Western nations plus two South American states. Fish imports are provided by the Soviet Union's own fishing fleets, with distant water fisheries

representing about 90% of the total Soviet catch. The Soviet fishing industry is supported by powerful bureaucratic interests, but while its officials and fishermen are extremely assertive, the Soviet Union has shown that it is prepared to work within the framework of the evolving law of the sea and to respect the unilateral extension of jurisdiction. Although both grain and fish protein are important in terms of consumer satisfaction and political stability, these imports are not vital. If rallied by a plausible call to national unity, the population could well tighten its belt and either do without or improve its agricultural competence.

The Soviet Union imports certain key raw materials. These include tin and fluorspar (about 25 percent), tungsten, and barite (about 40 percent), natural rubber (? percent), and bauxite and alumina for aluminum production (about 40 percent and rising steadily). Sources of supply are diversified. For example, the material for aluminum comes from more than eight countries (including the USA) although about one-quarter of these imports come from a single bauxite mine in Guinea, developed with Soviet credits which are being repaid in kind.

The distant exploitation of hydro-carbons and deep sea minerals is of no immediate relevance to the Soviet domestic economy. Russia has extensive continental shelves, about 75% of which have good oil and gas potential, although 70% of these areas lie in the Arctic. Until recently the offshore industry has been neglected and it seems unlikely that domestic interests will lead to Soviet involvement in operations overseas. Much the same reasoning applies to hard minerals. Although the Soviet Union

is placing an increasing emphasis on the extraction of minerals from seawater and the development of marine mining, these activities are concentrated within her enclosed and semi-enclosed seas and the areas of her continental shelf and economic zone, where extensive commercial deposits are to be found. The Soviet Union does however have a longer term interest in exploiting the resources of the deep seabed, and has been engaged in manganese nodule research and prospecting since the 1950's, although there has been little concern for commercial exploitation. Given the extensive resource lying within Russia's border, it seems likely that this is partly long term insurance and partly reflects a concern that the Soviet Union should not be excluded from what looks like becoming a major world resource.

To sum up the economic discussion. Resources within the borders of the Soviet Union make it mainly self-sufficient in raw materials, apart from six commodities which come from abroad. The problem is not with the level of reserves but with their exploitation, and this is becoming particularly evident with oil, where production will fall during the next 5 years. However, the Soviet Union has immediate access to the Middle East's resources and in physical terms, this presents no problems.

This brings us to the nub of Soviet difficulties. It is unable to earn enough hard currency to pay for important imports, mainly oil and grain, but including key equipment and technology; these are all important to the immediate performance of the economy. The Soviet Union has no difficulty over physical access to overseas markets, except that people don't want to buy her products. Physical access for import

presents no problem, but paying for it does. Furthermore, the availability of important imports like grain and high technology depends on Western goodwill. The safe transit of most imports depends on continuing maritime stability and the freedom of the seas, which still remains within the gift of the West, but the passage of oil by land is relatively secure.

Strategic. There are two sources of strategic interest, one wartime and the other peacetime. First and foremost is the requirement to be favorably placed in the event of war with China or with the West. The Chinese contingency focuses attention on the facilities needed to secure the sea lines of communication between Western Russia and the Far Eastern Front, and (less important) to launch diversionary attacks on China from (for example) the South China Sea.

The contingency of world war with the West is more demanding and has two components. The most immediate stems from the nature of nuclear missile war, which requires the discharge of a range of tasks in distant sea areas at the very onset of war. In talking about this requirement in his book (p. 379), Gorshkov refers to the need to implement various measures in peacetime, including "the formation and deployment of groups of forces in a theatre in such a manner as to ensure positional advantage over the enemy, and likewise the provision in the ... theatre of operation of the appropriate force organization, .. basing structure, command and control system, etc."

The other component stems from the definition of world war as a fight to the finish between two social systems, which will be waged mainly

with such weapons and materiel as exists at the outset, and combat endurance will depend on prepositioned stockpiles and the availability of support facilities throughout the globe. It is hard to be certain of the priority the Soviets attach to this requirement, but the general thrust of Gorshkov's writings suggest that the navy, at least has thought through the implications of world war with a maritime coalition, and envisages wide-ranging operations in the latter stages of a nuclear war. The mobility and firepower embodied in warships could have a critical impact on a protracted conflict in what may well be a largely pre-industrial world and, while it is hard to envisage detailed scenarios with any confidence, the importance of preplanning and prepositioning is clear.

What we are talking about is establishing the kind of strategic infrastructure (physical, political and operational) that will enable the discharge of various crucial tasks at the onset of a war, and facilitate the conduct of military operations in subsequent stages. This strategic infrastructure includes the existence of the physical facilities which will be required to gain access to distant areas and to sustain wartime operations there. Control of such facilities is not essential in all cases prior to the onset of war and, where key pieces are missing from the strategic map (ports, airfields, roads, etc.), these can be provided in peacetime under the guise of economic aid. Overseas stockpiling can be achieved through the acquisition of bases and storage areas, or by the supply of more arms than a client state can absorb.

The second source of strategic interest stems from the peacetime requirement to have rapid access to distant parts of the world, should it be necessary to bring support to a client state or faction, to exploit an unforeseen opportunity or (perhaps in the future) to reassert control. This comes down to ensuring that there are sufficient airfields with the necessary capabilities to serve as alternative stepping stones to distant areas.

Clearly, the wartime and peacetime requirements mutually support each other. But the level of commitment to providing the war-related strategic infrastructure is relatively high, and the Soviet Union is prepared to accept significant political and economic costs in the process of establishing it. It does not, however, carry the concept of a world-wide war to its logical extreme and priority is given to those areas which are most directly relevant to the security of the Soviet state.

Political. The Soviet Union's political interests in the developing world overseas stems from traditional national aspirations, from the systemic competition for influence with the capitalist bloc in general and the United States in particular, and from the competition with China for leadership of the world communist movement. Influence building is an extremely complex and little understood phenomenon. In its most direct state-to-state form, it used to be seen as a relatively simple process of meeting a country's (or regime's) perceived needs, thereby encouraging a situation of dependence, part psychological (gratitude), part material (economic and political). Although such a naive approach is now behind

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us, we are little clearer as to what is involved, and indeed, of who influences whom in such bilateral relationships. In the early years of her approach to the developing countries, Russia was further hampered by a doctrinaire perception of the problem, but since the early sixties, her policy has become increasingly pragmatic. Whereas the Soviet attitude towards the Third World used to be ideological and universalist, it is now more realistic and particularist.

Influence building (and/or diminishing) can be thought of in terms of the target(s) of the policy, and of the means employed to achieve the objective. The latter can be usefully discussed under four major headings: (1) improvements to economic welfare, which includes the whole range of inducements and interrelationships involved in the process of trade, aid and investment; (2) political and military support, ranging from diplomatic activity to direct military involvement; (3) ideological indoctrination, either by means of mass propaganda, or focused on elites in the course of secular training and education programmes; and (4) image creation through demonstrations of advanced technology, high standards of living, military power or the ability to shape events.

The targets of influence building/diminishing policies also divide into three main types: (1) governments in power, (2) opposition groups and 'liberation' movements, and (3) China and the West. The Soviet Union now appears to recognize that on balance, support for the government in power yields the more certain dividends, although this does not prevent them from talent spotting amongst emergent factions. Aid to 'liberation'

movements is more speculative and in many cases the primary justification is to gain international merit, with the accession to power of their clients being seen as a possible bonus. Meanwhile, with the dwindling exception of Southern Africa, the opportunities to support genuine anti-colonial liberation movements are now few, and increasingly it is becoming a matter of picking sides in a traditional civil or inter-state war.

In many cases objectives (1) and (2) may also serve (3), but the requirement to diminish Western influence in particular could generate its own policies. One such target is the Western-dominated international trading and financial structure, which is already under attack at the United Nations. Despite being seen as a 'have' nation, Russia should be able to construct an effective alliance with the developing world on this issue, although her record at the Law of the Sea Conference illustrates her reluctance to compromise her more immediate interests.

Another conceivable target is the West's dependence on the supply of raw materials from overseas, either by manipulating supplies at source or by interfering with their shipment. We know that Russia encouraged the Arab states to use the 'oil weapon' in 1973, but the longer-term outcome of this particularly favorable opportunity illustrates the difficulties of third party manipulation. It is certainly possible that prices may be jacked up, but for most countries the withholding of supplies would be extremely difficult. Russia is not Saudi Arabia and lacks the economic strength to subsidize such a policy, or to corner the market in key

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commodities. As for interfering with the free passage of shipping, it is extremely hard to identify circumstances in which it would be in the Soviet Union's interests to initiate a commerce war at sea, outside the conditions of general war.

The Balance of Interests. Inevitably, several of Russia's individual interests are in conflict, raising questions of which take priority. One area of conflict involves the support of national liberation movements, the continuing interest in East/West detente, concern for the domestic economy and the competition with China. First, we should note that theoretically the Soviets see no contradiction between seeking detente and supporting liberation movements, and have made this quite clear from the beginning. The sense of betrayal in the West on this score stems from wishful thinking and self-deception. However, D. S. Papp notes that the national liberation movement "is not viewed as an organic part of the socialist revolution. It is an ally of the international communist movement and the socialist commonwealth, but clearly less significant in the 'world wide struggle against imperialism'." Certainly, the Soviet Union will automatically tend to support such movements, but one might suspect that the increasing emphasis on this role since 1965 stems as much from the competition and criticism from China as from a heightened concern for the fate of the oppressed. Meanwhile, even today, the possibility of detente remains important to the Soviet Union, not only for what it can bring in terms of Western investment and technology, but

also (to quote Brezhnev in 1971) because consequential arms limitation would "release considerable resources for constructive purposes". Policy will therefore be dictated by the particular circumstances, including the extent of Soviet involvement.

In Angola, for example, the Soviets had been supporting the MPLA since 1962 and continued to provide relatively modest support in the internal struggle for power which followed the announcement of forthcoming independence, stepping it up when U.S. financial support was channeled to one of the opposing groups. Russia reacted much more vigorously when the highly successful intervention by a small South African force threatened to drive her proteges from the field, and helped to bring Cuban troops armed with Soviet weapons into the field, which turned the battle in favor of the MPLA. In the circumstances it is hard to see how the Soviets could have done otherwise. It is true that the West and certain African states wished to see another form of government emerge in Angola, and that two African leaders secretly encouraged South African intervention. But against that, South Africa's intervention had swung many states onto the MPLA's side, and to have had deserted their clients at such a crucial juncture would have had incalculable effects on Russia's image and prospects throughout Africa.

A second area of conflict between interests involves, on the one hand, the more assertive aspects of influence building such as the support of client states with combat supplies, military demonstrations and perhaps interposition forces, and, on the other hand, the concern to avoid major

war, while maintaining the posture to fight and win one if necessary. The assertive support of client states could draw forces away from their operational alert stations and bog others down in peripheral activities. And this at a time when international tension would inevitably be high, with the possibility of direct confrontation with U.S. forces, leading to conflict and possibly escalating to all out war.

Military Intervention Overseas

Before focusing on military intervention, we should note that a very wide range of foreign policy instruments are available to the Soviet Union, including diplomatic, political, economic, cultural, subversive and military. Trade, aid and investment play an important role and it can be argued that a well-coordinated economic programme has in many respects replaced political penetration as a means of Soviet influence-building. Meanwhile, the sea is no longer the only means of providing access to distant parts. Although it remains the most economical (and only practical) means of shipping vast quantities of goods and people over long distances for sustained periods, and the only method of transporting really heavy and bulky objects, there have been tremendous advances in aircraft ranges and payloads. The Soviets have established a network of air routes around the globe, helping developing countries with airfield construction and setting up national airlines. This facilitates the rapid supply of relatively large and heavy items, including major types of combat equipment, to most parts of the world.

Soviet policy concerning the role of the military instrument in pursuit of overseas objectives is still evolving, and it has been shaped in part by their view of the international system, which differs significantly from that of the West. Soviet ideology defines the international status quo as a dynamic process of change towards a predetermined end, whose inevitable progress may be delayed or deflected (but not prevented) by reactionary forces. By contrast, the West has a static perception of the international status quo, whose stability tends to be disrupted by undesirable revolutionary forces. Of course, these differing perceptions stem as much from the have/have not positions of the protagonists, as from their ideological beliefs. However, as a spur to military intervention, these differing attitudes predispose the Soviets to a policy of opportunistic exploitation, while relying in the main on historical inevitability; whereas they prompt the West to a series of rearguard actions or firefighting operations, which result in a generally more active overseas policy.

There is also a comparison to be made in the relation to military power and the use of force. The Soviets, usually being in the inferior position, are very conscious of the reality of military power and see it as something which it is hard to have too much of, since it provides the basis of national security and certain types of influence. However, the record shows that if we exclude the initial revolutionary wars and the 1939-45 period (when war was inescapable), the Soviets have used military force relatively infrequently, and then mainly in their immediate national

security zone. The latter is an ambiguous concept which varies with perceptions of threat, but even within this zone they are clearly conscious of the political costs involved although once the die is cast, the force used is overwhelming. In the case of the West, it is harder to make the distinction between military power and the use of force, and for the USA, military power is more closely equated with the ability to project useable force overseas. This is partly a function of America's geographic location, but also reflects its historical origins and the rather casual Western attitude to the use of force in the heyday of maritime imperialism. Russia's colonial expansionism was continental, added to which the revolution prompted a conscious attempt to break with bourgeois/imperialist attitudes and to develop "objective" theories concerning war, peace and international relations in general.

As a corollary of this conscious theorizing, coupled with the socio-economic foundations of their ideology, Soviet policy attaches a relatively high value to Third World opinion in the competition for world influence, whereas the West has tended to dismiss international opinion as non-fungible and to focus instead on more tangible factors such as access to raw materials and key strategic areas. Too much should not be made of these various differences, and certainly, no value judgments are implied since the two sides are pursuing their respective interests in what each sees as the most effective way. However, there is substance in these differences and taken together, they encourage misperceptions concerning the role of military force (as opposed to power) in Soviet overseas policy.

The role of the military instrument has steadily evolved since the middle fifties when, in the wake of Stalin's death, Soviet policy set out to capture the support of the so-called Third World through a policy of trade, aid and arms supply. The latter included the provision of advisors and training and had two main purposes: to gain political influence; and to discourage (by raising the cost) Western attempts to reverse the "course of history" through the use of coercive force. In a few cases the supply of naval arms was principally intended to serve the Soviet Union's direct strategic interests, as with Indonesia in 1958 (drawing the British strike carriers east of Suez) and Egypt and Algeria in 1963 (distracting the Sixth Fleet).

From 1961 onwards, a series of coincidental trends combined to progressively favor a more active overseas policy. I list them in no particular order. First, the United States placed new emphasis on counter-insurgency operations and supportive intervention, which led finally to half a million men in Vietnam. Second, there was growing Sino-Soviet competition for leadership of the World Communist movement accompanied by Chinese accusations that Russia was less than wholehearted in countering imperialist aggression. Third, we have the post-colonial era, with the diffusion of power and the prolonged sorting-out process which follows a breakdown of structure. Fourth, we have the gradual maturation of Soviet policy towards the Third World, moving from ideological determinants to national interests concerning access to markets and certain raw materials. Fifth, as a byproduct of decisions concerning the security of the Russian homeland, we have the emergence of a capability to project

force overseas, the build-up of a long-range lift for the airborne forces and the navy's shift to forward deployment. And sixth, the renewed emphasis within the Soviet military on contingency planning for world war, highlighted the requirements for a worldwide infrastructure.

There were all enabling factors, but it seems that Soviet ideas about a more assertive use of the military instrument began to be shaped by various developments between 1967 and 1972. Achieving strategic parity increased Soviet self-confidence, while a series of events caused them to downgrade the dangers that confrontation with the West would escalate to nuclear war. Among the latter, I would list the Czech crisis in 1968, the 1967 Arab/Israeli war and the Jordanian crisis in 1970, but probably the more important was the SALT negotiation process, which led to a greater certainty of U.S. restraint. Meanwhile, the Western media's exaggerated response to the Soviet Navy's important involvement in the 1967 crisis highlighted the political potential of this instrument. Then the Egyptian war of attrition and the Israeli deep penetration raids, forced them to a decision of direct involvement in Egypt, with substantial air defense forces. And finally, the evidence of Vietnam, backed by the Nixon doctrine suggested that the risks of direct confrontation with U.S. forces was on the wane.

Given this situation of increased opportunities and lowered risks, the role of what they call a "Soviet military presence" appears to have been a major element in the sustained debate on defense and foreign policy which rumbled on from 1969-73. The policy which seems to have emerged was that, anyway for the time being, direct Soviet involvement

overseas would be limited to advisers, weapons and strategic logistic support, including the provision of adequate military supplies in the course of the battle. The combat role could be delegated to the Soviet equipped forces of revolutionary states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. This allowed the Soviet Union the best of both worlds; to affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support while ensuring that political commitment and liability remained strictly limited.

This is the policy which seems to prevail today. In speculating on what may develop in the years ahead, we should recall that during the debate in 1971-73, Grechko (and, presumably, significant elements of the military leadership) appeared to be against an extensive definition of the armed forces' "internationalist mission", which he preferred to restrict to defending other Socialist states. However, the evidence suggests that Grechko had to compromise on this point, accepting a more generous definition, although not as assertive as that being propounded by Gorshkov at that time. On the other hand, the evidence of Soviet overseas military involvement since mid-1973 suggests a clear retrenchment from the exposed position adopted during the deployment of Soviet air defense units to Egypt in 1970-72. Meanwhile, the shift in Soviet support in 1978 from Somalia to Ethiopia could be read as indicating that peacetime ideological considerations had been allowed to override the geostrategic factors which made Somalia so important as a point d'appui in the event of war with the West or with China.

In other words, it is hard to determine a consistent trend, except in the steady increase in the Soviet Union's capability to deliver prompt military support over large distances. It might be argued that during the last five years the Soviets have shown a greater willingness to become embroiled in military affairs in Third World states. It is, however, difficult to distinguish between the availability of opportunities and deliberate policy choices, and the Soviets have yet to match the extent of their military involvement in Egypt during 1968-72. Nevertheless, there are two consistent features of their policy. One, they are politically adept in the way they use the supply of arms to "capture" a Third World state in time of need, and they have the resources readily available to do so. Two, their military intervention overseas has always been supportive, in direct contrast to Soviet policy within their national security zone; this reflects the very different types of interest involved.

It is still early days to assess the long term political utility of the Soviet Union's current military intervention overseas. The strategic advantages of its involvement in Vietnam are clear, and it is possible that certain members of ASEAN see some advantages in having such a counterweight to potential Chinese hegemony. The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia is quite a different matter and it is not at all clear where that is going or what political dividends it will yield. The Angolan involvement is yet another category, and if the problem of Namibia can be resolved satisfactorily, this investment could well run into the sand. Lastly, we have still to see the full political implications of the growing perception of a new Soviet imperialism, particularly among the Arab and African states.

The Navy as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy

Using the past prologue, we see that the Soviets' use of the naval instrument evolved as an incremental by-product of the navy's shift to forward deployment to counter Western strategic delivery systems, and not as the result of some clearly perceived policy decision. Supporting this assertion is the operational evidence of 1964-66, the shipbuilding evidence of the shift to ASW configurations, and most recently, evidence of the war-fighting rationale for a large carrier. Certainly, the navy had been used to show the flag in the past, but the more ambitious and sustained use of naval forces for political purposes did not begin until 1967, and expanded steadily thereafter.

A policy towards the political employment of naval forces in peacetime has evolved progressively, and changes in threat perception, risk and opportunity have meant that this role has become increasingly important. In assessing these developments, I have found it useful to distinguish between four types of objectives which underlie this peacetime employment, because each type involves a different level of risk and degree of political commitment.

At the low end of the scale of political commitment, we have "Projecting Soviet lives and property." This objective is referred to, but has received little priority to date. Landing ships are positioned to evacuate Soviet nationals in third party conflicts, but the only case of property involved Soviet fishing vessels seized by Ghana in 1969. At the high end we have "Establishing the strategic infrastructure to support war-related missions." This objective is not referred to

directly, but can be inferred from the pattern of overseas military involvement during the last 20 years, and is implied in some of their more recent writings. Such an infrastructure can also serve peace-time policies, and the pattern suggests a readiness to incur high political and economic costs in pursuit of this objective. However, so far the Soviets have not used military force to maintain their position when the host country has withdrawn its agreement to their presence, although on at least two occasions, once in Egypt, once in Albania, they have sought to engineer a coup to bring a more sympathetic regime to power. Neither effort was successful.

In between these extremes we have the general objective of "increasing Soviet prestige and influence." In naval terms this encompasses a wide span of activities ranging from showing the flag and port clearance to providing support for revolutionary forces or to regimes threatened by secessionist elements. They are prepared to commit substantial resources to this objective, such as their minesweeping activities in Bangladesh and the Gulf of Suez, but while the propensity for risk-taking has risen steadily, the underlying political commitment remains strictly limited.

Overlapping this general influence-building objective is the more restricted one of "countering imperialist aggression." Despite much bombast in talking of this task, I believe that in terms of risking a major confrontation with the West, Soviet political commitment is low. The first clear cut example was the establishment of the Guinea Patrol in December 1970, since then we have the deployments of warships to

the Bay of Bengal in 1971, to the South China Sea in 1972, and to Angola in 1975, as well as the three Middle East crises in 1967, '70, and '73. The latter series did show a shift from a narrow concern with the carriers towards a more general concern for the overall capability of the Sixth Fleet. But none of these examples provide evidence of Soviet readiness actually to engage Western naval forces in order to prevent them from intervening against a Soviet client state.

However, what we do see is progressively greater involvement by the Soviet Navy in the provision of logistic support both before and during third party conflicts. In 1973, Soviet landing ships, escorted by combatants, carried Moroccan troops to Syria. Landing ships were also used during the subsequent war to ferry military supplies from Black Sea ports to Syria. More significantly, SAM-armed warships were stationed where they could protect aircraft making their final approaches to the main resupply airfields in Syria and Egypt, as if to cover against Israeli air attack. And most recently, we have the escorting by Soviet warships of military supplies being ferried from Aden to Ethiopia, and the use of landing ships to deliver such supplies.

The evidence suggests a policy of incrementalism, which explores and takes advantage of opportunities as they occur or are created, a policy of probing Western responses and establishing precedents. The role of a "Soviet military presence" in support of overseas objectives will therefore be shaped by the scale and style of the Western response


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to the various Soviet initiatives. In this context the distinction I have just drawn between the employment of Soviet warships to ensure the safe arrival of logistic support, and their employment to prevent Western intervention against a client state is important. So, too, is the distinction between the Soviet Union's willingness to risk hostilities with a third-party state, and their continuing reluctance to engage U.S. naval forces. Meanwhile, we should bear in mind that the Soviet Navy's role in this assertive policy is secondary. The primary instruments are arms supply; military advice and training; the transport of men, munitions and equipment by merchant ship and long range air; and direct participation by the combat troops of revolutionary states. The navy's task is to provide protection and support, and to serve as an earnest of Soviet commitment.

Future Requirements. The strategic quality of the sea derives from the access it provides to non-adjacent areas. Maritime strategy is about the use of the sea, and the function of navies is to secure such use when it is to the nation's advantage and to prevent such use when it is to the nation's disadvantage. This navigational use breaks down into the two main categories of conveying goods and people, and of projecting force ashore. National interest in the use of the sea can be purposive or preventive. Most nations have a purposive interest in the conveyance of goods and people (seaborne trade) and a preventive interest in the projection of force ashore against their own territories. Only a handful of states have a purposive interest in using the sea to project force.

We can use the foregoing framework to structure the discussion on future Soviet requirements for naval forces.

Securing Use - Goods and People. This category breaks down into maritime trade and the movement of military cargoes in merchant ships. All states have a purposive interest in maritime trade, but military cargoes shade into the projection of force. We have already seen that the Soviet Union will have a continuing requirement to supply its Far Eastern Front in the event of war with China. In the separate context of the competition for world influence, the Soviet merchant fleet is a primary instrument of foreign policy, and access to specific countries at specific times needs to be secured. The Soviet Union already has experience of threats to such access. The United States denied access to Cuba in 1962 and to Hanoi in 1972, and there was talk of preventing the shipment of supplies to Angola in 1975. But threats to access have also come from third party states, as for example Israel, when the military reinforcement of Arab states was involved, and Somalia (and perhaps Eritrean supporters) in the case of Ethiopia.

The threat from China is primarily submarine; from third party states, missile patrol craft; and from the United States it is most likely to be blockade by surface ship and mine.

Securing Use - Projection of Force Ashore. This category extends from the display of latent force (flag showing, precautionary deployments, etc.) to the actual application of force ashore. The capability to display latent force is a byproduct of other naval requirements and need not be considered further. There have been unconfirmed press

reports of Soviet warships providing gunfire support to Ethiopian troops, and there is the questionable example of the sealifting of Dhofari insurgents to South Yemen. We also have the positioning of Soviet landing ships during third party conflicts, with naval infantry embarked as if ready to go ashore, but this is generally seen as preparation to evacuate key Soviet personnel and equipment.

Looking to the future, it seems unlikely that the Soviets see a requirement for the projection of coercive force ashore. The projection of supportive force will depend on the evolution of Soviet policy towards military intervention. The most recent evidence is of a drawing back from committing Soviet troops in direct support of a client state, as in Egypt 1970-1972. There is also the precedent of U.S. inaction during the 1973 Arab/Israeli war, when carrier aircraft could have made a significant difference to the battle. On present evidence, it seems unlikely that Soviet carrier aircraft would be pitted against U.S. planes in support of a client state. However, the nature of this requirement will develop incrementally, and it is unwise to be too certain.

Preventing Use - Conveyance of Goods and People. Up to now, the supply of client states has been treated as sanctuary by the two super powers, with the exception of the Cuban blockade and the mining of Hanoi. As regards the passage stretch of maritime waterways, it seems likely that the Soviets will continue to respect this convention as being in their overall interests, but it could change in the terminal areas. However, past Soviet practice makes it more likely, that they would delegate this task to proxies.

Preventing Use - The Projection of Force. This is the task of "countering imperialist aggression." As we have seen, the Soviets make great claims for this mission and they position themselves in crises as if ready to attack U.S. "projection" forces. However, we have as yet no indication of their actual willingness to engage U.S. forces, in the event that these were used against one of their clients... and where strike aircraft are involved, they are presented with the "rules of engagement" problem of the stage at which they should attack. This is not a matter of relative strength, since for some time the Soviet ACW groups have had a significant capability against U.S. carriers.

Once again the development of the requirement will depend on the evolution of the broader national policies. In the years ahead, the Soviet navy will have more powerful general purpose forces and the leadership may well be inclined to interpose these between the U.S. Navy and a client state. But here again, policy and requirements will develop incrementally.

Conclusions

To be presented orally.

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APPENDIX 4

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

By

JEFFREY RECORD

PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE
ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL
AND MARINE FORCES

APRIL 1, 1980

"Some Thoughts on the Rapid Deployment Force"

by Jeffrey Record

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer recently labelled the Administration's proposed Rapid Deployment Force the "most demanding challenge confronting the American military in this decade."^{1/} His remark may well be the understatement of the decade. While the need for a rapidly deployable, effective military force is widely accepted, uncertainty continues to surround issues related to the composition of such a force and the politico-military conditions required for its successful employment.

Soviet behavior in Africa and recent events in Iran and Afghanistan argue strongly for a major increase in U.S. capacity for timely and effective military intervention in much of the world where American forces are not already deployed on the ground. During the past fifteen years, while the United States diverted its conventional military resources to a stubborn conflict in Southeast Asia, and in the category of nuclear arms remained for the most part content to live off capital invested in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union has stolen a massive military march on the West. Since the mid-1960s the Soviet Union has attained strategic nuclear parity with the United States; eliminated NATO's longstanding advantage in theater nuclear arms; expanded an existing

preponderance in ground and tactical air forces deployed on the Eurasian continent; and constructed a blue-water navy that for the first time in history challenges the West's traditional supremacy on the high seas. Soviet foreign policy, emboldened by this relentless military buildup, and by the flaccidity of American responses to it, now seeks to gain a stranglehold on the economic foundations of the West's industrial and military might. This is the common denominator of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored activities in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan, and Indochina.

It is in the context of this bid to establish a Soviet imperium in the Third World that the role of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) must be weighed. Blocked in Europe by an alliance that has mustered military forces commensurate with its political interests on that continent, the Soviet Union seeks to undermine Western solidarity and security by means of a gigantic flanking movement across the West's soft economic underbelly. It is a Schlieffen Plan on a global scale, although much more subtle because it relies largely on local client forces to do the actual fighting. Yet it is potentially no less deadly because only now is the West awakening to the reality that events in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean can be as consequential to its security as events along the inter-German border.

Our principal strategic dilemma in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf lies in the disjunction of U.S. interests and military power. Historically, the presence of vital interests unattended by sufficient military power to protect them has always been a standing invitation to hostile adventure, and it is difficult to believe that this disjunction escaped the attention of either the Kremlin or Khomeini during the last two months of 1979. Aside from occasional visits by surface naval forces, the United States maintained no significant force presence in the Indian Ocean or its littoral states. With respect to tactical airpower--that most flexible and mobile component of general purpose forces--we continued to deploy carrier-based aviation in less threatened areas where we enjoyed a comparative abundance of land-based air power. As for ground forces, we still deploy them through the medium of an overseas base structure established during the early years of the Cold War in response to perceived communist threats quite different in locus and character than those confronting the West today.

A strong case can thus be made for the creation of a capacity for timely and effective military intervention in the logistically remote Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. To do so, however, clearly entails (1) an expansion of the size of the U.S. surface navy; (2) alterations in its traditional deployment patterns; (3) the establishment of a new base

structure in the region capable of sustaining prolonged intervention; (4) a sizable increase in strategic airlift and sealift capabilities; and (5) the creation of a new command organization capable of identifying and orchestrating the inevitably disparate components of any major intervention force.

All of these measures are prominent in recent Administration actions and in its proposed Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Budget and Five-Year Defense Plan. Two carrier battle groups have been deployed to the Indian Ocean on an indefinite basis. Negotiations for access to bases in the region have been opened with Kenya, Somalia, and Oman. The U.S. facility at Diego Garcia is being expanded. A Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Command has been established. And substantial increases in the size of the U.S. surface fleet and in U.S. strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities have been requested.^{2/}

With respect, specifically, to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) itself, the Administration has wisely chosen not to create new formations but rather to focus on improving the strategic mobility of existing ground and tactical air forces. According to Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, the newly-appointed commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,

Our task is to provide a capability for deploying force packages, of varying size and structure, to any region of the world. This is neither a separate nor discrete category of forces of fixed size; i.e., 50,000 or 100,000 man force. Rather the concept calls for a central "reservoir," composed primarily of CONUS-based

units from which forces can be drawn to cope with a specific contingency. Obviously, the size and composition of the force selected will depend on what is determined to be our mission. Forces could be developed capable of responding to situations ranging from minimum application of force to mid-intensity combat. One could draw a building block analogy. ...

This "reservoir" of forces is now identified as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. It is comprised of CONUS-based Army divisions, a Marine Amphibious Force, and appropriate Air Force and Navy units. It should be noted that no new forces have been added to our force structure.^{3/}

As defined by the Administration, the problem, in short, is not a lack of sufficient forces, but an inability to deploy existing formations "in force and with great rapidity to an area of crisis."^{4/} Accordingly, the Administration has proposed a number of initiatives designed to enhance the strategic mobility of U.S.-based ground and tactical air forces. As described by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,

The first will be a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry in dehumidified storage the heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine brigades. These ships would be stationed in peacetime in remote areas where U.S. forces might be needed. Though not designed for the Marines' traditional mission of amphibious assault landings against enemy opposition (a capability we mean to continue, using other ships), they would be able to debark their equipment over-the-beach if no port were available. The Marine personnel (and other equipment not well suited to prepositioning) would be airlifted to marry up with their gear and be ready for battle on short notice.

The other major initiative will be the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft able to carry Army equipment, including tanks, over intercontinental distances. These aircraft would be used initially to deliver outsize equipment of the advance forces necessary to secure airbases or the ports or beaches needed by the Maritime Prepositioning Ships to deliver their heavy gear. After the initial phases, they would assist in additional deployments, resupply, and, if needed, intra-theater movements.^{5/}

Related, although more minor initiatives include:

extending the life of the entire C-5 fleet from 7,100 to more than 30,000 hours, and stretching all 271 of the existing C-141 aircraft to increase their payload by 30 percent. We are also funding the adaptation of 36 commercial aircraft so as to increase the cargo capacity of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and adding 12 dry cargo ships and six tankers to the Ready Reserve Fleet.^{6/}

Under the concept of maritime prepositioning, the Administration's new Five-Year Defense Plan proposes the construction of 14 specially designed ships and the purchase of an additional set of equipment for an entire Marine division. Each ship is to be capable of carrying approximately one battalion's worth of equipment and 30 days' supply of spares, fuel, ammunition and other combat consumables; the vessels are to be manned by civilian crews charged with the maintenance of their cargoes.

The proposed new strategic airlifter--known as the CX--would supplement the existing U.S. fleet of C-5s and C-141s. Some 150 to 200 CXs are envisaged, although the design of the aircraft remains a matter of dispute within the Department of Defense.^{7/}

There is little question that if fully realized, the proposed maritime prepositioning, CX, and other strategic mobility-enhancement programs would substantially increase the speed with which the United States could generate a ground force buildup in the Middle East and other "hot spots" in the world where U.S. forces are not already prepositioned ashore.

According to Robert Komer, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, current U.S. airlift capabilities are such that at least one week would be required to move a single, unmechanized infantry brigade from the United States to the Arabian peninsula.^{8/} Judged in this light, and in the light of the virtual absence of a U.S. ground force presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the proposed Rapid Deployment Force initiatives constitute a significant and imaginative attempt to close the gap between U.S. interests and military power in the "arc of crisis."

Admirable though the initiatives are, however, they beg a number of questions that must be addressed successfully if the United States is to establish a credible military presence and capacity for effective intervention in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The first of these questions is rooted in the absence of politically stable and militarily vigorous U.S. client states in the region. While many commentators pronounced the Nixon Doctrine dead on arrival in the wake of the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, the doctrine's fundamental premise remains as valid today as it did when promulgated in Guam in 1969.

The sustained application of U.S. military power in the Third World is not likely to succeed if unsupported by viable and competent local regimes capable of assuming the primary burden of at least the land battle. This is surely one of

the principal geo-strategic lessons of U.S. intervention in Indochina. Rushing to the defense of any nation either unwilling or sufficiently incapable of defending itself is to rush into the potential abyss of another Vietnam. As stressed by Under-Secretary Komar in a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

The United States would be hard pressed to defend its interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region if regional forces are not able or inclined to participate in their own defense. Accordingly, we would hope to have direct military support from regional states which are at risk.^{9/}

On what grounds, however, can we "hope to have direct military support from regional states which are at risk," particularly the kind of effective support required in the face of a major threat? The availability of such support is ultimately a function of the political stability of the regime supplying it; its effectiveness is a product of the size and competence of the regime's military forces. In the Shah of Iran the United States for decades enjoyed a powerful and stable local client committed to the defense of shared interests. Yet which potential U.S. client among the littoral states of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean today can be regarded as both politically stable and militarily competent? Somalia? Oman? Saudi Arabia? Kuwait? The Emirates? Pakistan? All of these states--one cannot call them nations, since most are little more than collections of disparate and often warring ethnic groups and tribes cohabitating within boundaries arbitrarily drawn by European colonial offices in the Nineteenth Century--are

governed by military regimes or semi-feudal monarchies whose social and political fragility renders them exceedingly vulnerable to internal overthrow by Soviet-sponsored leftist groups or the forces of religious fundamentalism now sweeping the House of Islam.

In the light of the Shah's overthrow and recent events in Mecca and Islamabad, one is propelled toward the view, expressed during the past several months by Senator Henry M. Jackson among others, that the primary threat to Western interests in the Persian Gulf is not, as implied by the so-called Carter Doctrine, Soviet aggression from without, but rather collapse from within. In dealing with the latter challenge, however, U.S. military intervention appears particularly ill-suited. Could, for example, the Rapid Deployment Force forestall a coup d'etat in Saudi Arabia? Could it effectively preserve the Saudi monarchy against a swelling Khomeini-style revolution? Would not the very presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil in such an environment strip the Saudi regime of whatever legitimacy it retained in the eyes of its people? Even were Saudi Arabia invaded by the Soviet Union or, say, Iraq, on what grounds could the United States expect a resolute, vigorous, and competent Saudi performance on the battlefield?

These are profound and difficult questions, but they must nonetheless be addressed, since, neither politically

nor militarily, can the United States ever expect to be in a position to defend--certainly against direct Soviet aggression--another country, much less an entire region of the world, without the assistance of reliable and competent indigenous forces. Coalition warfare has been the foundation of American military success in modern times, yet with whom can we coalesce in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia? Even Pakistan, confronted with the menacing arrival of Soviet forces along its borders, has refused proffered U.S. indirect military assistance for fear that the very act of acceptance may further compromise the already tainted internal legitimacy of a regime threatened as well by the same forces that toppled the Shah.

The very intra-state political instability that denies the United States reliable and effective regional partners in any program to block further Soviet penetration of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf also deprives the United States of a second pre-requisite for sustained military intervention in the region: an infrastructure of U.S.-controlled military bases. Simply having the promise of access on a contingency basis to facilities in Mombasa, Berbera, Masira, and elsewhere--the option now being pursued by the Administration--is no substitute for U.S.-controlled and -operated bases whose use is not subject to momentary political calculations of host governments. The apparent refusal of the Kenyan, Somali, and

Omani governments to permit the permanent stationing of U.S. ground and tactical air forces on their respective territories is certainly understandable. A sizable U.S. force presence could compromise the internal legitimacy of all of those governments. Yet, can we assume that these same political considerations would not be invoked to deny the United States access to those facilities in the event of crisis, irrespective of the letter of the provisional agreements now being negotiated?

As for Diego Garcia, the sole U.S.-controlled base in the region, even were it transformed into the world's largest land-fill, its great distance from the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia makes it only marginally suitable as a base for staging operations against the littorals of the Indian Ocean.

The absence of politically reliable and militarily competent local client states, and the dim prospects for establishing the kind of regional U.S. base structure that would maximize the ability to sustain military intervention are not the only obstacles to an effective U.S. defense of Western interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The chosen instrument of intervention--the Rapid Deployment Force--may itself be ill-suited to deal with even external challenges to those interests.

The Administration's proposed package of RDF initiatives addresses only one aspect of the problem it seeks to resolve. An enhanced ability to move U.S. ground forces quickly into the Indian Ocean and the Middle East is of little avail if the forces themselves are improperly structured and armed to deal with potential opponents. With respect to contingencies in the Middle East, the Administration's RDF initiatives may do little more than speed the arrival of the wrong kind of forces.

Like most modern countries, the United States maintains two basic types of ground forces: heavy forces, consisting of tank and mechanized infantry formations; and light forces, composed of airborne, amphibious, "straight-legged" infantry, and other foot-mobile units.

Heavy forces are organized around tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. They possess great firepower and are extremely agile on the battlefield, since they move entirely on tracked or wheeled vehicles. Heavy forces are best suited for combat against other heavy forces on flat, rolling, and comparatively unobstructed terrain. It is for these reasons that most of the U.S. Army's divisions, which are heavy, are deployed in Europe or earmarked for NATO contingencies.

Light U.S. ground forces, which include the Marine Corps' three divisions, are structured primarily for combat outside Europe, particularly in areas where the use of armor is inhibited either by the potential adversary's lack of armor or by terrain (jungles, forests, mountains, etc.). Because light forces lack the firepower of heavy formations and depend mainly on marching for moving around on the battlefield, they do not hold up well in combat against heavy formations. This is especially the case in terrain, such as deserts, tailor-made for high-speed armored operations of the type that have characterized warfare in the Middle East during the past 20 years.

Light forces, however, do possess one distinct advantage over heavy forces: precisely because they are light, they can be moved quickly from one region of the world to another. The very thing that makes light forces relatively immobile on the battlefield--the comparative lack of tanks and other heavy armored fighting vehicles--makes them easier to transport from the United States to a potential battlefield overseas. In contrast, heavy forces possess little strategic mobility. For example, even with the CX it would take weeks to move a single U.S. armored division by air from the United States to the Middle East or South Asia.

And it is here that we confront the great paradox of the Rapid Deployment Force: those U.S. ground forces most rapidly

deployable overseas are least suited for combat against potential U.S. adversaries in the Middle East and South Asia. The days are long gone when a handful of Western troops armed with a few Maxim guns could awe and subdue the non-industrialized regions of the world. Future contingencies in the Middle East are likely to involve combat against numerically superior Soviet-model client armies of heavy forces whose tactical mobility and fire-power, even battalion for battalion, far exceed that now possessed by either U.S. Army or Marine light forces. The Iraqi army alone fields some 3,500 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, almost seven times the Marine Corps' entire inventory; the Syrian army has some 2,600 tanks; even the tiny army of South Yemen has 260, fivefold that of an unmechanized U.S. Army infantry division.

In short, the kind of ground forces the United States might be able to deploy rapidly to the Middle East would face the prospect of swift destruction by quantitatively and qualitatively superior forces operating in terrain and a combat environment permitting the full exploitation of the weaknesses of foot-mobile infantry in the face of tanks.

Thus if the United States is to develop a capacity for effective intervention on the ground in the "arc of crisis," more is required than simply the ability to move existing U.S. ground forces faster to that region. Staying on the battlefield is just as important as getting to it in time. What is needed

is not just an increase in the strategic mobility of our present ground forces, but a new type of ground force combining the strategic mobility of light infantry and the tactical agility and firepower of heavy ground forces.

Is there a means at hand that would maximize the tactical mobility and firepower of existing light forces without imposing the severe penalties in strategic mobility that most of the Army has already paid? I believe there is, in the form of a new family of small, lightweight tracked and wheeled armored fighting vehicles and personnel carriers which, if married to recent stunning advances in small-caliber anti-armor guns and ammunition, could provide the foundation for a deadly new light armored force compatible with the strategic mobility required by a Rapid Deployment Force. For several years the Marine Corps has been exploring these technologies, and is on the verge of constructing prototypes of a two-man, 14-ton mini-tank mounting a 75-millimeter, high-velocity gun capable of destroying any known main battle tank. A C-5 could carry some six or seven of these tank-killers, known as the Mobile Protected Weapons System, compared to only one of the Army's new 60-ton XM-1 main battle tanks. The lack of restraint in the Army's approach to the design of armored fighting vehicles has precluded the rapid deployment of the Army's heavy divisions, leading to growing doubts over the cost-effectiveness of the administration's proposed \$6 billion program to build the CX,

which, like the existing C-5, will be able to carry only one Army tank. Might not that \$6 billion be better spent on the acquisition of smaller armored fighting vehicles much more compatible with existing U.S. strategic airlift capabilities?

Indeed, the Marine Corps appears to be the natural primary instrument of any Rapid Deployment Force. Traditionally the "first to fight" and oriented primarily toward non-European contingencies, the Corps has a history of enthusiasm for innovation in both tactical doctrine and armaments unequalled by the Army. The Corps moreover possesses a force structure more easily adaptable to the demands of an RDF.

No survey of the various issues surrounding the Rapid Deployment Force would be complete without addressing the role of our NATO allies and Japan in the defense of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The disarray that continues to characterize Western and Japanese political responses to recent events in that region is indicative, among other things, of the greater dependence of Europe and Japan on both Middle Eastern oil and Soviet good will. While the Soviet Union consolidates its grip on Afghanistan, Western nations bicker among themselves and with their respective, and apparently sovereign athletic communities over whether to attend Olympic games hosted in a country whose good will toward any weaker state brave enough to oppose it is ultimately measurable in

cannisters of poison gas. It is a sorry spectacle, but a nonetheless understandable one. Moreover, with the exception of France, no West European state is capable of playing a significant, much less independent military role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Thus, despite our allies' greater economic stake in re-establishing stability in that volatile region of the world, they are not likely--if at all--to contribute more than token forces to a reinvigorated Western military presence in the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, there is no reason why our European allies and Japan cannot and should not assume more responsibility for their own defense. At this juncture in history, the United States has a right to ask--indeed, to demand--of its traditional partners that they do more for the common defense. Japan, a nation that for over three decades has enjoyed a free ride on matters of security, should be informed in no uncertain terms that the ride is over. As for Europe, the time has come to create a new division of military labor within NATO. Given the indivisibility of Western Europe's security and stability in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the assumption by the United States of the primary responsibility for the defense of the latter region must be accompanied by proportionately greater Allied contribution to the ground and tactical air defense of Europe. The United States has never been in a position to defend Europe alone; it is certainly not in a position to defend both Europe and the Indian Ocean.

Notes

1/

Drew Middleton, "U.S. Will Vary Makeup of Rapid Deployment Unit," New York Times, March 20, 1980, p. A14.

2/

Some 92 naval vessels are requested in the Five-Year Defense Plan. Together with those already authorized but not yet completed, the Plan, if fully authorized, would generate an active U.S. fleet of approximately 550 ships by the mid-1980s. The present size of the fleet is approximately 460 ships.

3/

Prepared statement on the Indian Ocean and Rapid Deployment Forces before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 21, 1980, pp. 2-3.

4/

Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 9.

5/

Prepared statement on the preview of the FY 1981 budget and highlights of the Five-Year Defense Plan before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 13, 1979, pp. 8-9.

6/

Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, p. 116.

7/

The U.S. Air Force favors a design that would incorporate the short-takeoff and landing capabilities of the now defunct Advanced Medium-STOL Transport (AMST); however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense appears to favor a design based on a modification of the existing C-5 or Boeing 747.

8/

Prepared statement on the Indian Ocean and Rapid Deployment Force before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 21, 1980, p. 3.

9/

Ibid., p. 6.

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APPENDIX 5

"LIMITED" U.S.-SOVIET CONFLICT
AND THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

By

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AND MARINE FORCES

APRIL 1, 1980

"LIMITED" U.S.-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

By changing the titles and the wiring diagrams of some military units, the Department of Defense recently organized a "Rapid Deployment Force". Funding for the RDF will emphasize cargo ships and giant aircraft for more rapid transportation to the incipient battlefield. Is such emphasis akin to General Custer buying fast horses so he could hasten to Little Big Horn? Is the RDF a public relations gimmick, or has it substance? In attempting to answer that question, this brief article will discuss the RDF in terms of strategy, of force structure and of combat capabilities.

I. Strategy. For decades the United States has programmed conventional forces to respond to contingencies worldwide. A Defense hallmark, however, of the Carter Administration through 1979 had been its determination to reduce contingency forces in order to increase investment for NATO's Central Front. For several years, the Navy was held to negative growth, as was procurement for Marine Corps land forces. The U.S. Army began to withdraw from South Korea and not a single request for an amphibious ship was made in FY78, in FY79 and in FY80. There were frequent press reports of Navy memos accusing OSD of monomania about

the Central Front. SACEUR publicly chastised the Pentagon for overemphasizing NATO to the neglect of global concerns and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army called for a "Unilateral Corps" in case of conflict outside NATO.

In the summer of 1979, President Carter announced there was an "unacceptable" Soviet brigade in Cuba. Any Caribbean mischief by that brigade, he implied, would be checkmated by quick-reacting U.S. forces. In November the U.S. embassy in Teheran was seized for a second time. Although President Carter vowed not to use force in the crisis, the Pentagon re-emphasized non-NATO contingency forces. To the FY81-85 Defense program request were added \$2.5B for civilian "Maritime Prepositioning Ships" (MPS) and \$6.6B for a giant CX aircraft. Although it is unclear how the CX could have contributed to the resolution of the Iranian crisis - save for adding to the que at the Teheran airport - the request seemed emotionally satisfying. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and were poised within 300 miles of Hormouz, the Pentagon had to reassure the public of something. So by the swift redesignation of existing units, the RDF was unveiled as our deterrent response to potential Soviet aggression outside NATO (excluding Afghanistan, of course.¹)

¹ Also excluding Pakistan, or at least Pakistan's borders. By calculated ambiguity, Iran seems to be neither excluded nor included under the new U.S. security umbrella.

Hence, the Administration has a public policy of sizing U.S. conventional forces adequate, together with those of our allies, for "1 & 1/2 Wars". In de facto terms, the "1 War" is to be waged against the Soviet Union along the Central Front, while the "1/2 War" is also to be waged against the Soviet Union somewhere else, like in the Persian Gulf or in the Caribbean. A semanticist would have trouble with the logic of the terms; a defense analyst should have trouble with the unstated assumptions underlying the strategy.

U.S. strength relative to that of the Soviet Union has steadily declined for ten years. The Soviets have procured one hundred billion dollars more than has the U.S. in military hardware. Since they are outspending us each year by 45 percent and since our real annual Defense growth promises to be about two percent to their four percent, the gap in military systems will grow. The larger the gap, the less politically credible that the U.S. will close it, absenting a dramatic crisis like the 1950 Chinese invasion of Korea. For instance, in the face of the current Iranian and Afghanistan crises - "the most serious crisis since World War II" - the House of Representatives may still cut a Defense budget which is already undercosted for inflation. So, as a substitute for the strength we want to claim but don't want to pay for, we as a nation have become clever at obfuscating strategic theories.

The RDF is the same force we had yesterday under a different name. The RDF will be that same combat force tomorrow and in 1985, plus some increased sealift and airlift. Ten billion dollars for the RDF over five years is not trivial; it amounts to over one percent per year of the Defense budget. However, President Carter and the Pentagon have linked the RDF directly to fighting and killing Russians. The question is whether we are bluffing. Or, to put it more kindly, whether we have thought through our strategy.

A half-cheer for the RDF is that the Pentagon has acknowledged there are U.S. interests beyond the Central Front. The other half cheer is reserved until there is better understanding of the RDF. Conceptually, the RDF applies to four cases.

The first is the peacetime deterrence of enemies and reassurance of those (in the Persian Gulf) whom we need. The problem is the nations of the Persian Gulf do not perceive they need our overt or speedy military presence. The Soviet threat is not seen as a World War II-style invasion; a U.S. presence is seen as contributing to subversion; U.S. policy is criticized for lack of steadfastness. The RDF can do little to redress these perceptions.

The second reason for creation of the RDF is in the expectation of the failure of deterrence, with results

intolerable to U.S. interests. That is, stern Presidential warnings will be ignored, as in the Afghanistan case. Consequently, the U.S. must place troops at the scene of the crisis before the Soviet Union can do so. Presumably the Soviets will then desist from their planned course of action.

If the Soviets do not turn aside, then at the third level the RDF - lacking local strength - could act as a tripwire which escalates the crisis beyond the immediate region. How escalation acts to the benefit of the U.S. or of the West is not evident. In NATO, our conventional forces are at best configured for a defensive war. A nuclear counterforce exchange in the European theater does not favor NATO, and for well over a decade U.S. central strategic systems have not been powerful enough to compensate for NATO conventional weakness. Concern over escalation beyond rational control would affect Soviet - and U.S. - calculations in a crisis. But it is self-delusion for the U.S. to compensate for its chosen weakness in conventional forces by ambiguous threats of uncontrollable nuclear escalation. While in a war escalation may come because events escape human control, that is quite different from the calculating escalation on which extended deterrence was based ten years ago. To leave one's escalation options open is not the same as relying upon escalation. What if the Soviets persisted in what the U.S. regarded as an unacceptable action? The U.S. cannot employ De Gaulle's nuclear strategy without a

De Gaulle (who in turn had the luxury of denying the deterrence extended courtesy of the U.S. nuclear umbrella).

If the RDF is neither a sufficient deterrent in itself nor a reliable "tripwire", then the RDF should have the capability of fighting successfully. As things stand, the RDF is a means of becoming involved in a fight, not of winning one. It may require the language of New Speak to analyze how to "win" a "limited" war against the Soviet Union. That, however, is the task set for the RDF.

Since war against the Soviet Union will not be a "lesser contingency", we had better emphasize combat power, not rapid movement. The RDF has merit; it is wise to position at sea some armored equipment; undoubtedly more airlift can always be used. But we must be careful not to claim too much. At present, the reason for the RDF is that it is to be a thick and mobile shield of deterrence. The motivation is a belief that other U.S. deterrent steps will fail; i.e., Presidential or diplomatic warnings, mutual defense pacts, naval forces moved offshore, etc. Consequently the U.S. must move 8000 miles by aircraft faster than its foes can move much shorter distances. Then, once the U.S. has troops on the ground, the other side will desist from its intended military aggression.

Today we can move to the Persian Gulf perhaps 20,000 men in 20 days. In the late 1980s, with the CX and maritime

prepositioning, we can perhaps double or triple that figure, assuming enough fuel en route, emergency airfields, overflight rights, and that we will not have to fight our way in. What are the scenarios in which the foe would then be deterred where he is not already deterred? Why, for example, would the Iraqis or Soviets not invade Saudi Arabia if the U.S. possessed the CX as well as the C5A? If the Soviets (or Iraqis) go to war, it is reasonable to expect that they will include in the initiation of hostilities strikes against reception airfields for the RDF. The RDF concept, in short, says we will fight Soviet land forces with air lifted U.S. land forces. Can we expect to succeed in that way given the Soviet penchant for employing overwhelming force rather than dribbling in a few airborne divisions? Even if 110,000 men were enough under certain conditions, it would not represent warfighting power until seapower and resupply by sea were established.

Yet the current strategy implies that the RDF will be able to operate without any increase in our current seapower, essentially by hopscotching the seas by use of air. That just is not going to work. We will not be able to sustain any forces engaged in combat overseas, particularly any that are engaged with Soviet forces, unless we have, keep and exercise naval superiority.

The RDF should be evaluated more as a measure of something than an end in itself. That "something" should be warfighting. Prudently we should assume we will have to fight to succeed. But there are few scenarios in which the RDF would be "enough." If we are going to kill Soviets and if Americans are going to die, we should look for points of leverage rather than try to match Soviet brute strength. For example, we can blockade, or destroy some portion of Soviet submarines and of Soviet surface forces. While the application of any of these advantages risks escalation to world war, so too does any clash between our RDF and Soviet/forces. For instance, Soviet/Cuban/PDRY forces on the Persian Gulf peninsula might well be defeated by U.S. land and air forces and by U.S. blockade. But the Soviets might then move into Iran opposite the Straits of Hormouz and declare the Strait closed until the West came to reasonable terms.

Consequently, any discussion of the actual employment of the RDF must focus on three issues. First, how to keep a U.S.-Soviet war "limited"? It is hard to imagine a clash in the Gulf in which the war does not spread worldwide via the sea as submarines and surface combatants, in close contact at various points around the globe prior to the initiation of hostilities, opened fire. Second, excepting local blockade, how could we use our relative advantages elsewhere to

achieve bargaining leverage, since the Soviets could threaten other areas also? Third, how to conclude a U.S.-Soviet war?

The lesson of Afghanistan is that we must attend to our military capabilities on a global level. The extended deterrence concept of the "1 War" on the Central Front simply does not apply. Nor does a light, quick-reaction force for a "1/2 War" provide a satisfactory answer when the opponent may well be the Soviet Union. We shouldn't swing our DoD sights to the Gulf as we did to the Central Front. If we are going to be serious about defending the Gulf against a global military power, we have to think globally, shore up our weak points around the globe, and identify and have plans for exploiting his weak points. Given the edge we have allowed the Soviet Union to gain, there is no way we are going to do all this on two or three percent real Defense growth, half of which is needed to match military pay to inflation.

II. Force Structure. If an RDF is to be designed to fight the Soviet Union (rather than to posture a frail American presence), then money is needed. The Defense budget in April of 1980 seems to be sliding back towards little or no real growth. The military pay raise is less than half that of inflation; skilled manpower is decreasing; the President has criticized the JCS for saying pay is inadequate. The cost of the MX, with or without SALT II, is enormous,

unsettled and growing. The U.S. has yet to fund critical antisatellite and antichemical programs. The unspecified new bases in the Middle East will cost billions. For these reasons it is unlikely that the RDF will be funded by a supplemental request by President Carter. It must be understood that the Defense programs for the next five years were devised in consultation with the Senate about SALT II in November of 1979. It is a pre-Afghanistan budget. If the budget is not modified by the President, then items in the existing Defense program must be deleted in favor of the RDF.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham W. Claytor assigned the leadership and force primacy of the RDF to the Marine Corps. This seemed a shrewd move, since the marines have the training and the C³ to combine tactical air and ground units, while using ships for logistic bases and carriers for close air support. Commercial ships soon will be dispatched to the Indian Ocean, carrying substantial combat and armored supplies. This is termed "maritime prepositioning" and it appears to be a sound and cost-effective force structure decision. In a crisis, most of the troops would be flown in while the equipment was unloaded before hostilities began. In terms of time/distance/logistics factors, it is credible that a combined U.S. Army/Marine force of division size could be in combat position in the Persian Gulf within a three-week timeframe. Although land-based

tactical air support for the division would prove difficult (consider the fuel, bombs and maintenance required), it is reasonable that carrier-based air would be available (probably before the ground forces were in position.)

But - so what? This force structure describes the 1958 Lebanon operation. Something like that may recur in the 1980s and, to that extent, the RDF is a prudent idea. However, in 1958 other nations held us in awe and we held nuclear superiority. If in the 1980s the situation demands more than the rapid introduction of a few divisions, the forces for the RDF will need substantial bolstering.

Until recent months, the Administration claimed its Defense strategy would, through SALT II, once again "cap" the nuclear arms race, while U.S. leadership in conventional forces had "rejuvenated" NATO. While these claims are no longer asserted, the Pentagon budget remains, due to bureaucratic inertia, fixated upon the Central Front. The United States invests much more in defense - and shows a much steeper procurement profile for the Central Front - than does any of our NATO allies, whether the measure is actual dollars invested, rate of growth, GNP for defense or percent of per capita personal income. Successful conventional defense of the Central Front, however, depends much less upon increased rates of unilateral U.S. defense spending than it does upon the reliability of France, ample warning time for mobilization and speedy logistic movement in a congested Western Europe.

Without a major shift in the existing five-year Defense budget plan, the RDF will remain a cosmetic. Through publicized exercises and Presidential speeches, the RDF concept may yield some foreign policy benefit during peacetime. The RDF is also a political instrument, which bypasses U.S. military commanders in Europe and in the Pacific and reports directly to the Pentagon. In theory, it establishes direct Washington and Presidential control over the battlefield. But in a deadly serious crisis when, for whatever reason, the Soviets are determined to advance, then the tangible distinction between a rapid deployment force and a combat deployment force will be painfully explained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whomever is the President of the United States.

III. Combat Capabilities. I very much hope that in our 1 April meeting we can discuss the nature and the parameters of a limited U.S. Soviet war, and from that discussion derive insights into the combat requirements for an RDF. To reverse the logic and to create an RDF and then to speculate on its effect upon a U.S.-Soviet war is ethnocentric and escapist. For decades we have had an RDF. What is new is the name and the direct operational control by the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. What is also new is that the Administration is publicly discussing a

U.S.-Soviet war outside NATO, although the overwhelming budgetary emphasis remains the Central Front.

What does this mean? In terms of a comprehensive framework about a limited U.S.-Soviet war, I don't know. At this stage, I would like to advance five subjects for discussion. First, if the Soviets are determined to make a military move somewhere around the Persian Gulf, they will attempt to preclude the landing of the RDF. The airfields for the CSA or the CX may not be in operational order. The Pentagon has assumed the civilian "maritime prepositioning" ships will require no programmed Navy ASW or AAW escorts. Hopefully, this assumption reflects only emotional prejudice and a lack of money and in reality the Navy will be ordered to provide escorts from NATO missions. In a deadly serious crisis, there would be no military sense in tempting the Soviet Union.

Second, carrier aircraft will provide the main surveillance/intelligence/EW/reconnaissance as well as interdiction/close air support for the RDF. The Navy has requested restoration from mothballs of one carrier, several battleships and cruisers for the RDF. The alternative is to carry out U.S. commitments in three oceans with a two-ocean navy. This can be done by permanently withdrawing most of the 7th Fleet from the Japan-Korea-China-Soviet Union quadrant in the Western Pacific. Since November of 1979 we have in

fact done precisely this. Of course, there will be an eventual cost to our credibility, since Secretary Brown has repeatedly assured there would be no further U.S. force withdrawals from the Western Pacific. Or, by 1984 we could homeport another carrier overseas (somewhere), visit the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf only occasionally and resume bilateral naval arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

Third, we could expand our Navy to seek leverage in a domain where we are strong to offset Soviet land strength. The idea of offset, or "Beta", deterrence was in vogue in the late 1950s. For instance, we once contemplated the deterrence of conventional attack against Norway by the threat of a tactical nuclear response against the Kola Peninsula. In a similar manner, we might infer that Soviet aggression against, say, Pakistan would risk the response of a naval blockade, or larger quarantine, or even some sobering manifest of our ASW. Secretary Brown is fond of asking whether five dollars in U.S. naval offensive systems are merited when they can be offset by one dollar in Soviet defensive systems. However, Defense officials also assert that ASW, and in particular underwater warfare, is among our very last remaining warfighting advantages and Secretary Brown has said strategic ASW is a U.S. advantage in his balance ledger of "Essential Equivalence". A U.S. nuclear attack submarine evidently can inflict damage far in excess of its own costs. On a larger scale, in a war limited to

the naval environment, the Soviets are at an extreme disadvantage due to our submarines and to our sea-based air, which outrange their antiship missiles. It can be objected that it is nutty to presume the Soviets would allow us to maneuver them into a conflict where we held the clear advantage. But are we not creating an RDF for potential conflict in areas where they will hold the clear advantage? Should we not retain at least one warfighting environment where the advantage accrues to us, short of escalation to a NATO War (if our allies will cooperate) or to a nuclear war? At present the RDF frame of reference excludes naval procurement and excludes any offset deterrence which utilizes our naval warfighting advantages. This oversight, or bias, should be corrected.

Fourth, the RDF focus upon ground combat does not rule out battle in Southwest Asia, where the Soviet Union would enjoy a land line of supply. So our troops would face heavy armor, which seems to be the key to victories in the Mideast and, presumably, on NATO's Central Front. Technologically speaking, there is no apparent reason why in the 1980s armor cannot meet its Battle of Crecy. Our ability to build and transport 60-ton tanks is limited. For years the Marine Corps has tried to pursue a very promising lightweight (14-17 tons) tank killer. The Marines have lacked the funds. Surely now that they are in the vanguard

of the RDF, they should be given a budget proportionately equal to that of our ground units earmarked for NATO. If the RDF encounters Soviet troops, the latter will be well equipped. The most pressing need of the RDF is for stopping power against armor. And if the Marine antiaarmor concept pans out, its application in NATO and elsewhere will prove a significant bonus.

Fifth - and last - let us return once again to the idea of a limited U.S.-Soviet war. That is what the RDF is all about. How do we define the terms of a limited war outside NATO? I don't know. It is clear we would be spotting the Soviets an enormous advantage on the mainland of Southwest Asia. On the peninsula of the Persian Gulf, the balance is ambiguous. Both sides would have long LOCs. Both would have to forward base and maintain tactical air and logistics, where our advantages are large. If the Soviets had to transit any sizeable body of water, they would be in trouble. Clearly the Soviets cannot tolerate a lengthy, (say, 2-3 years), limited war against the United States. For we would certainly be in the process of rearming our strategic as well as conventional forces and against an aroused America the Soviet Union could not compete over the long haul. The strongest deterrent to further Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia is probably not concern about U.S. combat troops being placed on the mainland; rather it is - or should be - that limited Soviet aggression (say, against

Pakistan) would result not in an Olympic boycott but in a doubling of the U.S. Defense budget, a draft and a Dulles-type foreign policy.

That observation is meant not to provide solace. It is meant to exclude as a planning factor the notion of a Soviet-U.S. limited war along the lines of the Korean War. How, then, should we plan the RDF? First and foremost, by not starting with the RDF. We must avoid turning the RDF into a placebo, or into an excuse for not thinking or for not investing. The RDF has a legitimate place in Defense strategy, but it is rather low in the investment hierarchy. Since the list of essential programs exceeds the Defense budget, hard choices loom between the current preferential rate of investment increase for NATO's Central Front and these items:

- the reduction of our growing ICBM vulnerability and the enhancement of a secure U.S. strategic counterforce
- a secure theater nuclear counterforce
- an antisatellite program
- a response to the Soviet chemical program
- a second-hand fleet, with cruise missiles, for the Indian Ocean
- an antiaarmor system for the RDF
- forward bases for the RDF.

The "1 & 1/2 War" strategy will not suffice for the 1980s. It is going to take some time and effort to develop a new and coherent strategy. The starting point for a new strategy is to understand what was wrong with the old one. Basically, we claimed too much for the role of extended nuclear deterrence, concentrated too exclusively on the Central Front, heeded too little the trends elsewhere. Now that we are looking elsewhere, with widespread domestic agreement that we must do "something", we must be careful not to promise the American public that there are cheap, easy fixes. I favor the RDF. But I fear we are trying to organize it on the cheap, without thinking through the enormity and the complexity of a "limited" U.S.-Soviet war outside NATO.

III. GEOPOLITICS AND MARITIME POWER

In the past, the United States Navy was fascinated with the high seas mission of protecting North Atlantic sealanes during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This fascination has only recently given way to the recognition that in many cases the most important parts of the seas are those adjacent to the land and that there is an inextricable link between political and military developments on land and the role and operations of forces at sea.

On September 17 and 18, 1980 the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University convened a seminar to analyze this important link between geopolitics and maritime power. The fundamental conclusion of the seminar held that political changes on land will have a profound impact on the Navy's ability to use the sea and that any naval strategy must be highly sensitive to this interaction.

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, assessed the broad geopolitical factors that will have an impact on the role and operations of the U.S. Navy.

Geopolitics, the relation of international political power to the geographical setting, received little attention after World War II due in part to the fact that geopolitics had been used to justify Hitler's policies prior to the war and was discredited as a consequence. It was also a result of the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles which made geographic factors seemingly irrelevant to the kind of conflict -- ie. a nuclear exchange -- with which defense planners were increasingly preoccupied.

In recent years, geopolitics has undergone a resurgence, largely for three reasons. First, the West's growing dependence on imported sources of energy, especially oil, has made policy makers more sensitive to geographic constraints. In the past, there was little concern about the physical terrain, demographic characteristics, or boundary definitions that may restrict the flow of oil. Today, those kinds of considerations are inescapable.

Second, the growth of Soviet power and an enhanced capability to project that power beyond the borders of the Soviet Union has invested hitherto ignored areas of the world with considerable strategic importance. Questions of distance, climate and infrastructure must be addressed by defense planners if the likelihood of confronting the Soviets in some of those areas are perceived to increase.

Third, the existence of a rough parity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the nuclear level has effectively negated any utility of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, conventional capabilities have a heightened significance, and geopolitical factors must be carefully evaluated if those forces are to be used effectively.

The present situation in the Persian Gulf brings these points into focus. It is the combination of the Gulf as a source of the bulk of Western oil, its strategic location and the region's volatility, instability and vulnerability to external intervention that makes it such a source of concern. It is a unique geographical setting in which all forms of international power -- the resource power of the Arabs, Moscow's

military strength, the commercial and diplomatic clout of the Japanese and West Europeans, and the leadership of the United States -- come to bear.

It is in this situation that the U.S. Navy has been inserted. The despatch of two carrier task forces to the Indian Ocean reflects the assumption that the American naval presence will have some impact favorable to U.S. interests on what happens in Iran and elsewhere in the region.

Developments on land, however, can also have a tremendous impact on naval operation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, provided Moscow for the first time with airfields from which Soviet naval aircraft can cover targets in the north-west quadrant of the Indian Ocean.

There are three conclusions to be drawn from this analysis regarding long-term operations of the Navy. First, as a result of changes on land, the Navy is likely to confront changes in terms of its access to some regions. It is not difficult to conceive, for example of events in the Philippines, Indonesia, central America or southern Africa that would diminish the ability of the Navy to transit certain areas, and ultimately to control the seas. The assumption of power of anti-American government in the Philippines that forces the Navy out of its base at Subic Bay, greater pressure on the Panama Canal as a result of growing guerilla activities in Central America, or closure of the Straits of Hormuz during a civil war in Iran are only a few of the scenarios that might be suggested.

Second, the potential impact on naval operations of political developments on land requires naval planners, indeed all defense policymakers, to be more sensitive to instability in areas other than the Gulf. Central America and the Caribbean basin have recently received greater attention, and in the future some other region may be the locus of crisis. The Navy will likely be sent to these areas. A credible naval strategy, therefore, must be developed not only on the criteria of being able to defeat an enemy fleet, but also on a basis that will allow the Navy to influence situations on the land effectively.

It is not only political crises, however, which will affect the future of naval operations. Broader factors, such as changes in the world economy and shifting logistics of resources will also have an impact. The shift from wood to coal and then from coal to oil, for example, each created a new geopolitical situation for the British Navy in the nineteenth century and imposed new operational requirements as a result. The rapid technological change that is characteristic of the last half of the twentieth century will surely have a similar effect.

Third, the concept between "landpower" and "seapower" is artificial, and the naval environment cannot be divorced from the land and air milieux. Land, air and naval forces are not alternatives, but complement one another. They must be viewed as working together.

It can be argued that during this century, air power has revolutionized the naval environment. The most potent offensive

naval system is the attack carrier with its mix of aircraft. Improved land-base tactical air power has complicated immensely the projection of naval power against the shore. Maritime reconnaissance has been improved immeasurably by the introduction of even more capable reconnaissance aircraft and satellites.

The logical extension of this argument confronts the U.S. Navy with a serious question: What will be the role of the Navy in outer space? The Navy cannot ignore the question for two reasons. First, technological developments in space are likely to have serious implications for the outcome of conflicts or potential conflicts on the earth's surface, including naval operations. Second, as the push to develop outer space economically increases the size of national investment in this newest frontier region, there will be a more intense requirement to protect that investment. Because international law is not always effective, some insurance in the form of military protection will be required. To what extent should the Navy be involved in defining the national security requirements in the development of outer space?

While the remainder of the seminar did not consider the question of the Navy's role in outer space, it did address the relationships outlined by Kemp and others between the geopolitics and maritime power in specific regions, including the Caribbean, and Latin America, the Indian Ocean, southern Africa and the South Atlantic and Western Pacific.

The Caribbean

Three interrelated issues form the core geopolitical concerns for the United States in the Caribbean basin: 1) the importance of the region in supporting U.S. national security; 2) the growing number of poor, underdeveloped mini-states in the area; and 3) Cuban activity

The Caribbean's geopolitical importance to U.S. national security is difficult to underestimate. Its geographic proximity to American shores, its role as a link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its resources and its historically close association with the United States are all key considerations for U.S. policymakers. Developments in the area, therefore, cannot be divorced from events elsewhere. If conflict were to erupt in Central Europe, for example, 60% of the supplies required to resupply NATO forces in the region, including all of the POL would be shipped from ports on the Gulf of Mexico and transit Caribbean sea lanes. Admiral Train, current Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, has indicated he would take one carrier task force "off the top" to safeguard these supplies.

A vast majority of America's oil imports are also carried over maritime trade routes in the Caribbean. Those oil supplies are frequently refined at key locations on Caribbean islands such as Trinidad. These supplies could be disrupted at sea by developments on some of the islands controlling key waterways. An equally if not more disturbing possibility is the destruction of refineries on the islands as a consequence of domestic violence.

The United States would be hard pressed to find alternative refining capabilities.

The fact that many of these islands are terribly poor mini-states beset with severe economic, demographic and social problems makes the possibility of such domestic violence more likely. The problems are not limited to the islands, of course, but are shared by many of the nations on the Caribbean littoral as events in Nicaragua and El Salvador clearly demonstrate. In many Caribbean countries, as illustrated during the campaign prior to the elections in Jamaica, violence is never far from the surface and is ready to boil over.

Such a situations is ripe for exploitation by actors looking to foment instability. Castro's Cuba has a wide-ranging, multi-faceted program to encourage anti-American developments and promote a regional environment more amenable to Cuban (and Soviet) goals. That program includes direct servicing of Soviet needs by providing port and repair facilities for Russian naval and merchant vessels, as well as covert support of leftist insurgents in Central America or opponents of pro-Western regimes in Caribbean islands. It also has an active social action dimension to its activities that provides doctors, teachers, and financial contributions to meet basic human needs, thereby casting Castro as the "true friend" of needy states in the area.

In this environment, the role of the U.S. Navy is twofold. In the event of conflict, the Navy must protect Caribbean sea

lanes and support the actions of land-based U.S. military forces. There is little likelihood, however, that any state in the area (or even the Soviet Union) would engage the United States in a direct military conflict.

More importantly, therefore, is the Navy's role in support of U.S. political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. The nature of the threat to U.S. interests in the area is not really military. Rather, that threat takes the form of domestic violence resulting from deep-seated economic and social problems. The major thrust of U.S. policy therefore must be directed toward alleviating these difficulties, and as such, U.S. policy can only assign a secondary, support role to the Navy. The challenge to U.S. policy in the Caribbean is to recognize that change in the area is inevitable, to define what kinds of change will be most favorable for U.S. goals and to work to achieve that change without destabilizing the region. The major requirement for the United States, therefore, is to develop better instruments for economic and political aid to the civil powers. It also demands an approach that is coordinated with other interested parties such as the former colonial powers in the area, especially France and Britain, as well as influential actors in the region itself including Mexico and Venezuela.

Given this requirement, military force can be held back as a last resort. Naval forces, in particular, can provide a security backdrop so that political and economic development can proceed. Occasional U.S. naval presence in the region,

for example, which the U.S. long neglected, can bolster other efforts to maintain regional stability by presenting a dramatic symbol of the American commitment to the area's peace and security. If the United States is to achieve its goals in the Caribbean, the Navy must be a limited, but necessary component of American strategy.

The Indian Ocean

U.S. defense planners must demonstrate greater creativity in their thinking about the Indian Ocean, especially the Persian Gulf area. In the past, there has been a tendency to compartmentalize and isolate the Israel-Arab dispute, events in the Persian Gulf region and developments in Pakistan from one another. A more useful approach would be to consider southwest Asia a strategic whole. There is a constant interaction among these areas as well as between events in southwest Asia and Europe. Some conceptual value can be gained by thinking of the Gulf area as an extension of NATO's southern flank, although the Alliance clearly will not include the area formally in its zone of responsibility.

In assessing the region's geopolitical situation, three additional factors must be taken into account. First, the reason for attention to the Gulf area is Western dependence on the area's oil. Much additional interest derives from that dependence, e.g. stability of Gulf regimes, reasonable oil prices, no external intervention in Gulf affairs and so on. If the need for oil from the area would be removed, U.S. interest

in the Persian Gulf area would diminish drastically. As long as that dependence remains, there will be a close linkage between energy, security, and the military balance in the region.

Second, Soviet activities in the area have increased considerably. Moscow has sought to bolster its position from one end of the area to the other, from India to Ethiopia. Moscow's military diplomacy on land has been supplemented by the growth of the Soviet Navy, as well as by effective use of the Soviet merchant marine.

Third, the geography of the region itself imposes serious constraints on possible military operations. From the mountains of Iran to the arid deserts of the Arabian peninsula, the terrain, climate and other geographic characteristics of the Gulf area create a variety of serious problems for military planners. Logistical support of forces in the region is a nightmare.

In a conflict situation, therefore, success will require the ability to put trained ground forces into combat. In order to confront this requirement effectively, U.S. defense planners must resolve the interrelated difficulties of rapidity, access and allies. Under present conditions, the land forces that would have to be deployed in the case of a Persian Gulf crisis must come from somewhere outside the area, most likely from the United States. The distances involved are enormous, thereby reducing the speed with which the United States could get its forces to the scene. Yet, speed is of the essence, for the outcome of a crisis could depend on the exercise of military power.

To help alleviate this difficulty, the United States must gain access to facilities throughout the region. Access, of course, depends on the consent of countries such as Oman, Kaya, Egypt and Somalia where the United States has negotiated some access agreements. Through such agreements, however, the United States develops informal allies who, then, must be supported, creating additional political, diplomatic, economic and military requirements for U.S. policy.

While access to facilities in the region will be of great importance, the United States must exhibit more creativity in thinking about how to get forces to the area.

What is the role of the U.S. Navy? As in the Caribbean, in situations short of conflict, the Navy can play a support role by bolstering American political, diplomatic and economic efforts. In this context, the Navy's task is to contribute to regional stability. The Persian Gulf area is extremely fragile in that there are severe pressures toward instability. An American naval presence in the region symbolizes a U.S. commitment to its friends and allies and might prevent destabilizing actions by U.S. adversaries. To this end, there is no substitute for naval forces in the region given their flexibility and relative responsiveness to political sensitivities of local actors.

In conflict situations the Navy will be extremely important despite the fact that land forces would ultimately determine the outcome. Nevertheless, the Navy would play a crucial role

by buying time for land forces and keeping a conflict under control until those forces arrive. For the Navy to do so effectively, however, U.S. defense planners must resolve a major problem, that is, the large gap that exists between U.S. conventional capabilities that could deal with a regional brushfire (even if improved by a Rapid Deployment Force) and American strategic nuclear forces. The United States faces two dilemmas in coping with hostilities in the Persian Gulf region:

First, the thinly stretched carrier force must be called upon and, perhaps relied upon exclusively, to respond to anything but the most limited conflict.

Second, even with the carriers, the United States is thin in its capability to conduct or more importantly, deter hostilities above low-level conventional conflict but short of a nuclear homeland-to-homeland exchange.

The problem is, therefore, those situations when the United States is faced with the need to bring large scale conventional forces to bear in the region quickly, but before there is time to assemble the massive presence represented by several carrier battle groups. This need defines a requirement for opening the U.S. surface fleet to a more offensive mode that should include a capability to respond if adversaries introduce chemical or biological weapons or even tactical nuclear weapons.

One technology that could be creatively utilized as a step toward solving this difficulty is the sea-launched cruise missile (SCLM). Greater exploitation of SCLM technology could prove to be a flexible and comparatively quickly available bridge over the gaps that have emerged. This is not to argue that SCLMs are

an alternative to carrier-based aircraft. Clearly, they are not. But as cruise missile technology improves the utility of SCLMs as a complement to aircraft increases significantly.

Implicit bargaining among all adversaries would be an important dimension of any Persian Gulf conflict. To bargain effectively, however, demands usable power, that is, a military capability at all possible levels of escalation. Naval forces, properly equipped and utilized, offer a way to achieve that capability.

Southern Africa and the South Atlantic

In the past, American defense planners have considered southern Africa as something to get around. Several developments, however, are investing the region with an importance of its own. First, the region is a source of key strategic minerals on which the United States, Western Europe and Japan are increasingly dependent. In some cases, that dependence exceeds Western needs for imported oil. Given that many of these minerals are vital to continued industrial vitality, especially for a healthy defense industry, that source of mineral supplies must be safeguarded.

Second, the Soviet Union has made sizable inroads into the region. Not only does the Soviet Navy have access to key ports along the African littoral, but its political influence in countries such as Angola and Mozambique represents a potential destabilizing factor in the area. Moreover, through an aggressive arms transfer policy, Moscow has been able to make headway in

countries not considered to be close friends of the Soviet Union (eg., the transfer of MIGs to Zambia and Madagascar).

Third, southern Africa represents a point of potentially serious friction between the United States and its allies in Western Europe. The reaction of U.S. allies to developments in the region are not always commensurate with the American response. The French, for example, are very protective of their relationships in Africa and would find any U.S. policy that might threaten those relationships (e.g. a U.S. move closer to South Africa) difficult to accept.

In developing U.S. policy toward southern Africa the United States is confronted with three basic questions:

- 1) Does the United States actively support the right kind of change in South Africa?

The U.S. relationship with the Republic of South Africa is the key question for U.S. policy in the area. The United States is faced with the difficult problem of balancing the need to encourage change in South Africa and to maintain good relations with black Africa with the contribution that South Africa can make to U.S. security. South Africa itself is a source of many of the strategic minerals and its strategic location makes it a key factor in U.S. planning for potential conflict in the Indian Ocean or the South Atlantic. The United States could jeopardize its relations with the rest of black Africa, however, if it moves toward closer relations with Praetoria without demonstrating an American commitment

to change within South Africa.

These considerations are related to the other two key U.S. policy questions.

- 2) Should the United States allow the Soviet Union to militarize potential conflicts in southern Africa, especially South Africa?

The one sphere in which Moscow can compete with the West in the Third World is the military. If the Soviets were successful in militarizing conflicts in southern Africa, it would create greater opportunities to move developments in the area in a direction more favorable to Moscow's interests.

- 3) Should the United States compete in the black states north of South Africa?

Whether by design or fortuitous circumstances, the Soviet Union has been able to entrench itself in some of the black African states north of South Africa including Angola and Mozambique. It is making serious overtures to Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. The future of these countries will largely determine the future of the entire region. If the United States, indeed the entire Western Alliance, does not compete in these countries and others like Zaire where the potential for instability is high, its ability to maintain its interests in the area will be undermined.

These geopolitical concerns define a more limited role for the U.S. Navy in the south Atlantic than in some other parts of the world. The issues do not readily lend themselves to influence through the application of naval power. The stakes

in the area, while high, are not as immediately threatened as elsewhere. Other regions such as the Gulf must receive higher priority given the Navy's limited assets. Moreover, the geography of the region (especially with the United States denying itself access to the excellent facility at Simonstown in South Africa for political reasons) lends itself even less to sustaining a naval presence in the region than in other areas such as the Indian Ocean.

This is not to argue that American naval planners can ignore the south Atlantic. Sea lines of communication in that area are vital. Supplies from southern Africa are critical. The potential threat to them both is growing.



The Center for Strategic and International Studies

APPENDIX A

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street Northwest / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202/833-8595
Cable Address: CENSTRAT

CONFERENCE

on

G E O P O L I T I C S A N D M A R I T I M E I S S U E S

Third Floor Conference Room

September 17-18, 1980

September 17

5:00 - 5:30 p.m. Registration
5:30 - 6:30 Cocktail Reception
6:30 - 7:30 Dinner
7:30 - 8:30 Opening Remarks:

Vice Admiral Staser Holcomb, USN
Director, Navy Program Planning

8:30 - 9:00 Discussion

September 18

9:15 - 10:15 a.m. Panel I: GEOPOLITICS AND MARITIME POLICY

Paper: Professor Geoffrey Kemp
Fletcher School

Discussants: Professor Francis West,
Naval War College; Ambassador Michael
Samuels, CSIS

10:15 - 11:30 Panel II: GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND MARITIME
POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN

Paper: Pedro Sanjuan
American Enterprise Institute

Discussants: Ambassador John Norton Moore,
University of Virginia; Ambassador Robert
Anderson, CINCLANT; Professor Michael
McGwire, Brookings Institution

September 18 (cont.)

11:30 - 12:45

Panel III: GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND MARITIME POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Paper: Hon. R. James Woolsey
Former Undersecretary of the Navy

Discussants: Mr. Richard Burt, New York Times; Dr. Dov Zakheim, Congressional Budget Office; Dr. Alvin Cottrell, CSIS

12:45 - 2:00

Lunch

2:05 - 3:45

Panel IV: GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND MARITIME POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION

Paper: Dr. Richard Bissell
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Discussants: Dr. Chester Crocker, CSIS; Rear Admiral Robert Hanks, USN (Ret.), Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; Dr. Kenneth Adelman, Stanford Research Institute

3:45 - 5:30

Panel V: GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES AND MARITIME POLICY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Paper: Dr. Gaston Sigur
George Washington University

Discussants: Dr. Ray Cline, CSIS; Professor W. Scott Thompson, Fletcher School; Captain James Patten, CNO's Executive Panel

5:30 - 5:45

Closing Remarks:

Dr. David M. Abshire, Chairman, CSIS

5:45 - 6:30

Cocktails

As of 9/15/80

Geopolitics & Maritime Issues Conference

Meeting Acceptances: Sept 18, 1980

Kenneth Adelman
Stanford Research Institute

Michael Donley
Office of Senator Jetson

Dora Alves
CSIS

Cdr. D. Gentry
Dept. of the Navy

Amb. Robert Anderson
CINCLANT

John Goshko
Washington Post

Cdr. Roger Barnett
Dept. of the Navy

RADM Robert Hanks, USN
IFPA

Richard Bissell
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Robert Helm
Senate Budget Committee

Capt. A.M. Bowen
Library of Congress

Harold Hinton
George Washington University

Frank Bray
Asst to Senator Humphrey

VADM Staser Holcomb, USN
Dept. of the Navy

Richard Burt
New York Times

Douglas M. Johnston, Jr.
Harvard University

James Bierbower
Georgetown University Law School

Amos A. Jordan
CSIS

Capt. Craig Campbell
Dept. of the Navy

Wynfred Joshua
Defense Intelligence Agency

John K. Cooley
Carnegie Endowment for Int'l. Peace

Al Keel
Senate Armed Service Committee

Charles Corddry
Baltimore Sun

Lt. Cdr. Kelsey
Office of the CNO

Alvin Cottrell
CSIS

Geoffrey Kemp
Fletcher School

Ray S. Cline
CSIS

RADM Lee Kollmorgen, USN
Dept. of the Navy

Chester Crocker
CSIS

Lawrence Korb
American Enterprise Institute

Anne Crutcher
Washington Star

Capt. Ronald Kurth
Dept. of the Navy

Bradford Dismukes
Center for Naval Analysis

RADM Charles Larson
Ofc. of the Chief of Naval Operations

Meeting Acceptances: Sept. 18, 1980

Chris Lehman
Asst. to Senator Warner

Bill Lind
Legislative Asst. to Senator Hart

Michael McCwire
Brookings Institution

James McConnell
Center for Naval Analysis

Bud McFarlane
Senate Armed Services Committee

Cdr. Kenneth McGruther
Dept. of the Navy

David C. Martin
Newsweek

Curt Matthews
Baltimore Sun

Michael Moodie
CSIS

John Norton Moore
University of Virginia

RADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.
Dept. of the Navy

Capt. Norman Mosher, USN
Asst. Undersecretary of the Navy

Ralph Nahra
SACLANT Headquarters

Robert Neumann
CSIS

John O'Shaughnessy
House Budget Committee

Berton R. Otto
Special Asst. to Congressman Chappell

Capt. James Patten
CNO Executive Panel

Charles Perry
IFPA

Charles Pirtle
University of Pittsburgh

Norman Polmar
Jane's All the World's Aircraft

John Pond
Dept. of the Navy

Richard Porth
Foreign Policy Research Institute

Sean Randolph

Amb. Michael Samuels
CSIS

Pedro Sanjuan
American Enterprise Institute

Ben Schemmer
Armed Forces Journal Int'l.

Gaston Sigur
George Washington University

Lindley Sloan
Pacific Forum/Honolulu

David Sullivan
Asst. to Senator Humphrey

Vincent Thomas
Navy League

W. Scott Thompson
Fletcher School

Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr. (Ret.)

Francis J. West
Naval War College

Hon. James Woolsey
Shea & Gardner

Dov Zakheim
Congressional Budget Office

David Kassing
Center for Naval Analysis

Meeting Acceptances: September 18, 1980

Dimitri Simes
School for Advanced Int'l. Studies

Charles C. Chadbourn
Naval War College

Walter Hahn
Strategic Review

Kristin Hinds
Naval War College

APPENDIX B

GEOPOLITICS AND MARITIME POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

R. James Woolsey
Michael Moodie

Lloyd George once defined the most dangerous thing in the world as leaping a chasm in two jumps. This essay examines the problems of bridging two gaps---that between our security requirements and our capabilities in the Indian Ocean; and that between conventional and strategic nuclear deterrence.

SETTING THE SCENE

The Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region has been the highest non-European priority for American policymakers since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. The reason for such undivided attention is simple: oil. In the last half of the twentieth century, industrial democracies have developed economic systems that must have oil if they are to maintain their vitality, their pleasurable lifestyles, and their security. Indeed, they must have oil to survive.

The source of much of that oil lies in the Persian Gulf region. The United States imports approximately 45% of the total oil it consumes, and about 25% of those imports come from the Persian Gulf. American allies such as Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France depend upon imports for almost all of their oil needs, and a major share of those imports is produced in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Other American interests in the region are derived from this dependence. Obviously, the United States and its allies are deeply concerned by anything that might threaten to shut off the flow of this vital commodity, whether it is domestic instability in a major oil producer or external pressure on essential lines of communication over which the oil is transported. American interest in maintaining a regional power balance reflects the need for a stable environment for continued oil production. The U.S. search for access to facilities along the Indian Ocean littoral was spurred not only by the need to protect the sea lines of communication from the Gulf but also by the interest in having a proximate staging area from which U.S. power could be projected in times of crisis. In short, if the need for oil from the region were removed, interest in the area would become considerably less intense.

In setting the region's geopolitical scene, three additional factors must be considered. First, Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region have grown considerably during the last decade. From one end of the region to the other, Moscow has sought to bolster its strategic position. Mrs. Gandhi's accession to power in India has produced a more workable relationship for Moscow with the dominant power in the subcontinent. On the westernmost littoral, the Soviet Union has supported the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia against both Somali forces and Eritrean guerrillas. Moscow has developed a close comradely relationship with the government of South Yemen and secured access to Aden's excellent facilities

(improved by the Soviet Union) in the process. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was just the latest in a series of moves that has made the Soviet Union a weighty presence in the region.

In these efforts Moscow has been supported by Cuban and East German surrogates, who have considerably assisted in the performance of Moscow's clients. The Cubans have concentrated primarily on assisting local armed forces and the East Germans on improving internal security and police forces.

Moscow's military diplomacy on land has been supplemented by the growth of the Soviet Navy, which has evolved from a coastal protection service to a force capable of operations anywhere in the world. Moreover, Moscow has used its merchant marine effectively to provide much of the physical support--arms, equipment, other material--that the Soviets have supplied to regional clients. During the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict, for example, Soviet merchantmen were frequently seen to be unloading weapons at Ethiopian ports. While Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean have not always been extensive, they have not had to be. In situations short of war, frequent port calls, the monitoring of Allied naval activities, and occasional large naval displays are sufficient to create the perceptions of a sufficient naval presence in the region.

The second regional factor that complicates the U.S. position in the Gulf area is the interaction of events there with the relationship between the Arabs and Israel. The policies of all Arab states, including the Arab oil producers of the Persian Gulf, are conditioned by the continuing dispute

with Israel. It is an issue deeply rooted in centuries of conflict and competing religious tenets. In some cases, the Israeli issue may be used as a pretext for playing out inter-Arab rivalries. But whether it is in the foreground or the background, the Arab-Israeli issue is a constant factor that must be accommodated in any policy toward the Persian Gulf area.

The problem is particularly acute for a United States which has become the arbiter of a Middle East peace settlement and the staunchest supporter of Israel. The strong opposition to the Camp David agreement in most of the Arab world has expanded the already difficult barriers confronting an effective American Persian Gulf policy. For example, the likelihood of continuing Arab-Israeli problems makes it very difficult to station any significant number of men on land to maintain facilities in the region. Another war between Israel and any Arab states would produce enormous pressure for another oil cutoff as occurred in 1973.

The third complicating factor in the geopolitical environment of the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area is the geography of the region itself and the enormous logistics problems which that geography creates. In an excellent study of the historical evolution of logistics, Martin van Creveld argues that after World War I, as a consequence of the changing nature of warfare,¹ "strategy became an appendix of logistics." This is particularly true today for U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf area. Logistics problems have driven American policy and strategy.

A major logistic problem confronting the U.S. is the vast

distances that must be covered. Diego Garcia, while it will be an excellent site for supporting Indian Ocean deployments, is 2100 miles from Aden and 2600 from Bahrain. Facilities at Mombassa in Kenya are almost as far. Australia, a solid American ally, has offered Cockburn Sound on the nation's west coast as a base for a U.S. Indian Ocean naval contingent. Mounting operations from that location, however, would be comparable to mounting them from Subic Bay in the Philippines. It would have the advantage of avoiding the potential choke points of the Malaccan, Lombok, and Sunda Straits, however.

To compensate for the distance, the United States has concluded agreements with Oman and Somalia for access to airfields and port facilities in both countries.² There is nothing automatic, however, about such access. Both agreements have attendant political problems that could serve to deny the United States access to those facilities when it is most needed.

Recent attention has focused on the possibility of American use of facilities at Ras Banas in southern Egypt. Across the Red Sea from Jidda, Saudi Arabia, in a remote, unpopulated area of the country, Ras Banas is currently a relatively minor naval facility with a primitive airfield. Some reports indicate that the United States has decided to allocate \$400 million to upgrade the facility to a major site. Administration sources denied such a figure had been decided upon, and even that the decision to go ahead was made at all. Another possibility is the Etzion air base, one of two Israeli

air bases in the Sinai that must be returned to Egypt by 1981. Perhaps the best air base in the region, it is about the same distance to the Persian Gulf as Ras Banas.

Egyptian facilities could prove particularly useful, especially for air transport and reconnaissance operations, although operating from there in the Arabian Sea would be stretching too far. Even so, there is a long term potential for political instability in Egypt. To base a strategy on access to these facilities, therefore, is to build a foundation on shaky ground.

The United States must have land based support to sustain operations in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area. Logistics demands are too great to be met without it. On the other hand, total reliance on access to shore facilities that are subject to the vagaries of regional or domestic politics in the host states is equally untenable. The United States must devise a form of operations that utilizes both shore based and sea based logistics and has the flexibility to move from one to the other when the need arises.

Such a task will not be easy, especially since the United States does not have much operational experience in the area. The U.S. Mideast Force has consisted of only a handful of ships. Consequently, the United States must begin to develop operational expertise---for example, to begin to understand what shipyards are available in the area for particular kinds of repairs, what food is available locally, how the climate might affect both men and equipment, what local

transportation networks can handle, and similar matters. Such expertise will come with time as it did in the Mediterranean after World War II. In the meantime the United States must pursue a diplomatic and political strategy that will ensure that adequate time will be available.

It is in this overall context, then, that the role of naval forces in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region must be considered. The geopolitical setting is more complex, more fluid, and less hospitable than many others. Historically, however, there have been few combinations of place and time where the stakes have been as high.

THE PROBLEM

There are three main questions:

- 1) What will naval forces be expected to do?
- 2) Do naval forces have the capabilities to perform those missions?
- 3) How will geopolitics affect that performance?

Two introductory points are important. First, the focus should be upon the Navy's role in a conflict or crisis in the region. While the logistics difficulties discussed earlier create problems for peacetime naval operations, those problems are not insurmountable. The issue is not how best to handle peacetime port calls, reconnaissance flights, and other such operations, but how to be prepared to fight.

Second, it must be recognized that addressing naval operations in the region in isolation is virtually useless.

The role of naval forces in the Persian Gulf will be primarily to influence the situation on land. The naval environment, therefore, cannot be divorced from the land and air environments, because events in one milieu will strongly influence events in the other. Consequently, naval operations must be considered in conjunction with land based operations, whether they are conducted by our own forces or those of our allies. The air environment is important as well. A case can be made that the party who quickly secures control of the air in a conflict in the Persian Gulf holds the key to ultimate success.

In looking at a possible conflict in the Persian Gulf region from this perspective, a major problem becomes apparent. It is a variant of the many problems associated with the United States's loss of escalation dominance. The notion that by virtue of its strategic nuclear dominance, the United States could forestall a conventional attack or other action short of a nuclear war in Europe or elsewhere has been wounded by the Soviets' achievement of parity (or better) at the strategic nuclear level. American strategic nuclear dominance had once extended to make up for gaps in capability at lower levels of hostility that are now becoming all too apparent. Escalation dominance demands that no such gaps exist. Their existence relinquishes control over the process of conflict to the adversary and leaves to him the choice of taking the next escalatory step.

American forces on all levels have problems, but a serious difficulty is the large gap that exists between U.S. conventional

capabilities--even if improved by the rapid deployment force--and American strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, conventional military power--particularly control of the air--is heavily dependent on the thinly stretched carrier force. As a consequence, the U.S. faces two dilemmas in case hostilities threaten in the region. First, the thinly stretched carrier force must be called upon, perhaps relied upon exclusively if land based airfields are not available early for political or military reasons. Against Soviet, or sophisticated client-state, threats three carriers might well be needed---three-fourths of our total forward-deployed battle groups. Second, we are thin in our capability to conduct or deter hostilities at levels above low-level conventional conflict but short of a nuclear homeland-to-homeland exchange.

The conventional level, success on land has always required and will require the ability to put trained ground forces into combat. Since U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region suffer severe disadvantages as a consequence of geography, the United States must take a two-pronged approach. It must work closely with allies like Egypt to ensure that adequate numbers of personnel can reach the area, and it must improve its own in-theater capability to conduct and support ground operations.

Progress is being made on both fronts. Even the consideration of allowing U.S. access to air bases and other facilities in Egypt shows the willingness of President Sadat to assist in preserving stability in the Gulf. The quiet cooperation of the Sultan of Oman also demonstrates the role that U.S. friends

in the area can play.

In terms of American capabilities in the area, access to regional facilities, even on a limited basis, will help considerably. The Rapid Deployment Force has been the subject of considerable controversy. While the specifics of the Force's design and its exact role can reasonably be debated,³ the fact that the need for some such capability has been recognized is a major step in the right direction. Administration plans to build and preposition containerships are another positive development, as is its effort to enhance American airlift. Some contend that the United States is not moving fast enough to improve its capability to project conventional forces ashore in the Persian Gulf area, but there is movement, and that is a hopeful sign.

There is also movement on the strategic nuclear front. While there is disagreement about whether there is now an imbalance of nuclear forces to the disadvantage of the U.S., there is a general consensus that we must do something to improve the standing of our strategic nuclear forces relative to the Soviet Union. Whether one seeks to make that improvement through MX, through "quick fixes" to improve Minuteman survivability, through moving a greater proportion of the deterrent to sea, or through some combination, the problem is one on which there is a broad consensus in favor of renewed effort.

But some key problems for American defense policy exist at levels between the two---in the realms of intensive

conventional conflict, chemical warfare, and tactical nuclear weapons. If a conflict were limited to a low-level action such as one between Yemeni and Cuban forces meeting Omanis, Egyptians, and--once the RDF is in full operation--perhaps even U.S. Marines supported by a carrier in the Dhofar, we might do rather well. But things might, to put it mildly, get out of hand rather quickly. We might rather quickly see, for example, the use of sophisticated aircraft with South Yemeni markings and curiously Slavic-sounding pilots. The threat or use of chemical weapons against U.S. or allied forces cannot be discounted. One cannot count on limited conventional conflicts staying limited and conventional in all senses of the word for long. Long inattention to developing capabilities to meet these sorts of challenges has created gaps that have undermined America's escalation dominance. This has brought us dangerously close to losing the ability to avoid the Soviet Union's stepping up the level of escalation to a point where we are forced either to threaten to escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange or to capitulate.

If a regional ally such as Egypt is willing to commit ground forces, the United States has a capability to respond to low-level hostilities in the Persian Gulf region. With some variant of the RDF, that capability could be significantly enhanced. The problems begin, however, when the United States is faced with the need to bring large scale conventional force to bear in the region quickly before there is time to assemble the massive presence represented by several aircraft carrier

battle groups.

Such a requirement may be generated by a confrontation with Soviet forces. That need not be the only time, however, for the sophistication and military capabilities of many regional actors has improved significantly. Iraq, for example, fields some 3,500 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, including Soviet T-62s. In the air, the Iraqis fly MiG-23s and 21s. At sea, they are reportedly ready to take possession of 10 Nanuchka-class missile boats and Exocet-armed Cherbourg fast patrol boats to supplement their Styx-equipped missile boats. Nuclear weapons may be in the hands of such nations as Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan before the end of the decade. Chemical weapons may conceivably be available even sooner. These types of increasingly sophisticated arsenals in the hands of countries in the area could prove quite potent in a regional conflict, especially if the client state is assisted, or if the arsenals are used directly, by Soviet, Eastern European, or Cuban "advisors". Given present U.S. capabilities, sophisticated regional adversaries would require the United States to deploy carrier task forces to the region in order to bring adequate force to bear in a conflict. For some types of conflict, for example those involving chemical weapons, carriers may themselves face severe problems. Moreover, as it now stands U.S. force planners must rob Peter (and Fred, Sam and everyone else) to meet a requirement for several carrier battle groups, denuding other regions where the need for carriers may also be critical. New carrier construction now would not bear fruit until the late eighties. The United States should

look for the means to improve quickly the amount of force that might be brought to bear in intensive conventional hostilities, chemical warfare, and theater nuclear warfare or it may soon lose its ability to deter those types of conflict.

Recent evidence suggests that gas may have been used by the Soviets or their clients in Afghanistan and Cambodia. There are also sketchy reports of its use in Ethiopia. The size of Moscow's chemical arsenal is unknown with estimates ranging between 3% and 30% of their conventional armaments.⁴ The means of delivery include artillery shells, aerial bombs, sprays and mines. The Russians have also developed chemical warheads for their Frogs, Scuds and Scaleboards. The mysterious outbreak of anthrax at Sverdlovsk suggests the possibility of work on bacteriological weapons as well, and of a lack of regard for treaty limitations in such fields.

The American arsenal of chemical weapons is limited, to say the least. Such self-denial may have been appropriate at a time of clear U.S. nuclear superiority or in the presence of verifiable arms limitations, but disregard now for developing a modern capability to deter this sort of conflict is to ignore the current reality of Soviet efforts. Beyond the issue of production of such weapons, however, serious consideration must be given to how we might have the delivery systems to provide a credible deterrent in parts of the world where land basing is impractical.

Similar consideration must be given to deterring the use of tactical nuclear weapons, or of primitive nuclear weapons by a

growing number of third world nuclear powers. There may be situations in which the threatened use of tactical or primitive nuclear weapons in countries outside the European theater is a possibility. Not to have the capability to respond to such threats in kind could have extraordinarily serious consequences.

A basic problem, then is the absence--apart from the deployment of several aircraft carriers--of any meaningful American capability in a broad range of the spectrum of possible conflict in parts of the world where land bases may not be available. Another dimension of the problem is time. The window of Minuteman vulnerability in the early 1980's, on which many noted analysts have commented, if not agreed, holds for some of these other capabilities as well. The question then is, within some reasonable time, what can be done?

A STEP TOWARD A SOLUTION

There is nothing that will march smartly off the development boards of the Department of Defense to solve all of the above problems. To relieve some of the pressure, however, the United States must be innovative in using technology and systems that it now has or will soon be available. One technology that could be creatively utilized and adapted as a step toward solving a range of these problems is the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).

Cruise missiles on surface ships have generally been regarded as anti-ship weapons and those on submarines have generally been assessed in the tactical nuclear role. Regionally, submarine-launched cruise missiles have been evaluated almost

exclusively in a European context since the debate over NATO's theater nuclear modernization set out differences over the advantages of SLCMs versus ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs. Little thought has been given to the potential utility of tactical nuclear SLCMs in regions outside Europe. Nor have they been thoroughly evaluated for chemical or conventional roles in land attack missions as a way of reducing time pressure if not the absolute requirement for carrier battle groups. Greater exploitation of cruise missile technology in these ways could prove to be a flexible and--for some uses--a comparatively quickly-available bridge over the gaps that have emerged in U.S. capabilities.

In situations where there is a threat of intensive conventional conflict, for example, it is not necessary to claim that several, or even several dozen, cruise missiles with conventional warheads would be more capable against land targets than carrier-based air strikes. Of course they would not. But as cruise missile accuracies improve, and the development of such systems as runway-penetrating sub-munitions progresses, the utility of conventional-warhead cruise missiles grows apace against targets such as airfields. Surface ships and submarines armed with such cruise missiles in the Indian Ocean would have the advantage of bringing greater power to bear against the shore than is now possible without committing two or three carrier task forces. A single carrier accompanied by SLCM-armed surface vessels and submarines would constitute a more potent projection force than if the carrier had to do the whole job

alone. With adequate intelligence, cruise missiles might, for example, have great utility in suppressing enemy defenses. And until a carrier arrived, attacks by conventional-warhead cruise missiles could buy time. This capability could be crucial since air supremacy would be such a key element in any Persian Gulf conflict. A number of the right kind of conventional-warhead cruise missiles could not do to the base at Aden what a carrier strike could, but the South Yemenis, East Germans, and Soviets in residency there might usefully be made to reflect upon the prospect that--even without a carrier around--U.S. naval forces on station could almost instantaneously ruin their whole week.

One must also consider at the conventional level the possibility of sea-to-sea action. As the Soviet Navy continues to grow and improve its capabilities for distant operations the possibility of such action increases, especially if they secure access to warm water facilities additional to those in Aden. Although this would probably be less of a problem than countering Soviet or client-state land-based forces, at present it would still require carrier operations. What is needed, therefore, is a capability to create more problems for Soviet naval units at greater ranges than is now possible other than with carriers. Cruise missiles used in an anti-ship mode could be a step toward that capability since they would allow submarines and surface ships to engage targets, even perhaps Kiev-class vessels, at some distance. Admittedly, there would be the need for surveillance, utilizing P-3s, V/STOLs, remotely-piloted vehicles, helicopters, or other intelligence systems. Whether this requirement would

demand the presence of a carrier is another question, especially if the United States had access to some facilities along the littoral.

At the level of chemical warfare, the recent evidence of the use of gas by the Soviets or their proxies demonstrates a willingness that is not likely to diminish, especially against an opponent that has not provided himself with a similar capability. Without modern chemical weapons in the theater, the United States would run the serious risk of not being able to deter the use of gas against U.S. or allied forces on the ground or American ships. In such a case, we would then be faced with the choice of escalating to tactical nuclear weapons or capitulating. Binary chemical warheads for sea-launched cruise missiles are not now available and would take some time to develop, although they are well within American engineering capability. A decision to go ahead, however, must be made soon if the window of vulnerability in this area is not to open further.

Finally, in the tactical nuclear mode, seaborne cruise missiles would have several advantages. First, surface ships and especially submarines armed with tactical nuclear cruise missiles would constitute a secure, regional tactical nuclear capability. Second, they would avoid many of the political problems with friends and allies associated with the basing of land-based nuclear systems on their soil. These problems may be surmountable with our NATO allies. They are not likely to be so in the rest of the world. Third, they would represent a mobile

force that could be deployed at one time to one region, such as the Persian Gulf, or at another time to the Western Pacific or even as a supplement to tactical nuclear forces in Europe. The flexibility and credibility of such a seaborne force would make it very difficult for Moscow to exert subtle or overt pressures toward escalation to the tactical nuclear level in a serious crisis in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere.

Arms control considerations may lead in the future to the possibility of certain limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles, such as were present in the Protocol related to SALT II; if so, such limitations should only be agreed to after a thorough consideration of the advantages of the above sorts of roles for such weapons.

CONCLUSION

The Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area is a region of special importance to the world's industrial democracies, including the United States. It is also an area in which the potential for conflict is high and in which the conflicts that do occur are likely to be intense. Such a combination of factors generates strong pressures for superpower involvement in regional hostilities. The moment the United States and the Soviet Union become involved, directly or indirectly, there is the threat of escalation of a conflict to higher levels of destruction and ultimately to a strategic nuclear exchange.

Implicit bargaining among all the adversaries will be an important dimension of any conflict in the Persian Gulf

involving the United States and the Soviet Union, even if military hostilities occur. To bargain effectively demands useable power. Power, in such an event, requires military capability at all possible levels of escalation. With the chips it now has the United States can stay in the game for a while as long as the bet is not raised. Once it goes up, we must fold, bluff, or bet the family farm. None of these is very attractive. Naval forces, properly equipped and utilized, offer a way out of this dilemma.

APPENDIX C

SOUTHERN AFRICA
AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN NAVAL POWER

by

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Southern Africa and the Future of American Naval Power

The role of American naval power in and around the southern African region is the object of increasing debate. As I understand the purpose here, we are not to debate the definition of the mission of American naval forces in the region, but rather to delineate some of the salient trends in countries of the region that will affect the ability of the U.S. Navy to operate in those waters, in pursuit of missions in the region or elsewhere. At the risk of some oversimplification, the mission once described by Mike McC Gwire will be used: "to prevent the use of the sea to one's own disadvantage, and to secure the use of the sea for one's own purposes."¹ In any consideration of southern Africa, too, it is necessary to remember that we are dealing with very diverse concerns, from the open seas of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans to the critical passages and harbors of the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Channel.

After the relatively calm period before 1974, the last five years have witnessed a revolution in naval trends in southern Africa. Some of the inputs of that revolution have been widely-noted, some were trumpeted loudly and did not come to fruition immediately, and some influenced Soviet and American strategists in ways not yet recognized. The clearest change to affect the political map of the region was the dismemberment of the Portuguese colonial empire. While the ports of Angola and Mozambique

were not heavily used by NATO forces, given the American attempt to separate policy towards metropolitan Portugal from policy towards the colonies, the transition to control by Moscow-oriented governments allowed for the significant entry of Soviet naval forces on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Reconnaissance flights by TU-95s operating out of Conakry shifted their focus from the entrance to Gibraltar and the central Atlantic to the Gulf of Guinea and the Angolan coast.² The posting of Soviet intelligence ships off the coast of Angola during the initial phase of that country's civil war was a Soviet contribution to monitoring South African activity, and the periodic appearance of a Soviet cruiser, destroyer, and related auxiliaries helped to underline the extent of the Soviet commitment to the war. Other Soviet warships were dispatched along the north-western coast of Africa, the entire line of naval vessels apparently supporting the air- and sea-lift of troops and supplies then underway from Cuba and the Soviet Union.³ Of some relevance to later changes in the environment, only Guinea and the Congo Republic provided the Soviet Union and Cuba with transit basing rights during their operations in the Angolan theater.

In the case of Mozambique, the transition to a Soviet presence was much less dramatic, and the rumors of attempts to acquire naval bases in Mozambique by the Soviet Union have led to few concrete results. In part, the lack of success reflects the

decision by Mozambique to pursue a limited detente with South Africa; an overt Soviet base would jeopardize the South Africa-Mozambique economic ties that sustain what is left of economic activity in the former Portuguese colony. Secondly, the Soviet Union is conforming (formalistically) to the proscription against foreign military bases laid down by the Organization of African Unity. This issue is of great importance, as discussed later, but suffice it to say that the political sensitivities of the Soviets lead them to provide a cover for whatever basing activities are created in African countries. Finally, the loss of Western access to ports in Mozambique is sufficient for the Soviets at the moment; the deployment of Soviet naval vessels in the southwestern Indian Ocean is very limited at the present time, even though it appears to be increasing. The Soviet focus remains on the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. All that is required in Mozambique is visiting rights and the maintenance of a politically-friendly regime.

One instructive pattern in the Soviet relationship with Angola and Mozambique, however, lies in the pattern of naval aid transfers. It has been noted previously that the Soviet Union does not encourage African states to take on the responsibility of sophisticated naval systems, particularly those that exceed the mission of coastal defense; "in particular, none of the surface vessels supplied to the Third World present a particularly

dangerous threat to the Soviet Navy.⁴ This pattern has continued in Angola and Mozambique, with only a few patrol craft and one landing craft (to Angola) being provided.⁵ Clearly their navies are not going to challenge the South Africans in any way, and in case of a confrontation with the South Africans or a non-African opponent, such as the United States, they would need to call on the Soviet Union for help.

A second change that has affected American and Soviet naval planning in southern Africa dating from the mid 1970s has been the relative importance of and relative access to the northwestern Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union lost its privileged relationship with Egypt in 1975-76, and with that break, created additional problems for its sea lanes of communication between the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the increasing vulnerability of the United States and its NATO allies to interruptions of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf has increased Western apprehension about the Cape of Good Hope route. In the parallel race to increase influence in southern Africa and to reduce the importance of the Cape route, the United States is clearly taking steps to de-emphasize the importance of the Cape. The special relationship with Egypt has been one step. The construction of the trans-Saudi pipeline and related pipelines (SUMED) at Suez may do much to cut traffic at the Cape. In addition, the expansion of the Suez Canal combined with the general downsizing of tankers is likely to reduce the use of the Cape route for oil supplies to the

United States and Western Europe. Such steps, if needs to be recognized, do not directly increase American control in southern Africa, but in reducing a sense of vulnerability, the United States may gain greater flexibility in dealing with the contorted politics of southern Africa. The Soviet alternative to controlling the Cape route has been expansion of land-based influence in South Asia. The loss of the Egyptian connection was a serious change for the Soviet Union, but one that would be amply remedied by access to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and either Pakistan or Iran. The principal Soviet interest in southern Africa, undeniably, is the overthrow of the South African government and the installation of a pro-Soviet government; but to be rushed into that change is not a Soviet aim. The Soviets cannot allow their goals in the northwestern Indian Ocean to be hostage to developments in southern Africa, given limited resources, but the severing of ties with Cairo has made that development more likely.

From the American perspective, the loss of access to southern African ports has come at an unfortunate time: when American naval activity in the Indian Ocean is increasing. The loss of access, of course, has involved both closure of ports by the black-ruled states and self-denial by the United States and in South Africa. The need to make a choice between black and

white Africa has been postponed by freedom of access to the Suez Canal; that such access may not last forever may have to be taken into consideration. Certain black-ruled African States, understanding of the American dilemma in Africa, have temporarily eased American problems by providing limited port rights.

Another major problem is developing for the American position in southern Africa in the level of arms transfers into the region -- a favorite method of the Soviet Union for increasing its influence.⁶ As recently as the early 1970s, the principal sale item for the Soviets in southern Africa was the AK-47, to arm the various guerrilla movements in the region fighting white-controlled governments. In the 1974-75 period, the scale of weapons transferred changed substantially. The first escalation involved weapons for land warfare: tanks, armored cars, and artillery. The most recent phase has involved aircraft, in particular MIG-21s, sold to both Zambia and Madagascar. The Zambians were even willing to pay commercial terms for the aircraft, while the leaders in Tananarivo got a special deal: three planes free, nine at half-price, and the other three at "full price."⁷ The introduction of advanced aircraft inevitably begins to impinge on naval activity in the area. The MIG-21s may not be involved directly in anti-naval

activity -- although its successor, the MIG-23, does have a significant range, and will almost certainly begin appearing in southern African armories soon -- but one can expect that the appearance of Soviet technical experts to service the Soviet fighters in Zambia and Madagascar will be followed by visits from other Soviet aircraft with greater capability. The ability of Madagascar to command the Mozambique Channel as well as important parts of the Indian Ocean makes it a fixed aircraft carrier; in that sense, there is simply a special bonus in the extent to which the Soviets may also be able to influence access to Diego Suarez at the northern tip of Madagascar. The important issue at Diego Suarez is not American access, but rather access by the French, to whom the United States has in large measure entrusted security in the southwestern Indian Ocean. The long-standing admiration for the French manipulation of security interests in countries such as the Seychelles, Madagascar, and Djibouti may be badly tarnished by the current tensions between France and Madagascar; for, however independently France may be aligned with Western security interests, there appears to have been much faith vested in the French ability to exclude the Soviet Union from the best port facilities in this region. An arms race in the southern

African region is underway, as testified by the recent Soviet sales, and it is unclear whether the West (either the United States or France) will be involved.

The most important change in southern Africa in the last year, however, is the implementation of the containment doctrine against South Africa. The doctrine has long been promulgated, quite ineffectively, by individual countries and in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. One of the most unacknowledged effects of the settlement in Zimbabwe, however, has been the placing of the keystone in the barrier against South Africa. The sides are being drawn, under the strong leadership of Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's President, and the American response will affect greatly the future of American naval power in the region.

Despite the fact that Zimbabwe just emerged from a fifteen-year civil war, it faces many of the same problems as its neighbors and allies on the rim of South Africa: Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola. The people must be fed, despite decreasing crop yields, and the economy must be restored, in the sense of encouraging investment and the creation of jobs. Thus there is a "capitalist" trend in all of the countries mentioned, of which much has been written, that includes the opening of trade links

with South Africa and facilitating American and European investment. Of greater long-term importance, however, is the creation of defense ties between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (which includes all of the black-ruled states of southern Africa). The strategy of the latter grouping, briefly put, is to create a common market with a vastly expanded and coordinated infrastructure that will attract foreign investors in South Africa to invest instead north of the Limpopo. Regional groupings have been created before, to be sure, with an anti-South African bias; the SADCC, on the other hand, has an existing rail infrastructure (from coast to coast) that can be the basis of development, and it is attempting to achieve its goals in cooperation with the West (by providing a favorable investment climate) in order to break South Africa politically.

One omen for the future of the SADCC is the persistent effort of Zaire to be included in the scheme: President Mobutu has escalated his anti-South African rhetoric and hosted meetings with the leaders of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. That a "moderate" state such as Zaire would want to be included has caused similarly-inclined states to the north to take the SADCC plan very seriously. It is now expected that the SADCC

leaders will approach Western Europeans and the American government for several billion dollars to fund their approach to change in southern Africa. That this is a form of confrontation with South Africa is undeniable, and the likelihood of escalation, if guerrillas are allowed to operate from any of the SADCC territories, is very high. The attitude of the United States, then, will determine greatly the political direction of this anti-South African coalition. Three out of the four SADCC anchors (Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia) are relying heavily on Soviet arms, and Mugabe may compromise his visceral opposition to the Soviets if the South Africans press him hard on the borders, and if there is a drift toward standardization of weapons and political alliances. Both Mozambique and Angola, after all, have formal Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union -- making them members of the "socialist commonwealth." Without a strong American initiative, the persistent pressure within the SADCC coalition is likely to be in the direction of Soviet Union. If Zaire were to join, it would mean taking the entire thrust of African political thinking in a leftward direction. The movements in southern Africa, then, do not simply have sub-regional significance. The spillover from southern Africa is likely to affect the American position throughout the continent.

During the days of disorganized opposition to South Africa by the African states, there were few stark choices. Boycotts were declared, and could safely be ignored, by both African and non-African states alike. The SADCC approach, however, is one inspired by the Nigerians: either you do business with us, or you do business with the South Africans, but not both. Such a message, said in a sweet way, particularly when sweetened with investment opportunities in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, or other mineral-rich areas, is likely to be increasingly seductive. One can be sure that the countries contributing to such a plan will be those obtaining the military access needed in the African region. At the same time, South Africa is clearly becoming unhinged from many traditional attitudes, and what cooperation remains between the West and South Africa would certainly be imperilled by ties between the SADCC and the West; the South Africans have already objected to it loudly. When coupled with South African writings about neutralism and the discussion of mineral boycotts of the West, (see below), the creation of a stark choice will be -- even more evidently than at the present -- unpleasant for the United States.

The other arena for major changes in the region is within South Africa. Here I refer not to the student riots in Cape Province or the bombing of the SASOL coal liquification plants.

Those incidents reflect the condition of law and order, a field where the current prime minister is allowing the public much free rein, and will undoubtedly take up slack if disturbances appear to shake the stability of the government in any major way. The important issue in South Africa is the drastic change in their view of the future international order, and what role may be played by the United States; from that formulation comes their interest or lack thereof in facilitating an American naval presence in the southern African region.

In the wake of the Portuguese revolution, the study of strategy received a new boost in South Africa. The assumptions that had guided what little foreign policy thinking occurred in South Africa were placed in question, and were generally found wanting. Thus, the assumption that Western Europe and the United States were the ultimate repositories of South African security was gradually abandoned. The view that the West would, at least through covert intermediaries, supply the arms for South Africa's self-defense was demonstrated to be false on a number of occasions. And a final assumption, that sustained anti-communism would ensure a beneficent attitude from the United States, was disposed of by the Carter Administration during its tenure since 1977. The result was the

evolution of South African attitudes of greater independence, declining interest in ties with the United States, a commitment to indigenous arms production (probably including nuclear arms), and a sense of losing cushioning barriers to the north from whence the principal enemy would come. One attitude that does remain intact, by and large, is that the principal threat to South Africa is from the land, and not from the sea. At the same time, there is certainly a willingness to measure the sea-borne threat to the West that influences Western attitudes to South Africa.

The process of political change -- and the change of major policies -- in South Africa is largely a closed process. When a possible change actually appears in print, one can assume that it is essentially adopted, given the source is reasonably authoritative. The discussion of non-alignment for South Africa's foreign policy has reached the print stage.⁸ For all intents and purposes, the South African government has detached itself politically from the West, and most especially from the United States. The years of continuous American hostility towards South Africa's racial policies have finally convinced the South African leaders that their independence in domestic issues will mean the termination of what was formerly

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a close relationship. Those terms have been accepted by the South Africans, given their commitment to an independent policy. Non-alignment in the South African case does not mean adherence to the "movement" of non-aligned nations, but rather a desire to stand outside the principal east-west political divisions in the world. The strong South African rhetoric denouncing Soviet support of African revolutions tends to undermine this drift to non-alignment, and increased east-west tensions would move the South Africans back towards the West. The many issues of contention between South Africa and the West, however, are a source of constant erosion of their relationship. Responsible South Africans, for instance, speak of using their important role in supplies of critical minerals to the West as a form of "informal blackmail;" they compare it to OPEC in oil. The tensions are exacerbated by a loss of respect for the United States: the increased vulnerability of the American economy, the deep recession of the West as South Africa continues record growth rates, the tepid response of the United States to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and most importantly, the sense of betrayal in Angola in 1976.

Much of the South African disillusionment with the United States can be dated from the 1976-1977 period. When the South Africans were in the process of cleaning out the Cuban forces

in Angola, the American Congress placed restrictions on American activity in Angola; the South Africans felt that they had been left out on a limb and withdrew, leaving the MPLA in charge in Luanda. South Africans hoped, in their quest for a renewal of the American alliance, that Secretary of State Kissinger would be replaced by a "more sensible" administration that would not have to operate so "deviously;" in Kissinger's place, they got Andrew Young. Given the active courting of the Angolan and Mozambican regimes that occurred in the Carter Administration, the South Africans eventually adjusted to a strategic future in isolation, drawing occasional strength from acquaintances with similar complaints against the United States (e.g., Israel, Taiwan, Paraguay) but otherwise expanding domestic arms production and going along with American restrictions on informal cooperation. Little has occurred in the course of American behavior during the Zimbabwe settlement that would reverse this trend of disillusionment with the United States.

The result, in terms of American naval activity in southern Africa, is the necessity for the United States to reconsider the availability of Simonstown and other South African harbors in time of emergency. It has been an operational axiom of American naval planning since the termination of the Simonstown agreement that the West could use it anytime Western navies

thought it really necessary. Two things would occur before the facilities would be available in current circumstances: (1) South Africa would consider, from its own self-interest, whether the conflict forcing American use of Simonstown were one in which South Africa wanted to be involved; and (2) South Africa would consider the price (political and/or economic) to be charged for such access very carefully. The first South African consideration would be in line with the emerging European practice to be selective in granting of access to American forces in case of non-NATO crises. The second consideration is more insidious, in conveying the loss of respect commanded by the United States in South African strategic planning. If South Africans consider the strategic trends to be moving so badly against the United States that the latter may not have a future in the southern African region, one can be sure that the price would be very high.

It may be, of course, that the internal situation in South Africa will deteriorate in conjunction with the emergence of an elite that sees Western intervention as positive. In that case, the tasks for the American Navy would be very different, in deterring non-Western vultures from seizing South Africa, which is, after all, the real crown jewel of Africa. It seems that such a challenge, if it emerges, is a long distance down the road, and one that need not be a part of current naval planning.

Southern Africa, then, does pose particular challenges for naval planning in the 1980s. The challenges are not extra-ordinarily complex; the likelihood of a coherent American response, however, is sufficiently small as to ensure that the region will complicate American naval planning. In this area, as in most other areas, naval planning is largely hostage to overall American policies, and the denial of base rights throughout southern Africa is a very possible outcome of current trends, both within the region and in outside responses to those trends.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Michael McCwire, "Comment" in James L. George, ed., Problems of Sea Power as we Approach the Twenty-First Century, (Washington: AEI, 1978), p. 201.

² Charles C. Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations," in Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 77-78.

³ Abram N. Shulsky, "Coercive Diplomacy," in ibid., pp. 144-151.

⁴ Michael L. Squires and Ann R. Patterson, "Soviet Naval Transfers to Developing Countries, 1956-1975," in Michael McCwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Influences (Praeger, 1977), p. 532.

⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-1980 (London; 1979), pp. 48, 52.

⁶ See my "Soviet Military Aid to Africa," Paper presented to the AF/INESS Conference, September 1980.

⁷ Paris AFP, June 27, 1980, in FBIS Middle East/Africa, July 1, 1980, p. U3.

⁸ See, for instance, Denis Venter, "South Africa: A Non-Aligned Posture in Foreign Policy?" South African Journal of African Affairs (1979), pp. 178-190.

APPENDIX D

THE POLITICAL SETTING IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

by

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THE POLITICAL SETTING IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

In the Western Pacific as elsewhere, a central factor in the political relationships in the area over the past several years has been the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power. This event has taken place in direct ratio to the growth of Soviet military strength. The Soviet leadership, as a result of this increasing power, have been more confident in their own actions and more willing to assume risks in their long-range efforts to spread communist ideology and Soviet influence.

Concomitant with this Soviet global outreach has been a decline in the fortunes of the United States. The political leadership in Washington in recent years has seen fit to play down the international responsibilities of the United States and to play up the limitations of America's ability and willingness to assume a leading role in world affairs. There has been an ambivalence in America's actions and a contradiction in the words of its policy makers that have confused our friends and given comfort to our adversaries. The perception of the United States as a vacillating, confused nation unsure of its goals and objectives in the global arena is unfortunately a rather pervasive one at present, not least in the Western Pacific area.

This perception must be reversed if there is to be the unity needed in the Western Pacific to stand against the increasing Soviet naval power in that region. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has become a major factor in the balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific. It is backed by

powerful Soviet land and air forces in Soviet Asia, including Backfire bombers. The Soviet fleet now has critical bases which it can make use of in Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. The USSR is in the position to use this fleet to further the political aims of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as the father of this fleet, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, has said.

However, in political terms, the communist nations in the Western Pacific have their troubles.

The Soviet Union, for all its increasing military power, still finds itself in a confrontational situation with the People's Republic of China. China, so far, has refused to succumb either to Soviet threats and massed Soviet men and materiel, both nuclear and conventional, on its borders, or to Soviet blandishments and offers to return to a fraternal socialist relationship, if not to an outright alliance.

Among Third World countries, the Soviet Union and China usually support different groupings of Marxists. In Southeast Asia the Chinese, for years, backed the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia (Kampuchea) while the Soviets give full assistance to the Vietnamese in their efforts to achieve control of the Indochina Peninsula and, perhaps, beyond.

The Chinese have stated in clear terms that they will act if Vietnam invades Thailand. What this means in real terms is not known. But certainly the conflict that exists in Southeast Asia among the communist states is one that will probably continue.

In Northeast Asia, the Sino-Soviet dispute influences the dangerous and volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula. Both the Soviet Union and

China seek to have Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader, support their particular positions in the international political arena. Kim plays a cagey game, attempting to adopt a relatively neutral posture but having to recognize that North Korea is a client state of the Soviet Union, requiring Soviet aid and assistance to maintain and sustain a powerful offensive military capability.

As Soviet power grows, as the Soviet Union acts more and more to further its global aims and objectives by means of the threat or use of this power and as tensions in the communist world mount, it is imperative that the United States and its allies and friends strengthen their own security unilaterally and collectively. In this regard, what is the situation in which we find ourselves today and how do we see the future?

There is an increasing apprehension in the Western Pacific area about Soviet designs and the capacity of Moscow to carry them out. There is an increasing feeling that the United States is not willing and, unfortunately less able than in the past, to stand in defense of its interests and those of its allies. The first step, therefore, to be taken to improve security in the area is for the United States to bolster its own forces and to indicate its willingness and readiness to stand by its commitments. This means simply more than words from Washington. It requires action.

The most important political and security relationship that the United States has in the Western Pacific is with the Japanese. The Japan-U. S. Security Treaty, which came into effect originally in 1952, has expanded into a full-fledged alliance system between Tokyo and Washington.

Particularly in the very recent past and at present, the United States and Japan cooperate closely in security planning and in the exchange of military information. Japan relies on the United States for her safety against external dangers, but, more and more, the Japanese leadership understands that Japan must contribute more to her own self-defense.

There are real and psychological limits to the extent that Japan can increase her security role in the Western Pacific. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution remains a block used by those who oppose any enlarged military role for Japan, either at home or in the region. Laws that flow from this constitutional article further define, in somewhat narrow terms, the mission of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

But great strides have been made in recent years in re-defining the security position of Japan by the Japanese government, the political opposition, and the general public. A no-holds-barred debate on security issues has been taking place in the media and within the political party system itself. As a result there is a growing realization that Japan faces a dangerous world and must react accordingly. This does not mean that Tokyo is ready to engage in any massive rearmament effort. It does mean, however, that Japan will be doing considerably more to provide for her own defense. This has come about as a result of a perceived danger from the Soviet military build-up in the Pacific, that is, the burgeoning Soviet naval presence in the Pacific, the Soviet installation of the most advanced weapons and weapons systems in Siberia, and the Soviet reinforcement of its forces on the four disputed islands north of Hokkaido. Recent published studies by the Japan Self-Defense Agency and the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs show clearly just how seriously the Japanese now take these ominous moves by the Soviet Union.

The Japanese also have long expressed concern about the effect of any major increase in their defense forces on other countries in the Western Pacific, in particular, on those countries that suffered under Japanese occupation during World War II. This is a legitimate concern, but memory fades as time passes, and most of the non-communist countries in Asia now welcome a stronger Japan. Their preference is for a Japan, in concert with the United States, doing more to insure the security of the region in certain selected ways. This means, particularly, a more important contribution to the defense of the sea lanes in the Western Pacific.

Politically in Japan the stage is now set for the development of policies by the government which will further expand Japan's contribution to the defense of her own shores and possibly to those of her neighbors in an as yet indirect manner. What might be seen as positive developments in this regard include the acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces by almost all of the population of Japan as necessary for the security of the nation, the support of the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty by a large majority of the Japanese people with even the grudging acknowledgment by the opposition Socialist Party that it would not be appropriate to do away with the Treaty immediately, and the disappearance of opposition to Japan's armament increases by friends and allies of the U. S. in Asia. It also should be pointed out that the stability of post-World War II Japanese society portends the successful implementation of any course which Japanese leadership determines is best to promote Japan's security interests.

At this point in time Japan's Self-Defense Forces are not adequate for any sustained defense of Japan against a powerful aggressor. Japan is reliant upon the United States not only for the nuclear umbrella but for support to repel any form of military invasion. The United States currently has air bases on the Japanese islands, and the U. S. Seventh Fleet is based in Yokosuka. At one time, demonstrations against these installations were an almost monthly occurrence, but no longer. Japan also now makes much greater financial contribution for the support of these bases than before. The present security arrangements between Japan and the United States are, therefore, ones without major problems.

However, many Americans believe that Japan should proceed more rapidly than is presently the case in expanding her armed forces and her participation in the defense of Japan herself and the surrounding region. The dialogue between Japan and the United States on this matter must continue at every level, both official and unofficial. However, Americans involved in such a dialogue must not fail to remember that the final decision on Japan's defense has to be made by the Japanese themselves, and that any undue pressure on Japan, public and otherwise, can be counterproductive. The Japanese are a proud people, as are we, and will not easily accede to what may seem to them to be unwarranted arm twisting, even by well-meaning friends from the United States. In the final analysis, Japan's decisions on defense will depend much upon Japan's interpretation of the world balance of power and American power. This is a central fact which we in the United States will forget at our peril.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is dangerous and explosive. The expressed determination of Kim Il-sung to unify Korea, under communist terms, can only lead to the persistence of the tensions between the Seoul and Pyongyang regimes. The threat of military confrontation is always present as both sides maintain powerful forces on both sides of the 38th parallel. The South Koreans must have the strength to make the North realize that any invasion by them, full-scale or otherwise, will not succeed and will lead to disastrous consequences for them. To doubly ensure this, the United States must show its firm determination to retain ground forces in South Korea until any threat from the North is dissipated.

The U. S. Seventh Fleet is a crucial part, together with the units of the ground and air forces stationed on Korean soil, of the American deterrence in the area. Movements of elements of this fleet to other possible danger spots, such as occurred in 1980 during the Iranian crisis, weaken its deterrence value to a critical degree.

The United States has a strong ally in the Republic of Korea. Over the past ten years or so, the Seoul government and the Korean people, assisted with U. S. and Japanese capital, have achieved an economic miracle. At all levels the economy has moved ahead. This has been accomplished at the same time as political stability has been the rule. The U. S. commitment to South Korea's defence is essential if progress in every field, economic, political, and social, is to be attained in the future so that the Republic of Korea can sustain its position as one of America's strongest and most dependable allies in the Western Pacific area. The assurance of the Korean-American partnership is needed if the power balance in the region is not to be seriously upset.

Towards the People's Republic of China the United States pursues a policy of improving overall relations and strengthening economic and political ties. More and more students from China are coming to the United States and missions of various kinds from and to both countries are becoming regularized. Businessmen from the United States spend more and more time in Beijing, Canton, and Shanghai seeking to reach agreements with Chinese officials which will lead to greater trade and economic exchange.

In the defense area, U. S. and Chinese officials confer frequently and arrangements have been made to sell to the Chinese certain equipment and technology which will assist them in making preparations to meet any attack from external quarters. The matter of arms and technology being transferred from the U. S. and/or its NATO allies to China is a delicate subject and one that is constantly under discussion, both within and without the government. In fact, the larger question of how far the United States should try to push its ties with the People's Republic is a very pertinent one and is constantly under review. But one thing that the United States has got to insist upon in its developing ties with China is reciprocity. Without reciprocity at all levels, the relations between Washington and Beijing will never be able to attain their true and hoped-for potential.

The situation in Beijing appears to be stabilizing. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping the Chinese have moved to establish a secure and sure succession in the future and to put in place in positions of authority those within China who want to move ahead in a more pragmatic and less ideological fashion with China's modernization program. If China

persists in this course, this in itself will be a factor contributing to stability in the Western Pacific area. But the tremendous problem of how to govern a country of almost one billion people remains a major cause, among numerous others, for uncertainty about the future of this great country made up of peoples with vast differences in cultural backgrounds and beliefs.

Off the coast of China, the island of Taiwan holds a position of great significance in the security of the Western Pacific. The sea lanes through which pass the oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia, so essential for Japan's livelihood, are located close to Taiwan's shores. This land with about 17 million people has achieved remarkable success in the past 30 years by creating a strong, vigorous, and growing economy and an increasingly pluralistic society. Taiwan's success serves as a model for all other countries in the Western Pacific, not excluding her closest neighbor, the People's Republic of China.

While the United States does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it does maintain close and friendly relations with that country. These relations are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed by the Congress by overwhelming vote and signed by the President.

Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is pledged to provide military assistance to Taiwan to allow her to defend herself against possible aggression. This is meant to contribute to stability and peace in the Taiwan Straits and also to show to other countries in the Pacific region that the U. S. does not casually abandon its friends and allies.

Following the Vietnam War disaster in 1975, the United States seemed to want to pretend that Southeast Asia either did not exist or, at least, was of no importance to the United States in the world political arena. American policy makers, for a year or more after the fall of Saigon, seldom referred to Southeast Asia and did not speak of it as relevant to U. S. foreign policy interests. This attitude changed when the Carter Administration took office.

In 1977 the Administration appeared to be counting on renewing American concern with Southeast Asia through recognition of the communist regime in Hanoi. Washington officials professed to believe that by acknowledging by means of diplomatic recognition the Vietnamese conquest, somehow peace in the region would be enhanced.

This approach has not proven successful for a variety of reasons, the most important being the determination of Vietnam to use military means to accomplish the subjugation of the entire Indo-China area, with Soviet backing, and the consequent opposition of China to this display of naked power and aggression. Continued armed struggle in the Indo-China region and the danger that it may spread create a tense and explosive situation which could involve one or more nations now under American protection. The situation involving Thailand is the most immediate danger point.

The decision of the Vietnamese to invade Cambodia (Kampuchea) and attempt to replace that country's genocidal leadership with another brutal dictatorship has led to continued armed struggle in Kampuchea. This in turn has created a refugee and food problem of immense proportions and a critical confrontation between Vietnamese troops and Thai

defenders along the Thailand-Cambodia border. Large-scale fighting could break out any time. Any Vietnamese attempt to move deeper into Thailand would probably trigger a positive response by China; at least the Chinese have said it would, and the United States would have to consider its responsibilities for the Thais.

Meanwhile the Soviet influence in Vietnam grows. Even though it is true that the Vietnamese are an independent-minded people, they have moved ever closer to Moscow in order to gain Moscow's aid and protection as they implement their plans to assure control over all of Indo-China and increase their influence in Southeast Asia.

As conflict among the communist nations in Southeast Asia seems certain to be continuing for some time in the future, it is imperative that the United States develop a policy which will serve to dampen the effects of this conflict on other non-communist states in the region.

First of all, the United States must see to it that our power is sufficient to protect our basic commitments in the area. This means that the Seventh Fleet must have the strength to defend the sea lanes that pass through Southeast Asian waters. It also means that the Fleet must maintain a presence in the area sufficiently visible and at-the-ready to deter any aggressor tempted by displays of weakness. Most importantly, the United States should make it unmistakably clear that it intends to stand by its friends and allies and that a spill-over of fighting among the communist forces into non-communist countries will not be tolerated.

Secondly, the United States should make it clear that it intends to retain its bases in the Philippines. These are essential if the

American Fleet is to have the necessary forward positions and maneuverability to protect not only the Western Pacific, but the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. This entire ocean area is tied together and its security must be perceived as contiguous and related. Without a strong and secure Western Pacific, there can be no security or safety for U. S. friends and allies in the Persian Gulf. Philippine bases are essential for the carrying out of U. S. strategic goals in this regard and the Philippine President and people are in accord with this interpretation which is also critical to their own defense and security.

Thirdly, the United States should provide support as it is required and sought by the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). The five countries that make up this organization--Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand--are all relatively stable societies, and have banded together in ASEAN to better move forward in their plan to bolster their economic well-being and improve the standard of living of their people.

Economic progress has been steady in most of the ASEAN nations during the past several years. This has been accomplished in part with important assistance from the United States, and especially from Japan. There is no better way for the U. S. and Japan to help to redress the imbalance of economic well-being between the so-called North-South nations than to aid the developing states of Southeast Asia. The need is clear and the assistance is welcomed. The importance of the region to the security of the Western Pacific is obvious.

Up until now, the ASEAN organization has really not concerned itself with military issues. However, this could change in the future, as the situation in Southeast Asia becomes more menacing and the dangers of military confrontation resulting from the communist struggles increase.

Individual ASEAN countries, of course, have their own military establishments and their own arrangements for defense. Defense means having sufficient forces to combat armed rebellion at home, as well as aggression from outside. And the United States must be prepared to help in both instances with the supply of needed equipment; and with the necessary U. S. deterrence force in the region, it is unlikely that the latter case of outside attack would even take place.

In discussing security in the Western Pacific, the U. S.-Australia-New Zealand alliance is of paramount significance. Australia and New Zealand are not only situated in strategic locations in the area; they are also staunch advocates of mutual security agreements and understand the trite but true saying, "Those who do not hang together will hang separately." Australia and New Zealand have never flinched from facing the uncomfortable and unpalatable when their national survival has been at stake. They can be relied upon to contribute their share to the development of a more clearly defined and supportable Western Pacific strategy and to take a major part in its implementation.

CONCLUSIONS

One central fact we must face at the present time in world history is that the Soviet Union has become a global power. In order to project that power to foster and further its global interests, the Soviet Union

is continuing to build up a military force structure second to none. This includes strategic nuclear weapons and the means of delivery, as well as the technologically most advanced conventional arms. The Soviets believe that what they call the "correlation of forces" is in the favor of the so-called socialist states, and that the highly industrialized world with its superior standard of life is on the way down. In the Western Pacific area Moscow is increasing its naval strength to challenge the U. S. Seventh Fleet which has been and is the major American deterrence force in the area.

It is essential that the United States maintain its fleet at top strength in the Western Pacific. If not, the Soviets will attain a major objective--that is, to show America's allies and friends that the U. S. cannot be depended upon.

It is also clear that the continuing economic and political advances of the independent and non-communist countries in the region cannot take place without the certain guarantee that the United States stands ready to assist against outside aggression. A vacillating, unsure America can only contribute to instability in the region and will make peace less secure.

The United States must show that it is prepared to work together with the countries in the Western Pacific area for strengthening their own security, as well as that of the United States. This requires the maintenance, broadening, and deepening of the U. S.-Japan alliance in order that the U. S. and Japan cooperate more closely in assisting develop-

ing countries in the region and it requires a clear understanding by the United States of the responsibility of power, an understanding which has, unfortunately, been somewhat dimmed in the past several years.

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